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liushikuan63liushikuan63/Qoder-Optimization/skills/redis-security/SKILL.md

redis-security

Skill2 starsChanged 14 days agoMITView on GitHub

Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands。中文触发:Redis 缓存 键值 TTL 集群 鉴权 安全

4 other projects use a version of this, 4 of them edited.

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3 rules. 1 is common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • 1

    Common

    Most of the 4 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 0

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

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  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Common:

    Never run a production Redis without a password.

    line 23
  2. Very specific:

    If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" …

    line 43
  3. Very specific:

    If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache …

    line 71

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 4 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

When to apply

  • Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
  • Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
  • Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
  • Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key
r = redis.Redis(
    host="localhost",
    port=6380,
    password="your-strong-password",
    ssl=True,
    ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See references/auth.md.

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan

# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous

# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

CategoryWhat it covers
@readRead commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@writeWrite commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerousFLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@adminAdministrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See references/acls.md.

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.0.2.100
protected-mode yes
# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.0.2.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""

See references/network.md.

References

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