team-security-review
Skill69 starsChanged 19 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security review methodology. Authentication, authorization, input validation, secret management, dependency scanning and finding reporting. The playbook of the security role.
- Reads credentials
1 other project uses a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- bostonaholic/teamtheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- bostonaholic/team★ 11same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository15 other files it gives its agents.
- docs/agents.mdAGENTS.md
- team/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- team-architectureSkill
- team-backlogSkill
- team-brandSkill
- team-buildSkill
- team-disciplineSkill
- team-docsSkill
- team-marketingSkill
- team-market-researchSkill
- team-memorySkill
- team-prdSkill
- team-qaSkill
- team-releaseSkill
- team-uxSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 23
Do two checks for every endpoint:
- Distinctive: line 25
Resource-based: do they own this resource?
- Distinctive: line 49
Do error messages leak internal details (stack trace, SQL)?
- Distinctive: line 63
Run these and put the output in the report:
- Distinctive: line 103
Do not make up a CVSS score.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Review
Core principle
Read the code, do not guess. A security finding is only a finding if you have read the actual code path. A "this might happen" hypothesis is not a finding — mark it as "suspicious".
1. Authentication
- Password: strong hash (argon2id/bcrypt), never SHA/MD5, never plaintext
- Session: cookie with
httpOnly+secure+sameSite, idle and absolute timeout - Token: short lifetime,
refreshrotation, revocable in case of leakage - Account lockout: attempt count + time-based throttling
- Password reset: single-use and time-limited token
- MFA: for administrator/critical operations
2. Authorization
Do two checks for every endpoint:
- Functional: does this person have permission to perform this action?
- Resource-based: do they own this resource? (IDOR)
Patterns to check:
- An endpoint without authentication (not on the allowlist)
- The
idparameter used directly (not compared against the user's own record) - An "edit" endpoint exists but the "delete" endpoint has no permission check
- Administrator endpoints are only hidden in the interface, not checked on the server
- Bulk operation endpoints (could mix the user's data with someone else's)
3. Input validation
| Attack | Protection |
| SQL/NoSQL injection | Parameterized queries, ORM, schema validation |
| XSS | Output escaping, dangerouslySetInnerHTML forbidden, CSP |
| SSRF | Allowlist of permitted hosts, private IP range blocking |
| Path traversal | Path normalization, blocking escapes from the root directory |
| Mass assignment | Allowlist of permitted fields |
| Deserialization | Untrusted data is never deserialized |
| ReDoS | No dangerous regex, input length limited |
Checklist:
- Does every user input pass through a class (type + format + length + range)?
- Is input validation applied in the application layer, or only on the client? (client validation is not security)
- Do error messages leak internal details (stack trace, SQL)?
4. Secret management
- Are secrets embedded in the code? (Has
.enventered the repo, is it ingit log?) - Are there secrets in the logs? (token, password, full card number)
- Is the secret in production or in development?
- Is the error shown to the user separate from the error that is logged?
- Is
.gitignorecorrect? Is.envtracked?
In the finding report, do not write the value of the secret — the file path and the type are enough.
5. Dependencies
Run these and put the output in the report:
npm audit # Node
pip-audit # Python
cargo audit # Rust
govulncheck # GoList the critical/high vulnerabilities and state which ones are actually on a code path that is used.
6. Transport and browser
- HTTPS mandatory, HSTS
- Cookie flags:
httpOnly,secure,sameSite - CORS:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *+ authenticated requests = critical - Security headers: CSP,
X-Content-Type-Options,Referrer-Policy - CSRF protection on form POSTs (cookie-based sessions)
7. Finding report
For each finding:
[Severity] Title
Location: file:line
Impact: <what an attacker can do>
Reproduction: <step by step>
Fix: <concrete suggestion>
Status: fixed / open / acceptedSeverity levels:
| Level | Criteria |
| Critical | Data leak, authentication bypass, remote code execution |
| High | Privilege escalation, IDOR, secret leak |
| Medium | XSS (reflected), CSRF, missing rate limit |
| Low | Information leak, missing header, version disclosure |
Do not make up a CVSS score. Write the impact and derive the severity from the impact.
Common mistakes
| Mistake | The right way |
| Making up a finding without reading the code | Read it, verify it, then write it |
| Guessing a CVSS score | Write the impact text |
| Writing the secret into the report | Location and type only |
| Looking only at the application layer | Infrastructure and deployment settings are in scope too |
| Closing a finding before it is fixed | Fix first, then verify |
Output format
Markdown: Summary / Finding table (severity, location, impact, status) / Finding details / Dependency scan output / Remaining risks.
In the user's language (Turkish or English).
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

