security-surface
Skill0 starsChanged 13 days agoMITView on GitHub
Perform a focused threat review of code, APIs, configuration, and dependencies. Use when a change touches authentication, authorization, uploads, external input, secrets, payments, or sensitive data.
In this repository25 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- agent-skill-auditSkill
- api-contract-checkSkill
- build-rescueSkill
- change-narrativeSkill
- context-handoffSkill
- data-quality-gateSkill
- dataset-workshopSkill
- dependency-careSkill
- docs-syncSkill
- experiment-ledgerSkill
- failure-forensicsSkill
- model-diff-reviewSkill
- model-eval-designSkill
- multi-agent-crosscheckSkill
- parallel-task-designSkill
- performance-proofSkill
- release-readinessSkill
- repo-scoutSkill
- research-evidence-mapSkill
- review-lensSkill
- safe-migrationSkill
- spec-firstSkill
- sql-integrity-checkSkill
- test-driven-changeSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 12
Verify authentication and authorization separately.
- Distinctive: line 15
Check that sensitive data is minimized, access-scoped, and retained only as needed.
- Distinctive: line 22
Never exfiltrate secrets, probe systems outside the authorized scope, or run destructive exploit payloads.
- Distinctive: line 23
Do not claim that a quick review is a formal penetration test or comprehensive security certification.
- Distinctive: line 24
Keep any discovered secret out of the report.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Surface
Procedure
- Sketch the relevant trust boundaries: user, browser, service, background job, database, third party, and operator.
- Trace untrusted input through parsing, validation, authorization, storage, rendering, and execution.
- Verify authentication and authorization separately. Confirm access is checked server-side at the resource boundary, not only in the UI.
- Inspect secret handling, logs, error messages, cryptographic use, session/cookie settings, rate limits, file paths, uploads, URL fetching, command execution, and injection risks as applicable.
- Review dependency and configuration changes for unsafe defaults or newly exposed capabilities.
- Check that sensitive data is minimized, access-scoped, and retained only as needed. Verify errors fail closed when that is the safe behavior.
- Propose a minimal fix and a test that proves the attack path is closed. Use safe local fixtures rather than real secrets or live targets.
Report
Separate confirmed vulnerabilities from defense-in-depth suggestions. Include attack preconditions, impact, affected boundary, and verification evidence.
Boundaries
- Never exfiltrate secrets, probe systems outside the authorized scope, or run destructive exploit payloads.
- Do not claim that a quick review is a formal penetration test or comprehensive security certification.
- Keep any discovered secret out of the report; identify its location and recommend rotation through the proper owner.
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Your trail
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