web2-recon
Skill2 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.
- Reads credentials
- Installs packages
8 other projects use a version of this, 7 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- shuvonsec/claude-bug-bountyedited, first seen Oct 8, 2026
- Gabson0x/bountyforgeedited, first seen Sep 16, 2026
- conjure-3301/skillsedited, first seen Aug 17, 2026
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunterword for word, first seen Jul 1, 2026
- awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunteredited, first seen Jun 9, 2026
- Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunteredited, first seen Jun 9, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use agentic-app-audit, client-reverse and 2 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
shuvonsecSkillagentic-app-audit
Black-box security audit of a DEPLOYED AI agent (not the MCP server behind it) — tool-call hijacking, cross-session memory poisoning, confused-deputy via connected tools, agent-to-agent IDOR, excessive agency / unconfirmed destructive actions, and privilege compromise where the agent holds broader perms than the user. Use when the target is a live assistant/agent product with tool access (bookings, email, payments, file/RAG, browsing) rather than a raw LLM chat box or an MCP server you can read.
Also in 3 projects that use this
shuvonsecSkillclient-reverse
Client-side request-signing and anti-bot token reversal for bug bounty — when a request carries a sign/sig/hmac/token/nonce/timestamp/X-Sensor header that Burp Repeater cannot replay, recover the signer just enough to reproduce the request outside the client. Packet-first staging (capture real request → prove replay works → only reverse if replay fails) across the locate→recover→runtime→validation→replay spine. Covers tracing backward from the signature field (writer→builder→entry→source), isolating user-mutable sign inputs (timestamp/nonce/deviceId/body) vs constants (secret key), hooking fetch/XHR in DevTools, JS deobfuscation basics (webpack/wasm/JSVMP), and the bounty payoff: reach the protected API to then hunt IDOR/auth/business-logic. Use when Burp/mitmproxy replay of a signed or anti-bot-gated request fails and you suspect a client-computed field is blocking you.
Also in 3 projects that use this
- +2 more from shuvonsec
Other versions8 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter★ 5.5k100% same
Edited · 7
- shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty★ 5.5k56% same
- awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter★ 5.5k56% same
- Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter★ 5.5k56% same
- Gabson0x/bountyforge★ 43129% same
- Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty★ 398% same
- conjure-3301/skills★ 0100% same
- hhjkjkjk/Claude-skills★ 0100% same
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository255 other files it gives its agents.
- ad-acl-abuseSkill
- ad-adcs-access-and-relaySkill
- ad-adcs-persistenceSkill
- ad-adcs-template-abuseSkill
- ad-ad-discoverySkill
- ad-ad-persistenceSkill
- ad-auth-coercion-relaySkill
- ad-credential-dumpingSkill
- ad-gpo-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberos-delegationSkill
- ad-kerberos-roastingSkill
- ad-kerberos-ticket-forgingSkill
- ad-pass-the-hashSkill
- ad-sccm-exploitationSkill
- ad-trust-attacksSkill
- hunt-ntlm-infoSkill
- offensive-active-directorySkill
- hunt-llm-aiSkill
- hunt-rag-vectorSkill
- offensive-ai-securitySkill
- cloud-iam-deepSkill
- hunt-cloud-misconfigSkill
- hunt-k8sSkill
- m365-entra-attackSkill
- network-container-escapesSkill
- offensive-cloudSkill
- offensive-container-escapeSkill
- offensive-k8s-attacksSkill
- okta-attackSkill
- vmware-vcenter-attackSkill
- credential-password-sprayingSkill
- hunt-brute-forceSkill
- hunt-forgot-passwordSkill
- post-exploit-credential-recoverySkill
- meme-coin-auditSkill
- offensive-crypto-attacksSkill
- web3-auditSkill
- ctfSkill
- advisory-miningSkill
- auth-bypassSkill
- code-injection-codegenSkill
- command-injectionSkill
- cross-pollinationSkill
- cve-hunting-methodologySkill
- decompression-bombSkill
- entity-expansionSkill
- fp-checkSkill
- method-clobberingSkill
- path-traversalSkill
- prototype-pollutionSkill
- recursion-dosSkill
- redosSkill
- sandbox-escapeSkill
- target-reconSkill
- web2-vuln-classesSkill
- evasion-av-edr-evasionSkill
- offensive-anti-forensicsSkill
- offensive-edr-evasionSkill
- offensive-keylogger-archSkill
- offensive-mitigationsSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
10 rules. 6 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
6
Common
Most of the 7 edited versions we read keep these.
