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kgrizz-gitkgrizz-git/AgentsConfigHelper/.cursor/rules/codeguard-0-supply-chain-security.mdc

AgentsConfigHelper / rules

Cursor rule2 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Dependency & supply chain security (pinning, SBOM, provenance, integrity, private registries)

We split this codeguard-0-supply-chain-security.mdc into the rules it gives an agent

4 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Use deterministic builds: npm ci (not npm install) in CI/CD.

    line 20
  2. Distinctive:

    Avoid install scripts that execute on install when possible.

    line 21
  3. Very specific:

    Use .npmrc to scope private registries.

    line 22
  4. Distinctive:

    Document risk decisions; escalate acceptance to appropriate authority with business justification.

    line 37

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 6,350 Cursor rule files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
codeguard-0-supply-chain-security.mdc
---
description: Dependency & supply chain security (pinning, SBOM, provenance, integrity, private registries)
globs: **/*.dockerfile,**/*.js,**/*.jsx,**/*.mjs,**/*.yaml,**/*.yml,Dockerfile*,docker-compose*
version: 1.0.1
---

rule_id: codeguard-0-supply-chain-security

## Dependency & Supply Chain Security

Control third‑party risk across ecosystems, from selection and pinning to provenance, scanning, and rapid response.

### Policy and Governance
- Maintain allow‑listed registries and scopes; disallow direct installs from untrusted sources.
- Require lockfiles and version pinning; prefer digest pinning for images and vendored assets.
- Generate SBOMs for apps/images; store with artifacts; attest provenance (SLSA, Sigstore).

### Package Hygiene (npm focus applicable to others)
- Regularly audit (`npm audit`, ecosystem SCA) and patch; enforce SLAs by severity.
- Use deterministic builds: `npm ci` (not `npm install`) in CI/CD; maintain lockfile consistency.
- Avoid install scripts that execute on install when possible; review for risk.
- Use `.npmrc` to scope private registries; avoid wildcard registries; enable integrity verification.
- Enable account 2FA for publishing

### Development Practices
- Minimize dependency footprint; remove unused packages; prefer stdlib/first‑party for trivial tasks.
- Protect against typosquatting and protestware: pin maintainers, monitor releases, and use provenance checks.
- Hermetic builds: no network in compile/packaging stages unless required; cache with authenticity checks.

### CI/CD Integration
- SCA, SAST, IaC scans in gates; fail on criticals; require approvals for overrides with compensating controls.
- Sign artifacts; verify signatures at deploy; enforce policy in admission.

### Vulnerability Management
- For patched vulnerabilities: test and deploy updates; document any API breaking changes.
- For unpatched vulnerabilities: implement compensating controls (input validation, wrappers) based on CVE type; prefer direct dependency fixes over transitive workarounds.
- Document risk decisions; escalate acceptance to appropriate authority with business justification.

### Incident Response
- Maintain rapid rollback; isolate compromised packages; throttle rollouts; notify stakeholders.
- Monitor threat intel feeds (e.g., npm advisories); auto‑open tickets for critical CVEs.

### Implementation Checklist
- Lockfiles present; integrity checks on; private registries configured.
- SBOM + provenance stored; signatures verified pre‑deploy.
- Automated dependency updates with tests and review gates.
- High‑sev vulns remediated within SLA or mitigated and documented.

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Trending

Steady: 0 new projects took it in the last 4 weeks, none the 4 weeks before.thin data

Week of Aug 30: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 6: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 13: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 20: 0 new projectsWeek of Sep 27: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 4: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 11: 0 new projectsWeek of Oct 18: 0 new projects
Aug 2026Sep 2026Oct 2026
New projects taking a version of this file each week, over the 8 weeks our latest run read: only 0 in all, so this is a hint, not a trend.

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