agentleFS
kgrizz-gitkgrizz-git/AgentsConfigHelper/.cursor/rules/codeguard-0-additional-cryptography.mdc

AgentsConfigHelper / rules

Cursor rule2 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Additional Cryptography guidance

We split this codeguard-0-additional-cryptography.mdc into the rules it gives an agent

4 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈4

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Use authenticated encryption.

    line 27
  2. Distinctive:

    Test: short max‑age (e.g., 86400) with includeSubDomains

    line 39
  3. Distinctive:

    Avoid browser HPKP. Consider pinning only for controlled clients (e.g., mobile) and when you own both ends.

    line 44
  4. Distinctive:

    Prefer SPKI pinning with backup pins.

    line 45

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 6,350 Cursor rule files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
codeguard-0-additional-cryptography.mdc
---
description: Additional Cryptography guidance
globs: **/*.c,**/*.go,**/*.h,**/*.java,**/*.js,**/*.jsx,**/*.kt,**/*.kts,**/*.m,**/*.mjs,**/*.php,**/*.py,**/*.pyi,**/*.pyx,**/*.rb,**/*.swift,**/*.ts,**/*.tsx,**/*.wsdl,**/*.xml,**/*.xsd,**/*.xslt,**/*.yaml,**/*.yml
version: 1.0.1
---

rule_id: codeguard-0-additional-cryptography

## Additional Cryptography & TLS

Apply modern, vetted cryptography for data at rest and in transit. Manage keys safely, configure TLS correctly, deploy HSTS, and consider pinning only when appropriate.

### Algorithms and Modes
- Symmetric: AES‑GCM or ChaCha20‑Poly1305 preferred. Avoid ECB. CBC/CTR only with encrypt‑then‑MAC.
- Asymmetric: RSA ≥2048 or modern ECC (Curve25519/Ed25519). Use OAEP for RSA encryption.
- Hashing: SHA‑256+ for integrity; avoid MD5/SHA‑1.
- RNG: Use CSPRNG appropriate to platform (e.g., SecureRandom, crypto.randomBytes, secrets module). Never use non‑crypto RNGs.

### Key Management
- Generate keys within validated modules (HSM/KMS) and never from passwords or predictable inputs.
- Separate keys by purpose (encryption, signing, wrapping). Rotate on compromise, cryptoperiod, or policy.
- Store keys in KMS/HSM or vault; never hardcode; avoid plain env vars. Use KEK to wrap DEKs; store separately.
- Control access to trust stores; validate updates; audit all key access and operations.

### Data at Rest
- Encrypt sensitive data; minimize stored secrets; tokenize where possible.
- Use authenticated encryption; manage nonces/IVs properly; keep salts unique per item.
- Protect backups: encrypt, restrict access, test restores, manage retention.

### TLS Configuration
- Protocols: TLS 1.3 preferred; allow TLS 1.2 only for legacy compatibility; disable TLS 1.0/1.1 and SSL. Enable TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
- Ciphers: prefer AEAD suites; disable NULL/EXPORT/anon. Keep libraries updated; disable compression.
- Key exchange groups: prefer x25519/secp256r1; configure secure FFDHE groups if needed.
- Certificates: 2048‑bit+ keys, SHA‑256, correct CN/SAN. Manage lifecycle and revocation (OCSP stapling).
- Application: HTTPS site‑wide; redirect HTTP→HTTPS; prevent mixed content; set cookies `Secure`.

### HSTS
- Send Strict‑Transport‑Security only over HTTPS. Phase rollout:
  - Test: short max‑age (e.g., 86400) with includeSubDomains
  - Prod: ≥1 year max‑age; includeSubDomains when safe
  - Optional preload once mature; understand permanence and subdomain impact

### Pinning
- Avoid browser HPKP. Consider pinning only for controlled clients (e.g., mobile) and when you own both ends.
- Prefer SPKI pinning with backup pins; plan secure update channels; never allow user bypass.
- Thoroughly test rotation and failure handling; understand operational risk.

### Implementation Checklist
- AEAD everywhere; vetted libraries only; no custom crypto.
- Keys generated and stored in KMS/HSM; purpose‑scoped; rotation documented.
- TLS 1.3/1.2 with strong ciphers; compression off; OCSP stapling on.
- HSTS deployed per phased plan; mixed content eliminated.
- Pinning used only where justified, with backups and update path.

### Test Plan
- Automated config scans (e.g., SSL Labs, testssl.sh) for protocol/cipher/HSTS.
- Code review for crypto API misuse; tests for key rotation, backup/restore.
- Pinning simulations for rotation/failures if deployed.

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Steady: 0 new projects took it in the last 4 weeks, none the 4 weeks before.thin data

Week of Aug 30: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 6: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 13: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 20: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 27: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 4: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 11: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 18: 0 new projects
Aug 2026Sep 2026Oct 2026
New projects taking a version of this file each week, over the 8 weeks our latest run read: only 0 in all, so this is a hint, not a trend.

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