osint-methodology
Skill35 starsChanged 45 days agoMITView on GitHub
Structured OSINT collection methodology. Planning, collection techniques, search operators, and documentation. Loaded by the osint-researcher agent.
- Reads credentials
6 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- elementalsouls/Claude-OSINTtheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- ajtazer/heckittheir own version, first seen Sep 11, 2026
- opencue/cuecardstheir own version, first seen Aug 17, 2026
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHuntertheir own version, first seen Jul 1, 2026
- hhjkjkjk/Claude-skillstheir own version, first seen May 29, 2026
Other versions6 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 6
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter★ 5.5ksame name
- elementalsouls/Claude-OSINT★ 2.9ksame name
- opencue/cuecards★ 6same name
- ajtazer/heckit★ 2same name
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1same name
- hhjkjkjk/Claude-skills★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository79 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- abuseipdb-apiSkill
- achSkill
- campaign-trackingSkill
- carding-financial-fraudSkill
- censys-apiSkill
- china-cyber-espionageSkill
- claim-extractionSkill
- confidence-levelsSkill
- control-coverage-mappingSkill
- crowdstrike-apiSkill
- cti-hyperloopSkill
- cti-orchestratorSkill
- cti-setupSkill
- darkweb-collectionSkill
- devils-advocacySkill
- domain-investigationSkill
- dprk-cyber-espionageSkill
- feedback-loopsSkill
- greynoise-apiSkill
- hacktivismSkill
- hash-investigationSkill
- horizon-scanningSkill
- indicator-pivotingSkill
- infostealersSkill
- initial-access-brokersSkill
- intelligence-sharingSkill
- intelligence-writingSkill
- ioc-enrichment-workflowSkill
- ioc-exportSkill
- ip-investigationSkill
- iran-cyber-espionageSkill
- key-assumptions-checkSkill
- kql-writingSkill
- likelihood-languageSkill
- lookup-abuseipdbSkill
- lookup-censysSkill
- lookup-crowdstrikeSkill
- lookup-greynoiseSkill
- lookup-liberty91Skill
- lookup-mispSkill
- lookup-openctiSkill
- lookup-otxSkill
- lookup-ransomwareliveSkill
- lookup-reversinglabsSkill
- lookup-sentinelSkill
- lookup-shodanSkill
- lookup-urlscanSkill
- lookup-virustotalSkill
- malware-analysisSkill
- maturity-assessmentSkill
- mitre-attackSkill
- otx-apiSkill
- phishing-social-engineeringSkill
- pir-managementSkill
- quality-controlSkill
- quality-of-information-checkSkill
- ransomware-ecosystemSkill
- reversinglabs-apiSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
9 rules. 0 are common, 8 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 6 edited versions we read keep these.
8
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 16
Keywords: Search terms, aliases, IOCs to look for
- Distinctive: line 69
Start with broad searches to understand what's available:
- Very specific: line 70
Search for the topic/actor/indicator across major sources
- Distinctive: line 76
Read full reports, not just headlines
- Distinctive: line 99
Only access publicly available information
- Distinctive: line 100
Do not create fake accounts or impersonate anyone
- Distinctive: line 101
Do not attempt to access restricted systems
- Distinctive: line 104
Do not engage with threat actors or participate in illegal activity
- Distinctive: line 108
When OSINT collection surfaces an indicator, route into the appropriate enrichment / pivot:
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 6 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
OSINT Collection Methodology
Collection Planning
Before collecting, define:
- Objective: What specific intelligence do we need?
- Scope: What sources are relevant? What's out of scope?
- Keywords: Search terms, aliases, IOCs to look for
- Time constraints: How recent must the intelligence be?
- Documentation: How will findings be recorded?
