prototype-pollution
Skill2 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Detect prototype pollution via object merge/clone/assign operations where __proto__ or constructor.prototype keys can modify Object.prototype.
10 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- mahumadad/quarrytheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- awarexone/AXguardtheir own version, first seen Sep 15, 2026
- emre-guler/websectheir own version, first seen Aug 27, 2026
- conjure-3301/skillstheir own version, first seen Aug 17, 2026
- Kur1sulab/blackboxtheir own version, first seen Aug 12, 2026
- thejefflarson/soundchecktheir own version, first seen Jul 31, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use mass-assignment, csrf and 8 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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- +1 more from blacklanternsecurity
Other versions10 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 10
- yaklang/hack-skills★ 2.4ksame name
- thejefflarson/soundcheck★ 20same name
- awarexone/AXguard★ 17same name
- langbyyi/websec-skills★ 4same name
- Kur1sulab/blackbox★ 3same name
- emre-guler/websec★ 2same name
- JustineDevs/premortem★ 2same name
- KaanBicaklar/mona-sast-skills★ 2same name
- mahumadad/quarry★ 1same name
- conjure-3301/skills★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 9 edited versions we read keep these.
2
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 20
Key insight: Only ~50% acceptance rate.
- Distinctive: line 36
Look for patterns where object keys from user input are used as property paths:
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 9 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Prototype Pollution Detection
When to Use
Audit merge/clone/deep-assign utilities, query string parsers, JSON parsers, config mergers, and any package that recursively sets object properties from untrusted input.
Key insight: Only ~50% acceptance rate. Must demonstrate REAL impact beyond just polluting prototype.
Process
Step 1: Find Object Manipulation Sinks
grep -rn "Object\.assign\|Object\.defineProperty\|Object\.create" .
grep -rn "merge\|extend\|deepMerge\|deepExtend\|deepAssign\|mixin" .
grep -rn "clone\|deepClone\|cloneDeep\|deepCopy" .
grep -rn "set\|setPath\|setValue\|lodash\.set\|_.set" .
grep -rn "\[.*\]\s*=" . --include="*.js" # Bracket notation assignmentStep 2: Check for Recursive Property Setting
Look for patterns where object keys from user input are used as property paths:
// VULNERABLE: recursive merge without key filtering
function merge(target, source) {
for (const key in source) {
if (typeof source[key] === 'object') {
target[key] = merge(target[key] || {}, source[key]);
} else {
target[key] = source[key];
}
}
}Step 3: Check Key Filtering
grep -rn "__proto__\|constructor\|prototype" . | grep -i "filter\|block\|skip\|ignore\|reject"
grep -rn "Object\.create(null)" . # Null prototype objects are safe
grep -rn "hasOwnProperty\|Object\.keys\|Object\.entries" .Step 4: Assess Impact
Prototype pollution alone is often not enough. Look for impact:
- DoS: Polluted property causes TypeError crash (toString, valueOf)
- Property injection: Polluted property affects security logic (isAdmin, role, auth)
- Gadget chains: Polluted property reaches dangerous sink (eval, template)
- Method clobbering: toString/valueOf overwritten causing crash
Dangerous Keys
| Key | Effect | Impact |
__proto__ | Sets properties on Object.prototype | All objects affected |
constructor.prototype | Same effect via constructor chain | All objects affected |
constructor | Overwrites constructor reference | Type confusion |
toString | Overwrites string conversion | TypeError on string operations |
valueOf | Overwrites value conversion | TypeError on comparisons |
hasOwnProperty | Overwrites property check | Logic bypass |
CVSS Guidance
- Proto pollution + RCE gadget chain: CRITICAL 9.8
- Proto pollution + auth bypass: HIGH 8.1
- Proto pollution + DoS (crash): HIGH 7.5
- Proto pollution with no demonstrated impact: MEDIUM 5.3 (often rejected)
References
- Sinks -- Object manipulation sinks
- False Positive Indicators
- PoC Skeleton
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