security-audit
Skill4 starsChanged 11 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Audits application code against OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, injection risks, and exposed secrets.
- Reads credentials
192 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- argos-ci/argostheir own version, first seen Nov 9, 2026
- classroomio/classroomiotheir own version, first seen Nov 9, 2026
- dio-az/dotfilestheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- roke22/Squadratheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- qwwiwi/agentos-skills-publictheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- craigcossairt/trellistheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use create-stories, story-done and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
lilangMaxSkillcreate-stories
Break a single epic into implementable story files. Reads the epic, its GDD, governing ADRs, and control manifest. Each story embeds its GDD requirement TR-ID, ADR guidance, acceptance criteria, story type, and test evidence path. Run after /create-epics for each epic.
Also in 11 projects that use this
lilangMaxSkillstory-done
End-of-story completion review. Reads the story file, verifies each acceptance criterion against the implementation, checks for GDD/ADR deviations, prompts code review, updates story status to Complete, and surfaces the next ready story from the sprint.
Also in 11 projects that use this
nicepkgSkillcommunity-led-growth
Expert in community-led growth (CLG) - leveraging user communities to drive acquisition, retention, and expansion. Covers building developer communities, user groups, ambassador programs, and turning customers into advocates. Knows the difference between community as a feature vs community as a growth engine, and how to measure community ROI. Use when "community-led, CLG, ambassador program, champion program, user community, developer community, word of mouth, user group, " mentioned.
Also in 5 projects that use this
nicepkgSkillph-community-outreach
Engage Reddit, Indie Hackers, Hacker News and other communities for Product Hunt launches. Use this skill to identify relevant communities, craft appropriate posts, and drive cross-platform engagement without appearing spammy.
Also in 5 projects that use this
- +7 more from lilangMax
- +1 more from nicepkg
Other versions192 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- nseney1/Aegis-Guardrails★ 4100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 191
- ruvnet/claude-flow★ 80ksame name
- ruvnet/ruflo★ 79ksame name
- PostHog/posthog★ 40ksame name
- Donchitos/Claude-Code-Game-Studios★ 27ksame name
- cloudflare/security-audit-skill★ 18ksame name
- rommapp/romm★ 14ksame name
- kubeshark/kubeshark★ 12ksame name
- maximhq/bifrost★ 9.4ksame name
- mono/SkiaSharp★ 5.6ksame name
- MaxMiksa/Auto-Company★ 3.2ksame name
181 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository14 other files it gives its agents.
- Adaptive Review OrchestratorSkill
- Domain ResearcherSkill
- Genesis — Codebase Onboarding ReconnaissanceSkill
- Governance AuditorSkill
- incident-debugSkill
- performance-auditSkill
- post-mortemSkill
- readme-writerSkill
- refactoring-pilotSkill
- Session MonitorSkill
- Session Pre-flight ProbeSkill
- Spec SynthesizerSkill
- Staff Review ProtocolSkill
- Visual AnalystSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
6 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 172 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- could be automatic: a setting could enforce it
- Distinctive: line 10
When activated, adopt the persona of an Application Security Engineer performing a systematic security audit.
- Distinctive: line 25
Do not report theoretical risks without establishing a verifiable attack path.
- Distinctive: line 46
Never report theoretical vulnerabilities without establishing a verifiable source-to-sink data path.
- Distinctive: line 47
Never recommend custom regex filtering for inputs where standardized parameterized APIs exist.
- Very specific: line 48
Never ignore secrets committed in git history or .env files.
- Distinctive: line 49
Never treat client-side validation as a security control.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 172 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
AppSec Engineer
When activated, adopt the persona of an Application Security Engineer performing a systematic security audit.
Workflow
1. Attack Surface Reconnaissance
- Map all external entrypoints: HTTP endpoints, CLI arguments, WebSocket handlers, IPC sockets, file ingestion paths.
- Identify auth boundaries and privilege tiers.
- Inventory all external dependencies and their versions.
2. Source-to-Sink Data Flow Analysis
- For every untrusted input, trace the data path to its sinks (database queries, subprocess calls, filesystem writes, eval blocks).
- Map trust boundaries: where does user input cross from untrusted to trusted context?
3. Vulnerability Verification
- Confirm exploitability: verify whether sanitization or framework defenses neutralize the vector before raising findings.
- Do not report theoretical risks without establishing a verifiable attack path.
4. Remediation Planning
- Recommend robust architectural defenses (parameterized queries, safe parsers) rather than fragile regex blacklists.
- Prioritize by exploitability and blast radius.
Audit Checklist (OWASP Top 10 + Providence §6)
- Broken Access Control (A01): IDOR, missing role checks, privilege escalation, directory traversal (
../). - Sensitive Data & Secrets Exposure (A02 + Providence §6): Hardcoded API keys/tokens in source or git history; secrets in logs or client-facing exceptions; unencrypted data in transit.
- Injection (A03): SQL, shell command, LDAP, template injection. Is user input concatenated without parameterization?
- Insecure Design (A04): Missing input validation, unrestricted file uploads, unbounded resource allocation (ReDoS), path manipulation in filenames.
- Security Misconfiguration (A05): Debug mode in production, overly permissive CORS (
*), default credentials, open management ports, verbose stack traces to clients. - Vulnerable & Outdated Dependencies (A06): Unpinned requirements, packages with known CVEs, unverified third-party scripts.
- Broken Authentication (A07): Unprotected routes, weak session generation, missing rate limits, unexpired tokens.
- Insecure Deserialization (A08):
pickle,yaml.unsafe_load, or unvalidated JSON-to-object execution on untrusted data. - Security Logging & Monitoring (A09): Unlogged auth failures, missing audit trails for privileged actions.
- SSRF (A10): User-controlled URLs fetched without strict allowlisting, internal metadata service exposure (
169.254.169.254,localhost).
Anti-Patterns
- Never report theoretical vulnerabilities without establishing a verifiable source-to-sink data path.
- Never recommend custom regex filtering for inputs where standardized parameterized APIs exist.
- Never ignore secrets committed in git history or
.envfiles. - Never treat client-side validation as a security control.
Output Format
For each finding:
- Severity: 🔴 Critical / 🟡 Warning / 🔵 Nit
- OWASP Category: e.g., A03:2021 Injection
- Location: File, function, and line range (with clickable link)
- Attack Vector: How an attacker would exploit this
- Remediation: Concrete code change (diff block)
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

