threat-hunting
Skill401 starsChanged 56 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when hunting threats or engineering detections — ATT&CK Detection-Strategies, Sigma + correlation with Detection-as-Code CI, Windows endpoint hunting (Sysmon/ETW/LSASS/LOLBins), network C2 hunting (JA4+, beaconing, DNS tunneling), cloud-identity hunting, Atomic Red Team purple-team validation
12 other projects use a version of this.
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Most recently taken up by
- zhaoxuya520/reverse-skilltheir own version, first seen Nov 14, 2026
- lza6/claw-code-tingfengtheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- allanninal/claude-code-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 17, 2026
- saivarun3407/DFIR-AItheir own version, first seen Oct 15, 2026
- zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill-privatetheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use incident-triage and threat-modeling.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
testified-ossSkillincident-triage
Triage production incidents with severity assessment, root cause hypothesis, impact analysis, and escalation recommendations. Use when analyzing outages, errors, or production issues.
Also in 3 projects that use this
msewellSkillthreat-modeling
Produces structured threat models for software systems using STRIDE on data flow diagrams. Generates DFDs with trust boundaries, identifies threats per element, scores risks, and defines concrete mitigations. Outputs a complete threat model Markdown document through phased, interactive delivery. Use when threat modeling a system, analyzing security threats, identifying attack surfaces, performing STRIDE analysis, assessing security risks in architecture, creating a threat model document, or when the user mentions threat model, attack surface, trust boundaries, STRIDE, or security risk analysis.
Also in 3 projects that use this
Other versions12 projects use a version of this.
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Wrote their own version · 12
- zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill★ 45ksame name
- zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill-private★ 40ksame name
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills★ 489same name
- lza6/claw-code-tingfeng★ 5same name
- jaskaranhundal/usap-skills★ 4same name
- jessefmoore/offensive-claude-code★ 2same name
- allanninal/claude-code-skills★ 1same name
- Quad4-Software/skills★ 1same name
- ftrout/secops-claude-skills★ 0same name
- imMamdouhaboammar/cybersecurity-skills★ 0same name
2 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository38 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- active-directory-attackSkill
- advanced-redteamSkill
- ai-agent-redteamSkill
- ai-securitySkill
- browser-exploitationSkill
- cicd-supply-chainSkill
- cloud-securitySkill
- coding-masterySkill
- container-k8s-escapeSkill
- crypto-analysisSkill
- edr-evasionSkill
- engagement-flowSkill
- engagement-memorySkill
- exploit-developmentSkill
- finding-disciplineSkill
- incident-responseSkill
- initial-accessSkill
- keylogger-archSkill
- malware-analysisSkill
- mobile-pentestSkill
- network-attackSkill
- opsec-disciplineSkill
- privesc-linuxSkill
- privesc-windowsSkill
- recon-osintSkill
- red-team-opsSkill
- reverse-engineeringSkill
- scope-disciplineSkill
- shellcode-devSkill
- threat-model-disciplineSkill
- using-offensive-claudeSkill
- vulnerability-analysisSkill
- web-pentestSkill
- windows-boundariesSkill
- windows-mitigations-bypassSkill
- wireless-rfSkill
- writing-offensive-skillsSkill
The file
Files
Threat Hunting & Detection Engineering
When to Activate
- Hypothesis-driven hunting across endpoint, network, cloud, and identity telemetry
- Writing & shipping detections (Sigma + correlation) as version-controlled code in CI
- Mapping & measuring coverage against MITRE ATT&CK v18 (Detection Strategies / Analytics)
- Hunting Windows post-exploitation: ETW/AMSI tampering, LSASS dumping, LOLBins, injection
- Hunting C2 in encrypted traffic: JA4+/JA4X fingerprints, beaconing, DNS tunneling
- Hunting cloud-identity attacks: Entra device-code/OAuth phishing, PRT theft, CloudTrail abuse
- Purple-team validation: emulate ATT&CK with Atomic Red Team/Caldera, find detection gaps
- Triaging EVTX/Zeek/CloudTrail offline during IR without a SIEM
Technique Map
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
| Hypothesis-driven hunt loop (PEAK/TaHiTI) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | - |
| ATT&CK v18 Detection-Strategies / Analytics mapping | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
| Detection-as-Code CI (lint + compile) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | scripts/dac_validate.py |
| Sysmon 15 PPL + tamper/visibility-gap | T1562.001 | CWE-693 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/sysmon_config_2025.xml |
| ETW / AMSI in-memory patch detection | T1562.001, T1562.002 | CWE-693 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| LSASS credential-access handle hunt | T1003.001 | CWE-522 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| LOLBin / process-tree anomaly hunt | T1218, T1105, T1059 | CWE-78 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| Sigma rule + correlation engineering | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/sigma-rule-engineering.md | scripts/dac_validate.py |
| EVTX triage (Hayabusa/Chainsaw/Velociraptor) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/sigma-rule-engineering.md | scripts/sigma_pipeline.sh |
