redis-security
Skill2 starsChanged 14 days agoMITView on GitHub
Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands。中文触发:Redis 缓存 键值 TTL 集群 鉴权 安全
4 other projects use a version of this, 4 of them edited.
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- redis/agent-skillsedited, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- vemetric/vemetricedited, first seen Oct 8, 2026
- ElyzeSolutions/skillsedited, first seen Aug 6, 2026
- jgamaraalv/delivery-loopedited, first seen Jul 4, 2026
Other versions4 projects use a version of this.
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Edited · 4
- vemetric/vemetric★ 39891% same
- redis/agent-skills★ 17491% same
- ElyzeSolutions/skills★ 191% same
- jgamaraalv/delivery-loop★ 089% same
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 1 is common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
1
Common
Most of the 4 edited versions we read keep these.
0
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Common: line 23
Never run a production Redis without a password.
- Very specific: line 43
If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" …
- Very specific: line 71
If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache …
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 4 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Redis Security
Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.
When to apply
- Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
- Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
- Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
- Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.
1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)
Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.
# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file /path/to/redis.keyr = redis.Redis(
host="localhost",
port=6380,
password="your-strong-password",
ssl=True,
ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.
See references/auth.md.
2. ACLs for least-privilege access
The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.
# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan
# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer on >password ~* +@all -@dangerous
# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin on >strong-password ~* +@allUseful command categories:
| Category | What it covers |
@read | Read commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...) |
@write | Write commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...) |
@dangerous | FLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc. |
@admin | Administrative commands |
If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.
See references/acls.md.
3. Restrict network access
The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:
# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.0.2.100
protected-mode yes# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.0.2.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROPAnti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.
Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:
rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""See references/network.md.
References
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