db-multitenancy (M9)

In a multi-tenant system the tenant boundary is the most important constraint in the schema: a single query that forgets it leaks one customer's data to another. It is also a performance axis — tenant_id must lead the keys and indexes so every access is tenant-pruned. This module is both-axis: isolation on design (Seguridad), index/partition locality on performance (Escala). Skip entirely (not_applicable) when the system is single-tenant.

What it checks

• Tenant model fit: shared-table (tenant_id column) vs schema-per-tenant vs database-per-tenant — flag a model mismatched to the isolation requirement (e.g. shared rows for a strict-isolation/regulated workload with no RLS).
• Missing tenant scoping: tenant-owned tables lacking a tenant_id/org_id/account_id column, or a tenant column that is nullable (allowing un-scoped rows).
• Unenforced isolation: tenant scoping relied on app code only, with no RLS policy (Postgres) and no constraint — one missing WHERE tenant_id = ? leaks data. Ties to M10 (RLS off = sev5 on a relied-on tenant table).
• tenant_id-leading index/key: indexes and the PK/clustering key that do not lead with tenant_id, so the engine cannot prune to one tenant — full-table scans crossing tenants (perf) and worse isolation. Ties to M11 ESR ordering and M16 partitioning.
• Cross-tenant FK / UNIQUE: uniqueness or FKs defined without the tenant column, allowing collisions/joins across tenants.

Axis & severity

• RLS off / no enforced isolation on a relied-on shared-tenant table: severity 5, fail, axis both, confidence established (caps; the cap itself is owned/asserted with M10's RLS rule — coordinate, do not double-count).
• Tenant-owned table missing tenant_id: severity 4, warn/fail, axis both.
• Index/PK not leading with tenant_id: severity 3, warn, axis performance.
• UNIQUE/FK omitting tenant column: severity 3–4, warn, axis both.

Tier-0 static check

Parse DDL/snapshot via scripts/parse-schema.mjs: identify tenant-owned tables (heuristic: business tables in a system flagged multi-tenant), check each for a non-null tenant column, verify PKs/UNIQUEs/indexes lead with it, and detect declared RLS policies. Program-source parses stay directional and never raise the sev-5 cap.

Tier-1 verification query

Check RLS state and tenant-leading indexes:

-- $DATABASE_URL, read-only
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class WHERE relkind = 'r' AND relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace;
-- is tenant_id the leading index column?
SELECT i.indexrelid::regclass AS index, a.attname AS first_col
FROM pg_index i
JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = i.indrelid AND a.attnum = i.indkey[0]
WHERE i.indrelid = '<table>'::regclass;

No live DB → RLS/enforcement findings stay needs_api, never a silent pass.

Findings

Emit per schema/finding.schema.json. Examples:

• M9.documents.rls_off_shared_tenant — shared-tenant table relied on for isolation with RLS disabled (severity 5, fail, axis both, confidence established).
• M9.invoices.no_tenant_id — tenant-owned table has no tenant_id column (severity 4, warn, axis both).
• M9.events.index_not_tenant_leading — index leads with created_at, not tenant_id; no per-tenant pruning (severity 3, warn, axis performance). Each finding: evidence.observed quotes the DDL/index/policy verbatim; verification.reproduce is a runnable query above (method: ddl_parse / schema_introspect / index_check); expected_impact banded + confidence-tagged.

Honesty

• The sev-5 isolation cap requires that the table is actually relied on for tenant isolation; without live/declared RLS evidence it is needs_api or directional, never a silent cap.
• App-level WHERE tenant_id = ? is real mitigation but is not a database guarantee — one forgotten clause leaks. Say so; do not treat it as equivalent to RLS.
• Single-tenant systems get not_applicable (severity 0, excluded from scoring) — never invent a tenancy requirement.