4
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Common: line 46
All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
- Common: line 47
No API endpoints visible in URLs
- Common: line 48
No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
- Common: line 50
No forms, no authentication, no user data
- Common: line 236
4-5: Only if nothing better available
- Common: line 243
All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
- Distinctive: line 404
Run the standard pipeline above.
- Distinctive: line 408
Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.
- Distinctive: line 416
Look for endpoints not in your URL list
- Distinctive: line 629
Always grep JS bundles for plausible sibling TLDs:
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 7 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
WEB2 RECON PIPELINE
Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.
SETUP (one-time)
# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc
# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates
# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF
# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-clientTHE 5-MINUTE RULE
If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.
5-minute kill signals:
- All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
- No API endpoints visible in URLs
- No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
- nuclei returns 0 medium/high findings
- No forms, no authentication, no user data
STANDARD RECON PIPELINE
Pre-Hunt: Always Run First
TARGET="target.com"
# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
| jq -r '.[].name_value' \
| sed 's/\*\.//g' \
| sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"
# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
-H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
| jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"
# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"
# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt
echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"
# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt
# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt
echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"
# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txtOutput to Organized Directory
TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR
# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txtATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE
Find Interesting Targets in URL List
# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt
# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt
# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt
# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt
# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txtgf Patterns (Quick Classification)
# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txtJS ANALYSIS
SecretFinder (API keys, tokens in JS bundles)
# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli
# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
echo "=== $url ==="
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivateLinkFinder (Endpoints hidden in JS)
source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate
# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli
# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli
deactivateDIRECTORY FUZZING
ffuf — Standard Fuzzing
# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
-w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
-ac \
-t 40 \
-o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json
# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
-w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
-ac \
-t 20
# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
-request-proto https \
-w <(seq 1 10000) \
-fc 404 \
-ac \
-t 10TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO
Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.
| Criterion | Points |
| Max bounty >= $5K | +2 |
| Large user base (>100K) or handles money | +2 |
| Program launched < 60 days ago | +2 |
| Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL | +1 |
| Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog) | +1 |
| Private program (less competition) | +1 |
| Tech stack you know | +1 |
| Source code available | +1 |
| Prior disclosed reports to study | +1 |
< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week
Pre-Dive Hard Kill Signals
- Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
- All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
- Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
- Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
- Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules
TECH STACK DETECTION (2 min)
# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"
# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails
# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)Stack → Primary Bug Class Map
| Stack | Hunt First | Hunt Second |
| Ruby on Rails | Mass assignment | IDOR (:id routes) |
| Django | IDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms) | SSTI (mark_safe) |
| Flask | SSTI (render_template_string) | SSRF (requests lib) |
| Laravel | Mass assignment ($fillable) | IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership) |
| Express (Node.js) | Prototype pollution | Path traversal |
| Spring Boot | Actuator endpoints (/actuator/env) | SSTI (Thymeleaf) |
| ASP.NET | ViewState deserialization | Open redirect (ReturnUrl) |
| Next.js | SSRF via Server Actions | Open redirect via redirect() |
| GraphQL | Introspection → auth bypass on mutations | IDOR via node(id:) |
| WordPress | Plugin SQLi | REST API auth bypass |
CONTINUOUS MONITORING SETUP
Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.
