AgentsConfigHelper / rules
Cursor rule2 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
XML security and safe deserialization (DTD/XXE hardening, schema validation, no unsafe native deserialization)
We split this codeguard-0-xml-and-serialization.mdc into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈4
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 46
If DTDs cannot be completely disabled:
- Distinctive: line 89
Never deserialize untrusted native objects.
- Distinctive: line 100
No network access during parsing.
- Distinctive: line 101
No unsafe native deserialization.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 6,350 Cursor rule files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
---
description: XML security and safe deserialization (DTD/XXE hardening, schema validation, no unsafe native deserialization)
globs: **/*.c,**/*.go,**/*.h,**/*.java,**/*.php,**/*.py,**/*.pyi,**/*.pyx,**/*.rb,**/*.wsdl,**/*.xml,**/*.xsd,**/*.xslt
version: 1.0.1
---
rule_id: codeguard-0-xml-and-serialization
## XML & Serialization Hardening
Secure parsing and processing of XML and serialized data; prevent XXE, entity expansion, SSRF, DoS, and unsafe deserialization across platforms.
### XML Parser Hardening
- Disable DTDs and external entities by default; reject DOCTYPE declarations.
- Validate strictly against local, trusted XSDs; set explicit limits (size, depth, element counts).
- Sandbox or block resolver access; no network fetches during parsing; monitor for unexpected DNS activity.
#### Java
General principle:
```java
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
```
Disabling DTDs protects against XXE and Billion Laughs attacks. If DTDs cannot be disabled, disable external entities using parser-specific methods.
### Java
Java parsers have XXE enabled by default.
DocumentBuilderFactory/SAXParserFactory/DOM4J:
```java
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
String FEATURE = null;
try {
// PRIMARY defense - disallow DTDs completely
FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl";
dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, true);
dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
logger.info("ParserConfigurationException was thrown. The feature '" + FEATURE
+ "' is not supported by your XML processor.");
}
```
If DTDs cannot be completely disabled:
```java
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
String[] featuresToDisable = {
"http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities",
"http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities",
"http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd"
};
for (String feature : featuresToDisable) {
try {
dbf.setFeature(feature, false);
} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
logger.info("ParserConfigurationException was thrown. The feature '" + feature
+ "' is probably not supported by your XML processor.");
}
}
dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
dbf.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
```
#### .NET
```csharp
var settings = new XmlReaderSettings { DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit, XmlResolver = null };
var reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
```
#### Python
```python
from defusedxml import ElementTree as ET
ET.parse('file.xml')
# or lxml
from lxml import etree
parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, no_network=True)
tree = etree.parse('filename.xml', parser)
```
### Secure XSLT/Transformer Usage
- Set `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD` and `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET` to empty; avoid loading remote resources.
### Deserialization Safety
- Never deserialize untrusted native objects. Prefer JSON with schema validation.
- Enforce size/structure limits before parsing. Reject polymorphic types unless strictly allow‑listed.
- Language specifics:
- PHP: avoid `unserialize()`; use `json_decode()`.
- Python: avoid `pickle` and unsafe YAML (`yaml.safe_load` only).
- Java: override `ObjectInputStream#resolveClass` to allow‑list; avoid enabling default typing in Jackson; use XStream allow‑lists.
- .NET: avoid `BinaryFormatter`; prefer `DataContractSerializer` or `System.Text.Json` with `TypeNameHandling=None` for JSON.NET.
- Sign and verify serialized payloads where applicable; log and alert on deserialization failures and anomalies.
### Implementation Checklist
- DTDs off; external entities disabled; strict schema validation; parser limits set.
- No network access during parsing; resolvers restricted; auditing in place.
- No unsafe native deserialization; strict allow‑listing and schema validation for supported formats.
- Regular library updates and tests with XXE/deserialization payloads.
Where files are headingNew Cursor rule files have more rules about planning and tracking tasks, and fewer about code style.
Of the Cursor rule files we read, the 3,978 first seen in the last six months, against the older ones: the kind of rule that gained most share, and the kind that lost most. About files like this in general, not this one, and an estimate, since a kind is a pattern in the words.
In this repository24 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-additional-cryptography.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-api-web-services.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-authentication-mfa.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-authorization-access-control.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-client-side-web-security.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-cloud-orchestration-kubernetes.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-data-storage.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-devops-ci-cd-containers.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-file-handling-and-uploads.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-framework-and-languages.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-iac-security.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-input-validation-injection.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-logging.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-mobile-apps.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-privacy-data-protection.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-safe-c-functions.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-session-management-and-cookies.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-0-supply-chain-security.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-1-crypto-algorithms.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-1-digital-certificates.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codeguard-1-hardcoded-credentials.mdcCursor rule
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

