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mejbaurbaharmejbaurbahar/software-tester-skills/skills/security-testing/SKILL.md

security-testing

Skill1 starsChanged 52 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use for authorized security/penetration testing of web apps and APIs — OWASP Top 10 checks, auth/session testing, header/config audits, and vulnerability triage. Only for systems the user owns or has explicit authorization to test.

9 other projects use a version of this, 1 of them edited.

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SKILL.md

Security Testing

Scope guardrail: test only systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test (your product, client engagements, CTFs, in-scope bug bounties). Prefer staging with synthetic data. Do not run destructive payloads, denial-of-service, or mass scans of third-party infrastructure; propose a safe alternative instead.

Approach

  1. Model threats first (threat-modeling): assets, entry points, trust boundaries.
  2. Automate the cheap wins in CI: static analysis (static-analysis-testing), dependency and secret scanning (supply-chain-dependency-testing), IaC/container checks (iac-container-security-testing).
  3. Test authentication and authorization deliberately (authn-authz-testing); this is where the worst bugs live.
  4. Manually probe business logic: automation cannot understand your rules.
  5. Report, fix, and add a regression test for every finding.

OWASP Top 10 quick-check pass

RiskWhat to check
Broken access controlObject IDs across users/tenants (IDOR), function-level checks (can a normal user call an admin route?), path traversal on file endpoints, forced browsing
Cryptographic failuresSecrets/PII in plaintext (logs, DB, responses), HTTPS everywhere + HSTS, weak/default credentials on new installs, sensitive data in URLs
InjectionSQL/NoSQL/OS/LDAP/template injection in every input incl. headers and filenames; use parameterized queries and output encoding
Insecure designNo rate limit on login/reset/OTP, business rules trusting client values (price, role), missing abuse-case handling
Security misconfigurationVerbose errors/stack traces, default admin panels, directory listing, debug mode, open cloud storage, missing headers
Vulnerable/outdated componentsKnown-CVE libraries and plugins (SCA scan), unsupported runtimes
Authentication failuresWeak password policy, no lockout, session not rotated on login, tokens not invalidated on logout, predictable IDs, MFA gaps
Software/data integrityUnsigned updates/webhooks, insecure deserialization, CI/CD exposure
Logging & monitoring failuresNo audit trail for privileged actions, no alerting on repeated failures
SSRFAny server-side "fetch this URL" feature (webhooks, image/PDF from URL) must block internal ranges and cloud metadata addresses

Fast header and cookie audit

curl -sI https://staging.example.com | grep -iE "strict-transport|content-security|x-content-type|x-frame|referrer-policy|permissions-policy|set-cookie|server|x-powered-by"

Expect: Strict-Transport-Security, a Content-Security-Policy that is strict yet does not break legitimate features, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, frame-ancestors or X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy; cookies Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite; no version banners.

Session and account flows

Session ID changes after login (fixation) · logout invalidates the token server-side (replay the old token) · password-reset tokens are single-use, short-lived and not leaked via URL/referrer · MFA cannot be skipped via another endpoint · multi-tenant isolation on every read and write.

Tools (use only on authorized targets)

PurposeTools
Intercepting proxy, manual testingBurp Suite, OWASP ZAP, mitmproxy
Automated baseline scan on stagingZAP baseline/API scan, Nuclei templates
Static/secret/dependency scanningSemgrep, CodeQL, gitleaks, Trivy, OSV-Scanner
TLStestssl.sh, sslyze
API contract security42crunch-api-security-testing

Triage and severity

Rate by real-world exploitability and impact, not only category: an unauthenticated IDOR leaking personal data is Critical; a missing header on a static marketing page is Minor. Reproduce, document minimal steps, and share findings through the private channel your team uses. Do not put working exploit chains in widely shared reports beyond what is needed to verify the fix. Use bug-reporting.

Related

security-owasp, security-hardening, authn-authz-testing, threat-modeling, static-analysis-testing, supply-chain-dependency-testing, compliance-testing

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