New Subdomain Alerts (daily cron)
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
-H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
| jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))
if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi
# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.shGitHub Commit Watch
#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"
CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
# Get changed files
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
| jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi
# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.shPORT SCANNING (often skipped — don't skip)
# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt
# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES
# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null
# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate
# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/nullGITHUB DORKING FOR TARGET
# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName" # Check their GitHub org
# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"
# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20
# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org30-MINUTE RECON PROTOCOL
Minutes 0-5: Read Program Page
Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)Minutes 5-15: Asset Discovery
Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.
Minutes 15-25: Surface Map
Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.
Minutes 25-30: Manual Exploration
Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:
- Register an account
- Perform main user actions (create/read/update/delete resources)
- Note all API calls in Burp history
- Look for endpoints not in your URL list
After 30 min: Prioritize
Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidatesToolchain fallback (when dnsx / httpx crash)
The projectdiscovery Go binaries (dnsx, httpx, naabu) occasionally SIGSEGV on macOS arm64 due to a cgo / system-resolver interaction. The crash signature is identical regardless of install method — both brew install and go install github.com/projectdiscovery/<tool>@latest produce binaries that segfault at the same address. Smoke-test once before relying on them in a real engagement:
dnsx -version # if SIGSEGV: use the dig fallback below
httpx -version # if SIGSEGV: use the curl fallback belowdnsx → dig fallback
# Replaces: dnsx -l subs.txt -a -resp -silent
while read s; do
ips=$(dig +short +tries=1 +time=3 "$s" \
| grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' \
| paste -sd, -)
[ -n "$ips" ] && echo "$s|$ips"
done < subs.txthttpx → curl fallback
# Replaces: httpx -l subs.txt -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect
while read s; do
resp=$(curl -s -L -m 5 -o /tmp/body \
-w "%{http_code}|%{url_effective}|%{header_server}" \
"https://$s")
code=$(echo "$resp" | cut -d'|' -f1)
if [ "$code" != "000" ]; then
title=$(grep -oE '<title[^>]*>[^<]*</title>' /tmp/body | head -1 | sed 's/<[^>]*>//g')
echo "$s|$resp|$title"
fi
done < subs.txtTrade-off: Serial vs. concurrent. The fallback handles ~24 subdomains in 14 seconds; the same workload on httpx with default 50 threads finishes in 2-3 seconds. For VDP-scale recon (< 100 subdomains) the fallback is fine. For mass recon (1000+) fix the toolchain first.
Verified against HackerOne's own VDP in docs/verification/recon-hackerone-vdp.md.
API Spec / Swagger / OpenAPI Discovery (2024-2026 surface)
API spec endpoints are the single highest-leverage recon target on any modern .NET / Node / Python / Java backend. The spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON. Default routes are commonly left enabled in production. Add this wordlist to the directory-fuzzing phase (after the standard common.txt pass).
