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Liberty91LTDLiberty91LTD/cti-skills/skills/lookup-reversinglabs/SKILL.md

lookup-reversinglabs

Skill35 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use for ReversingLabs Spectra Analyze (A1000) classification, threat name, ATT&CK mapping, sandbox and dynamic-analysis results on a file hash, or network threat intelligence for a URL, domain or IP. Returns verdict, risk score, AV detection ratio, behavioural tags and pivot candidates (parent containers, extracted files, related samples). Invoked by /hash-investigation and /malware-analysis for enrichment beyond VirusTotal.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

5 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 3

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    All subcommands accept --dry-run to preview the request plan without spending an API call.

    line 57
  2. Very specific:

    No public per-minute/day quota.

    line 124
  3. Very specific:

    Default rating for downstream /score-source: A2 (completely reliable, probably true).

    line 128
  4. Distinctive:

    Downgrade to B3: if:

    line 130
  5. Distinctive:

    Stay at A2 / consider A1: if:

    line 135

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

lookup-reversinglabs

Queries ReversingLabs Spectra Analyze (the A1000 appliance API) for authoritative classification, full enrichment reports, sandbox behaviour, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and network indicator reputation. Retrieval only — do not interpret, assess, or conclude. The invoking skill or agent reasons about the result.

When to invoke

  • User asks to check a hash against ReversingLabs / A1000 / Spectra Analyze
  • VirusTotal returned thin signal on a hash and you need a vendor-validated verdict
  • Investigation needs MITRE ATT&CK technique coverage from a sample's behaviour
  • Need parent/child relationships (which container did this drop from? what was unpacked?) for pivoting
  • Want to find sibling samples by threat name or AV-detection signature (/lookup-reversinglabs search)
  • Need network reputation on a URL, domain, or IP from RL's malware-analysis corpus
  • Submitting a sample for fresh static + dynamic analysis (slower; produces a full TitaniumCore + sandbox report)

How to invoke

One CLI: a Python wrapper around the official reversinglabs-sdk-py3. Self-bootstraps a private venv at tools/clis/.venv-reversinglabs/ on first run; no global install. The SDK exchanges your username + password for a session token via /api-token-auth/ automatically.

# Hash classification — fast verdict + AV detection
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py hash <hash> [--av-scanners] [--ticloud]

# Full enrichment report (default detailed; pass --summary for the lighter shape)
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py report <hash> [--summary|--detailed] [--fields F1,F2,...]

# File / URL submission (use --wait to block until analysis completes)
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py submit-file <path> [--wait] [--rl-cloud-sandbox windows10]
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py submit-url <url> [--wait] [--crawler local|tcb|cape|fireeye|vmray]

# Network threat intelligence (no submission — reads existing corpus)
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py url <url>
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py domain <domain>
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py ip <ip> [--pivot files,domains,urls] [--max-results 50]

# Advanced search — pivot by threat name, classification, AV signature
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py search "<query>" [--ticloud] [--max-results 100]

# Parent / child sample relationships
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py containers <hash>
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py extracted <hash> [--max-results 200]

# Read-only: which samples matched a YARA ruleset
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py yara-matches <ruleset_name> [--max-results 200]

All subcommands accept --dry-run to preview the request plan without spending an API call. All exit code 2 if $REVERSINGLABS_USER or $REVERSINGLABS_PASSWORD is unset (when not in dry-run). Report missing credentials; do not fabricate.

Examples

# 1) Fast verdict on a hash, including TitaniumCloud reputation
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py hash 5e884898da28047151d0e56f8dc6292773603d0d6aabbdd62a11ef721d1542d8 \
  --av-scanners --ticloud

# 2) Full enrichment incl. MITRE ATT&CK and network indicators extracted from the sample
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py report 5e884898... --detailed \
  --fields classification,riskscore,classification_result,attack,networkthreatintelligence,tags

# 3) Pivot from a known sample to siblings in the same family
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py search 'threatname:Win32.Ransomware.Lockbit classification:malicious' \
  --max-results 50

# 4) Pivot from an extracted hash to its parent container, then siblings dropped by the same parent
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py containers <child-hash>
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py extracted <parent-hash>

# 5) IP reputation + fan-out to files + domains seen on that IP
python3 tools/clis/reversinglabs.py ip 185.220.101.45 --pivot files,domains,urls --max-results 25

Quota awareness

ReversingLabs does not publicly document per-minute / per-day rate limits for A1000. The API returns HTTP 429 with a Retry-After header when limits are hit. Submission endpoints poll at 2-second intervals up to 10 retries (SDK defaults) before giving up. Each --pivot entry is a separate API call on top of the base IP report. Use --dry-run first when fanning out broadly.

Response format

The CLI emits JSON to stdout. Skills consuming it should treat it as:

source: reversinglabs
operation: hash_classification | report_summary | report_detailed | submit_file | submit_url |
           network_url_report | network_domain_report | network_ip_report |
           advanced_search | containers | extracted_files | yara_matches
indicator: <queried value>
type: hash | url | domain | ip | file | query | ruleset
host: https://a1000.reversinglabs.com
query_time: <ISO8601>
# operation-specific payload — typically the SDK's deserialised JSON body
classification: { ... }   # for `hash`
report: { ... }            # for `report`, `url`, `domain`, `ip`
results: [ ... ]           # for `search`
files | containers: [...]  # for `extracted`, `containers`

Common fields inside a detailed report:

FieldMeaning
classificationVerdict: malicious / suspicious / goodware / unknown
riskscoreNumeric 0–10 risk score
classification_resultThreat name string (e.g. Win32.Ransomware.Lockbit)
av_scanners_summary{scanner_count, scanner_match, scanner_percent}
av_scannersPer-engine scan results
tagsAnalyst + system-applied tags
ticoreFull TitaniumCore static analysis (format, headers, imports, strings)
attackMITRE ATT&CK tactics + techniques mapped from observed behaviour
rl_cloud_sandboxDynamic analysis output
networkthreatintelligenceNetwork indicators extracted from the sample
ticloudSpectra Intelligence reputation (when --ticloud)

Rate limits

No public per-minute/day quota. API returns 429 with Retry-After. SDK polls submissions with wait_time_seconds=2, retries=10. Back off and retry on 429.

Source reliability (Admiralty default)

Default rating for downstream /score-source: A2 (completely reliable, probably true). Vendor-authoritative static + dynamic analysis pipeline; verdicts are well validated against ground truth. A1000 is single-tenant — classification overrides applied by other tenants do not affect this lookup.

Downgrade to B3 if:

  • classification is unknown or suspicious (analyst should still verify)
  • Sample is very fresh (<24h since first-seen) — sandbox detonation may have been incomplete
  • Dynamic analysis was skipped or errored (no rl_cloud_sandbox payload)

Stay at A2 / consider A1 if:

  • classification is malicious AND av_scanners_summary.scanner_match >= 5 AND sandbox produced behavioural evidence
  • Threat name maps to a known family with public reporting

Related skills

  • /lookup-virustotal — community-aggregated detection; complements RL's authoritative verdict
  • /lookup-otx — community pulse context for the same indicator
  • /malware-analysis — methodology for interpreting static + dynamic analysis output
  • /hash-investigation — chains this lookup with VirusTotal and OTX
  • /score-source — apply Admiralty rating to the result

See also

Download now (ZIP)

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