finding-discipline
Skill401 starsChanged 54 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when about to record, claim, rate the severity of, or report any security finding — before marking anything [CONFIRMED] or writing it into the report
1 other project uses a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- mahumadad/quarrytheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- mahumadad/quarry★ 1same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository38 other files it gives its agents.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 30
Before any finding is recorded or reported:
- Very specific: line 36
Only a [CONFIRMED] survivor goes in the report.
- Very specific: line 42
If a function calls another, read the callee — do not infer what it does from its name.
- Distinctive: line 49
Every claim in a finding carries a confidence grounded in *what you can quote*, not in how it feels:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Finding Discipline
Overview
The Iron Law: No [CONFIRMED] without proof. A finding is a claim about real, demonstrated
impact — not a status code, a reflected string, or a hunch. This is the offensive equivalent of
test-driven development: the proof is the test, and the finding does not exist until it passes.
Violating the letter of this rule is violating its spirit.
The three tiers
[CONFIRMED]— impact demonstrated AND grounded in an evidence artifact that exists on disk.[POSSIBLE]— reachable but the class proof bar is not yet met. Keep digging; do not report as real.[INFO]— true but no security impact at the claimed severity.
The proof bar (per class)
A status code is not impact. See skills/references/finding-evidence-standards.md:
SSRF needs the internal response; IDOR needs another principal's data; RCE needs command output;
XSS needs script execution; open redirect needs an external destination.
Required mechanical gate
Before any finding is recorded or reported:
- Set the structured proof signal and run
python skills/vulnerability-analysis/scripts/validate_findings.py --findings f.json --evidence ./evidence— it rejects ungrounded findings and per-class false positives. - Pass it through the REQUIRED
finding-validatoragent (PASS / KILL / DOWNGRADE). - Only a
[CONFIRMED]survivor goes in the report. Severity must match what was demonstrated (CVSS honest).
See skills/references/finding-validation-runtime.md for the 7-question gate.
Read-first, never name-guess
If a function calls another, read the callee — do not infer what it does from its name.
sanitize(), is_safe(), validate_input() are exactly where vulnerabilities hide; a name is a
claim by the author, not evidence. The same applies to a config key, a decorator, or a CVE title:
open the thing before you reason about it. An unread dependency in a data-flow claim is a hole.
Quote-grounded confidence tiers
Every claim in a finding carries a confidence grounded in what you can quote, not in how it feels:
- High — a direct quote from the artifact (the exact source line, the response body, the decompiled instruction) supports the claim.
- Medium — an explicitly stated assumption bridges a gap you could not directly observe. State the assumption; do not hide it.
- Low — an inference you are flagging as unverified. Acceptable to record, never to report as fact.
This is orthogonal to the [CONFIRMED]/[POSSIBLE]/[INFO] tier (which is about impact); confidence
is about how well-grounded the claim is. A High-confidence claim of a Low-impact bug is still Low.
Red Flags — STOP, downgrade to [POSSIBLE]
- "I'm sure it's exploitable" (but haven't shown impact)
- "The payload reflected, so it's XSS" / "I got a 200, so it works"
- "The DNS callback fired" (SSRF with no internal response)
- "I changed the id and got data" (but it was my own — self-IDOR)
- "It probably works on a real target" (default-deployment unproven)
All of these mean: it is [POSSIBLE], not [CONFIRMED]. Get the evidence.
Rationalizations
| Excuse | Reality |
| "Pattern-matched, clearly vulnerable" | Pattern ≠ exploit. Demonstrate impact or it's POSSIBLE. |
| "I'll attach evidence later" | No artifact on disk = ungrounded = REJECTED now. |
| "Blind RCE counts" | No output / no OOB confirmation = POSSIBLE, not CONFIRMED. |
| "Severity is obviously Critical" | CVSS must reflect demonstrated impact, not the worst case. |
| "The validator is overkill here" | Untested findings are how false positives ship. Run it. |
"The function is called sanitize, so it's safe" | A name is the author's claim, not proof. Read the callee. |
| "The solver timed out, so it's not exploitable" | A tool limit is feasibility:null (manual), never false. |
A short list of CONFIRMED findings beats a long list of POSSIBLEs. Killing a false positive is success.
Does it work?
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People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