Default discovery path wordlist (paste into swagger-paths.txt)
# NSwag / Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)
/swagger
/swagger/
/swagger/index.html
/swagger/ui/index.html
/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/swagger/v2/swagger.json
/swagger/v3/swagger.json
/swagger/docs/v1
/swagger/docs/v2
/swagger-ui
/swagger-ui/
/swagger-ui.html
/swagger-resources
/swagger-resources/configuration/ui
/nswag
/nswag/index.html
/api/swagger
/api/swagger.json
/api/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/api/openapi
/api/openapi.json
/api/v1/swagger.json
/api/v2/swagger.json
/api-docs
/api-docs/swagger.json
# OpenAPI generic
/openapi
/openapi.json
/openapi.yaml
/openapi.yml
/openapi/v1.json
/openapi/v2.json
/openapi/v3.json
/.well-known/openapi.json
# Java / Spring (Springfox / springdoc)
/v2/api-docs
/v3/api-docs
/v3/api-docs.yaml
/v3/api-docs/swagger-config
/swagger-ui/index.html
# Python (FastAPI / Flask-RESTPlus / Connexion / DRF)
/docs
/docs/
/redoc
/redoc/
/openapi.json
/swagger.json
/swagger/?format=openapi
/swagger.yaml
# Express / Node / Hapi
/api-docs
/api-docs.json
/swagger.json
/swagger-stats
/graphql-docs
# GraphQL adjacent (often co-located)
/graphql
/graphiql
/playground
/altair
/voyager
/graphql/console
/graphql-explorer
# ReDoc / RapiDoc / Stoplight / alt UIs
/redoc
/redoc.html
/redoc-ui.html
/rapidoc
/rapidoc.html
/stoplight
/elements
# Misc / dev-leftover
/actuator
/actuator/openapi
/actuator/mappings
/q/openapi
/q/swagger-ui
/docs/swagger.json
/api/v1/docs
/api/v2/docs
/internal/swagger
/admin/swagger
/management/swaggerIntegration with the standard pipeline
# After live-hosts.txt is built (Phase 1 / 2), run:
ffuf -w swagger-paths.txt -u "https://FUZZ.target.com" -mc 200,302 -fs 0 -t 50 -o swagger-hits.json
# Or with httpx for content-aware filtering:
httpx -l live-hosts.txt -path swagger-paths.txt -mc 200 -mr "swagger|openapi" -json | tee swagger-hits.jsonl
# For every hit:
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json > endpoints.txt
jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json > schemas.json # mass-assignment field candidatesWhy this matters for recon-to-hunting handoff
- Spec → mass IDOR/BOLA —
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.jsonbecomes the input list forAutorize/ffufper-user testing. - Spec → mass-assignment payload construction —
components.schemas.UserUpdateDtoenumeratesisAdmin,emailVerified,tenantId,role. - Spec → hidden endpoint discovery —
/internal/*,/debug/*,/v0/*,/legacy/*routes documented but never auth-gated. - Spec → injection-class seeding — every parameter's type + format + enum + max-length means payloads pass validation before reaching the sink. Especially valuable against ASP.NET Core where the model binder rejects malformed input before any controller logic.
Tools
kiterunner— natively ingests OpenAPI spec, generates requests against the API.sj(Swagger Jacker) — purpose-built for Swagger spec exploitation.apidetector(brinhosa) — Swagger-UI mass scanner.XSSwagger(vavkamil) — detects vulnerable Swagger UI versions (CVE-2018-25031 family).nuclei -t http/exposures/apis/— built-in templates for default spec paths.
Anti-pattern reminder
A 404/403 on /swagger does NOT mean no spec is exposed. Many .NET projects route the spec under /api/swagger/v1/swagger.json rather than /swagger. Always test the full path list, not just the root.
Full attack-chain analysis is in hunt-api-misconfig → NSwag / Swagger / OpenAPI Spec Exposure.
Related Skills & Chains
offensive-osint— When recon needs concrete probes / wordlists / regexes beyond the basic pipeline. Workflow primitive: this skill produces the URL set;offensive-osintprovides the secret regexes, GraphQL/Swagger paths, and identity-fabric probes you apply to that URL set.osint-methodology— When you need a severity rubric for what you discovered. Workflow primitive: after recon outputssubdomains.txt/live-hosts.txt/urls.txt, score each asset againstosint-methodology's findings rubric to decide what gets a finding versus what stays in the asset graph.hunt-subdomain— When recon surfaces stale CNAMEs / dangling DNS. Workflow primitive: any subdomain insubdomains.txtwhose CNAME points to S3 / GitHub Pages / Heroku / Shopify / Azure should auto-route tohunt-subdomainfor takeover validation.security-arsenal— When the URL set is classified bygfand ready for active testing. Workflow primitive:gf xss/ssrf/sqli/idoroutput names become payload-class queries againstsecurity-arsenal's payload library.bb-methodology— When recon completes and Phase 1 transitions to Phase 2 (Mapping). Workflow primitive: hand the live host + URL set back tobb-methodologyPhase 2 for endpoint mapping and Phase 3 vulnerability discovery routing.
Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)
Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream pipeline covers the WHAT; this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.
Cross-TLD pivot discipline
Phase 2C's HackerOne VDP recon walked from hackerone.com (24 subdomains) into a sister TLD hacker.one (12 more subdomains found in JS bundle references). Operators who only enumerate *.target.com miss attack surface that the target legitimately operates on a different domain.
Always grep JS bundles for plausible sibling TLDs:
# pull all JS, grep for sibling-TLD candidates
for url in $(cat live-hosts.txt); do
curl -s "$url" | grep -oE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'
done | sort -u > js-urls.txt
# then on each JS file
for j in $(cat js-urls.txt); do
curl -s "$j" | grep -oE '[a-z0-9.-]+\.(io|app|one|dev|test|cloud|ai|co)' | sort -u
done | sort -u > sibling-tld-candidates.txtCommon sibling-TLD patterns: target.com → target.io / target.app / target.one / target.dev / target.test / target-corp.com / target-cdn.net. Always validate via WHOIS or by checking if the cert chain trusts the same internal CA before treating the sister TLD as in-scope.
Subdomain wordlist priorities by 2026
Top discovery prefixes by hit rate against enterprise VDPs in our 2024-2026 corpus:
mta-sts.* api.* docs.*
dev-* staging-* *-qa
*-stage *-uat events.*
portal.* customer.* partner.*
vendor.* internal-* admin-*
employee-* hr.* jobs.*
sso.* auth.* id.*Internal-looking subdomains often expose more surface than the marketing site — partner.target.com and vendor-portal.target.com frequently have weaker auth than the main app because they're scoped for "trusted" external users. Always send a probe to the long-tail wordlist after the standard subfinder run completes.
Live-host probe: how to fingerprint stack quickly
curl -sI <host> headers are 80% of the fingerprint:
Server:— apache / nginx / cloudflare / kestrel (= .NET Core) / openresty / envoyX-Powered-By:— PHP version, ASP.NET version, Express.jsX-Drupal-Cache,X-Generator: Drupal 9— DrupalX-Generator: WordPress— WordPressVia:— CDN chain (1.1 varnish, 1.1 cloudfront)Set-Cookie:names —JSESSIONID(Java),PHPSESSID(PHP),ASP.NET_SessionId(.NET),connect.sid(Express),laravel_session(Laravel)
JS bundle filename patterns:
/_next/static/= Next.js/_nuxt/= Nuxt/assets/static/with hash filenames = Vite/static/js/main.*.chunk.js= Create React Appruntime.*.js + polyfills.*.js + main.*.js= Angular CLI
The first 10s of recon should yield a stack guess; the rest is targeting. If your fingerprint contradicts itself (Server says nginx, Set-Cookie says ASP.NET) you've found a reverse proxy front-end — note the origin app for later smuggling/cache attacks.
GitHub Pages 404 vs takeover signal
Critical distinction operators get wrong:
- "Page not found · GitHub Pages" with HTTP 404 means the repo EXISTS — NOT a takeover.
- "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here" means the repo was deleted — TAKEOVER candidate.
Same distinction for CloudFront:
- "Error - 404" with
Server: CloudFront= distribution exists, origin returned 404 — NOT a takeover. - "The request could not be satisfied" with
X-Cache: Error from cloudfront= origin missing entirely — potential takeover.
Phase 2C verified both patterns live. Always check the EXACT response body string before filing a takeover finding — the takeover-scanner tools (subzy, subjack) match on multiple fingerprints and frequently false-positive on the "still owned, just empty" case.
Toolchain fallback
Already covered in this file's Phase 2C addition. Quick reminder: dnsx/httpx may segfault on macOS arm64; the dig+curl fallback works for < 100-host runs in ~14 seconds. Don't burn an hour debugging Go binary panics when the fallback gets you to the same URL set.
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