Source Categories
| Category | Sources | Best For |
| Government advisories | CISA, NCSC, CERT-EU, national CERTs | Authoritative threat alerts, vulnerability warnings |
| Vendor reports | Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Recorded Future, Talos | Campaign analysis, actor profiles, malware analysis |
| Security research | Blogs, conference talks, academic papers | Novel techniques, deep dives, vulnerability research |
| Underground | Forum mirrors, paste sites, Telegram (public), leak aggregators | Threat actor communications, credential dumps, tools |
| Code repositories | GitHub, GitLab | Malware source, PoC exploits, attacker tools, leaked configs |
| Certificate transparency | crt.sh, Censys | Domain enumeration, infrastructure mapping |
| DNS/WHOIS | SecurityTrails, DomainTools, RiskIQ (via web search) | Infrastructure relationships, historical records |
| News/media | Tech press, infosec news sites | Incident reports, geopolitical context |
| Social media | X/Twitter, LinkedIn, Reddit (public) | OPSEC failures, community intelligence, actor claims |
Search Operator Cheat Sheet
Google Dorks
site:example.com filetype:pdf # PDFs on a specific site
"threat actor" AND "APT28" -site:reddit.com # Exclude noise
inurl:"/wp-content/uploads/" filetype:exe # Exposed uploads
"index of" "/backup" # Directory listings
intitle:"login" site:*.example.com # Login pages on subdomainsGitHub Search
org:target-org password # Leaked credentials
filename:.env DB_PASSWORD # Exposed environment files
"api_key" language:python # Hardcoded API keys
"BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" # Exposed private keysCertificate Transparency (crt.sh)
https://crt.sh/?q=%.example.com # All certs for subdomains
https://crt.sh/?q=example.com&output=json # JSON outputShodan Dorks (via web)
ssl.cert.subject.cn:"example.com" # Certificates for domain
http.title:"Dashboard" org:"Target" # Web dashboards
product:"Cobalt Strike" # C2 serversCollection Process
1. Broad Sweep
Start with broad searches to understand what's available:
- Search for the topic/actor/indicator across major sources
- Note the quantity and quality of available information
- Identify the most promising sources for deeper collection
2. Targeted Collection
Narrow down to specific sources and extract detailed intelligence:
- Read full reports, not just headlines
- Extract specific IOCs, TTPs, dates, and attribution claims
- Note each source's perspective and potential biases
3. Source Assessment
Apply Admiralty Scale to every finding (per source-assessment skill):
- Rate source reliability (A-F)
- Rate information credibility (1-6)
- Note whether information is corroborated across sources
4. Documentation
Record every finding with full attribution:
#### Finding: [Title]
- **Source**: [URL or description]
- **Source rating**: [Admiralty code, e.g., B2]
- **Date collected**: YYYY-MM-DD
- **Date of information**: YYYY-MM-DD (when was this information produced?)
- **Summary**: [Key intelligence extracted]
- **Relevance**: [How this relates to the collection objective]Ethical and Legal Boundaries
- Only access publicly available information
- Do not create fake accounts or impersonate anyone
- Do not attempt to access restricted systems
- Respect robots.txt and terms of service
- Be aware of data protection regulations (GDPR)
- Do not engage with threat actors or participate in illegal activity
Related skills
When OSINT collection surfaces an indicator, route into the appropriate enrichment / pivot:
- Bulk IOC enrichment —
/ioc-enrichment-workflowchains/lookup-virustotal,/lookup-otx,/lookup-shodan,/lookup-abuseipdb,/lookup-greynoise,/lookup-urlscan,/lookup-censys, and/lookup-misp - Single-indicator first hop —
/ip-investigation,/domain-investigation,/hash-investigation,/url-investigation - Multi-hop graph walk —
/indicator-pivoting - Internal correlation against your own catalogue —
/lookup-misp search-attributes/search-events - Ransomware victim-status sweeps on org names —
/lookup-ransomwarelive search --q <orgname> - Underground forums and Telegram —
/darkweb-collection(read its OPSEC primer before any DIY collection) - Apply rigor to the finished product —
/score-source,/apply-tlp,/confidence-language,/likelihood-language
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

