review-security
Skill4 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Review branch or pull-request changes for application-level security issues — secrets, injection, path traversal, broken authz, weak crypto, vulnerable dependencies. Use before merging changes that touch an external boundary.
23 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- pauljasperdev/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- nitrictech/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- amirbena/code-review-skilltheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- codechup/claude-code-labtheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- yuri-xyz/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- 0xdeafcafe/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 6, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use review-bugbot, origin and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
0mlkrizzz655335vSkillreview-bugbot
缺陷导向代码审查。用 Bugbot 子代理找 bug。
Also in 5 projects that use this
0mlkrizzz655335vSkillorigin
origin CLI 管理。安装、登录、更新、修复 origin.cursor.com 的 CLI。"disabled-environments:
Also in 3 projects that use this
nielsmadanSkillreview-perf
Performance analysis for algorithmic complexity, memory leaks, N+1 queries, and render issues. Use when code feels slow, after adding loops/queries, or before scaling up.
Also in 3 projects that use this
PandelisZSkillupdate-cli-config
View and modify Cursor CLI configuration settings in ~/.cursor/cli-config.json. Use when the user wants to change CLI settings, configure permissions, switch approval mode, enable vim mode, toggle display options, configure sandbox, or manage any CLI preferences.
Also in 4 projects that use this
Tsumugii24Skillsplit-to-prs
Split current work into small reviewable PRs. Use when the user asks to split a chat, set of changes, branch, or PR.
Also in 5 projects that use this
32103210Skillcreate-rule
Create Cursor rules for persistent AI guidance. Use when you want to create a rule, add coding standards, set up project conventions, configure file-specific patterns, create RULE.md files, or asks about .cursor/rules/ or AGENTS.md.
Also in 7 projects that use this
- +1 more from 0mlkrizzz655335v
Other versions23 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 23
- pydantic/monty★ 8.9ksame name
- OpenAEV-Platform/openaev★ 1.8ksame name
- gtrabanco/agentic-workflow★ 23same name
- Phelan164/codex-howto★ 15same name
- amirbena/code-review-skill★ 8same name
- borkweb/skills★ 8same name
- kauffj/agent-config★ 8same name
- mgiovani/cc-arsenal★ 8same name
- nesnilnehc/ai-cortex★ 8same name
- paultyng/skill-issue★ 8same name
13 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository19 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- adapter-contract-testingSkill
- azure-devops-prSkill
- bugszero-root-causeSkill
- legacy-3pSkill
- port-refactoringSkill
- quality-gateSkill
- review-ai-writingSkill
- review-allSkill
- review-architectureSkill
- review-complexitySkill
- review-driftSkill
- review-impactSkill
- review-prSkill
- review-slopSkill
- review-testingSkill
- scope-challengeSkill
- teams-local-messagesSkill
- write-testsSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 21 edited versions we read keep these.
3
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 55
No validation at a trust boundary (request body, message payload, uploaded file)
- Distinctive: line 59
No rate limiting or replay protection on a new public or auth-sensitive endpoint
- Distinctive: line 71
Test fixtures using realistic-looking secrets that could be mistaken for real ones
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 21 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Review Skill
Reviews changes for application-level security: what an attacker could do with this diff. Examples below are Python; the vectors are not.
Scope: application code. Infrastructure and network hardening are out of scope unless the diff touches deployment configuration.
Protocol: docs/review-protocol.md — arguments, ref resolution, exhaustiveness, severity levels, report shape. Read it first.
Its § 4 Be exhaustive is mandatory; the lens steps it refers to are steps 2–4 (Find the trust boundaries, Apply the security lens, Check dependencies) below.
Process
- Resolve refs and gather the diff — per
review-protocol.md. - Find the trust boundaries this diff touches. Security findings cluster at boundaries, so classify the changes first: HTTP routes, message/queue handlers, settings and environment, subprocess and shell, filesystem paths, deserialization, token and auth handling, cryptography, logging, dependency manifests. A diff touching none of these is usually a short review — say so rather than manufacturing findings.
Apply the security lens
Critical (exploitable as-is — blocks merge):
- Secret, credential or API key committed in source, config or a test fixture
- Shell execution with
shell=True(or equivalent) on attacker-influenced input pickle.loads, unsafe YAML loading,eval,execon untrusted data- Query built by string concatenation or interpolation with user input
- Path joined from user input without containment —
..traversal, especially before a read or write - New endpoint or message handler with no authn/authz check where its peers have one
- Token validation disabled, signature unverified,
alg=noneaccepted - TLS verification disabled
- Hard-coded key, reused IV, MD5/SHA1 used for security, or a non-cryptographic RNG used for tokens, passwords or IDs
- Secret, token or full PII payload written to logs
- CORS opened to
*, or an open redirect introduced
Major (likely exploitable — fix before merge):
- No validation at a trust boundary (request body, message payload, uploaded file)
- Error responses leaking stack traces, internal paths or database errors
- Authentication present but authorization missing — any authenticated user can act on another's resources. Check object-level access, not just route-level.
- No rate limiting or replay protection on a new public or auth-sensitive endpoint
- Dependency added with known CVEs, or unmaintained, or pinned to a range that resolves to a vulnerable release
- Settings field holding a secret without a secret-wrapper type
- File written non-atomically to a path other processes read
- Long-lived task holding secrets in memory with no rotation hook
Minor (defence in depth):
- User identifiers logged without a consistent redaction policy
- HTTP client with no explicit timeout
- Permissive file modes on write
- Security headers missing where peer responses set them
- Test fixtures using realistic-looking secrets that could be mistaken for real ones
- Check dependencies. For each modified manifest, list what was added or bumped, and
flag anything known-vulnerable, abandoned, or pulled from an unexpected index. Suggest
running the ecosystem's audit tool (
pip-audit,npm audit,cargo audit, …). - Confirm § 4 of the protocol is satisfied, then generate report →
reviews/security-review-issues.md
Severity Model
| Severity | Indicators |
| Critical | Exploitable as-is: secret leak, code execution, injection, broken auth, broken crypto |
| Major | Exploitable under realistic conditions: weak validation, missing authz, vulnerable dependency |
| Minor | Hygiene gap with no immediate exploit path |
Output Format
Per review-protocol.md, with one extra field that is
required on every finding:
**Vector:** how it is reached — e.g. injection / path traversal / broken authz / secret in source
**Why it matters:** the attacker scenario in one concrete sentence"Why it matters" must name what an attacker gains. If you cannot write that sentence, the finding is speculative — leave it out.
Close with a Dependency Notes section and the standard summary.
Exclusions
- Style and lint issues — handled elsewhere.
- Performance concerns with no denial-of-service angle.
- Threat-model questions about infrastructure this diff does not change.
Example Usage
review-security # Current branch vs main
review-security feat/foo # Specific branch
review-security feat/foo dev # Different base
review-security 3574 # PR/MR by numberDoes it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