| JA4+/JA4X C2 fingerprinting | T1071.001 | CWE-300 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| Beaconing / long-conn / prevalence (RITA-style) | T1071, T1571 | CWE-940 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| DNS tunneling / DGA / DoH abuse | T1071.004, T1572 | CWE-940 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| Entra device-code / OAuth consent phishing | T1528, T1566 | CWE-287 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/entra_hunt.kql |
| PRT theft / token replay | T1550.001 | CWE-522 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/entra_hunt.kql |
| AWS CloudTrail abuse / log tampering | T1078.004, T1098, T1562.008 | CWE-269 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/cloudtrail_hunt.py |
| Atomic Red Team / Caldera validation | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/purple-team-validation.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
| Coverage matrix + ATT&CK Navigator + gap report | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/purple-team-validation.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
Quick Start
# 0. Deploy hunting telemetry baseline (Sysmon 15+, PPL self-protected)
sysmon -accepteula -i scripts/sysmon_config_2025.xml # or: sysmon -c <file> to update
# 1. Offline endpoint triage over collected EVTX (no SIEM)
python3 scripts/evtx_hunt.py /cases/host01/EVTX --min-severity medium --json host01.json
# 2. Network: hunt C2 beacons / DNS tunneling over Zeek logs (+ optional JA4 blocklist)
zeek -r capture.pcap LogAscii::use_json=T
python3 scripts/beacon_hunter.py --conn conn.log --dns dns.log \
--ja4-blocklist bad_ja4.txt --min-score 0.7
# 3. Cloud/identity: paste scripts/entra_hunt.kql into Sentinel/Defender;
# triage AWS offline:
python3 scripts/cloudtrail_hunt.py /cases/cloudtrail/ --json ct_findings.json
# 4. Detection-as-Code: lint + compile your Sigma repo for CI (fail-fast)
python3 scripts/dac_validate.py rules/ --backend splunk --pipeline sysmon --fail-on-error
./scripts/sigma_pipeline.sh rules/ build/ splunk microsoft365defender elasticsearch
# 5. Purple-team validate + measure coverage (ATT&CK v18 Navigator layer + gaps)
Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.001 -TestNumbers 1,2,3 # lab only; -Cleanup after
python3 scripts/coverage_matrix.py --rules rules/ --atomic-results atomic_results.json \
--watchlist watchlist.txt --navigator-out attack_layer.json --gaps-out gaps.csvOPSEC & Detection (summary)
| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR) | OPSEC note |
| ETW/AMSI patch | RWX in ntdll/amsi; ScriptBlock w/ AmsiScanBuffer+VirtualProtect | Sigma AMSI/ETW patch rule; Sysmon EID 25; ETW-TI (kernel) | Userland patch defeats single source — correlate EID25 + ETW-TI + behavior |
| Sysmon kill | System 7036/7034, SysmonDrv unload, EPS drop to 0 | Visibility-gap metric on chatty hosts | Sysmon 15 is PPL; attacker kills agent instead — alert on stop/unload |
| LSASS dump | EID 10 handle to lsass + .dmp write | LSASS-access Sigma; access-mask + non-system source | Baseline your own EDR/AV SourceImage set first or you flood the SOC |
| LOLBin abuse | certutil/mshta/regsvr32 + http/decode/scrobj | LOLBin Sigma; parent→child tree anomalies | Hunt cold data first; live triage tips an EDR-aware operator |
| Beaconing | periodic intervals, uniform sizes, low prevalence | beacon_hunter.py CV<0.3; RITA; long-conn on non-interactive port | Need days of logs — small PCAPs inflate FPs |
| JA4X C2 | randomized certs sharing one JA4X (Sliver/Havoc) | JA4 segment-pivot; JA4X blocklist at TLS-terminating proxy | TLS 1.3 encrypts certs — capture at egress/proxy, don't block on FP alone |
| DNS tunneling | long/high-entropy subdomains, TXT volume, NXDOMAIN spikes | DNS entropy/volume scoring; DoH-to-public Sigma | Baseline normal long-FQDN apps (CDNs) before alerting |
| Device-code phish | deviceCode sign-in, broker/OfficeHome AppId, new ASN | entra_hunt.kql #1+#2; Elastic open rules | Baseline sanctioned device-code apps; not every device-code is evil |
| PRT theft | primaryRefreshToken from multi-geo same day | PRT KQL + LSASS/cloudAP endpoint join | Control-plane is the ONLY evidence — retain logs ≥90d before you need them |
| CloudTrail abuse | StopLogging/DeleteTrail, CreateAccessKey for others, Describe* burst | cloudtrail_hunt.py; Athena tamper query | Attackers disable logging early; enable org-wide all-region trail up front |
Deep Dives
- references/methodology-hunt-loop.md — PEAK/TaHiTI hunt loop, ATT&CK v18 Detection Strategies (
DETxxxx) & Analytics (ANxxxx) replacing legacy data sources, Detection-as-Code CI/CD (PTEFv4), visibility-gap detection. - references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md — Sysmon 15 PPL & tamper detection, ETW/AMSI in-memory patch detection (ETW-TI, EID 25, ScriptBlock), LSASS handle hunting, LOLBins & process-tree anomalies.
- references/sigma-rule-engineering.md — Sigma rule anatomy, correlation rules (value_count/temporal), pySigma/sigma-cli compile, Hayabusa/Chainsaw/Velociraptor 0.74 native-Sigma EVTX triage, AI-assisted authoring (SigmaGen/Uncoder).
- references/network-c2-hunting.md — JA4+/JA4S/JA4H/JA4X fingerprinting, Sliver/Havoc shared JA4X, RITA-style beaconing & long-connection stats, DNS tunneling/DGA/DoH, C2 framework signature cheat-sheet.
- references/cloud-identity-hunting.md — Entra device-code phishing (STORM-2372, Tycoon2FA, EvilTokens), OAuth consent abuse, PRT theft, Graph enumeration, AWS CloudTrail abuse & tampering.
- references/purple-team-validation.md — Atomic Red Team unit tests, MITRE Caldera chained emulation, ATT&CK v18-aware coverage matrix, Navigator layer generation, prioritized gap analysis.
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