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mtarcuremtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/.agents/skills/parser-differential-route-confusion/SKILL.md

parser-differential-route-confusion

Skill220 starsChanged 19 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use during an authorized API or gateway assessment when routing or authorization may parse a path differently from downstream execution: test encoded and nested path forms, prove safe-route validation reaches a privileged handler, and chain only if the real target yields controlled impact.

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  1. Distinctive:

    All multi-parse route points are enumerated.

    line 41

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Files
SKILL.md

Parser-Differential Route Confusion

Audit API gateways, batch processors, and microservice routers for route/permission desynchronization: one component validates a request's route/permissions using one parser while a different component executes it using another, so a nested or crafted path passes auth as a "safe" route but resolves at execution to a privileged one. Chain with a downstream injection (SQLi/command) reachable only through the confused route for pre-auth RCE.

Source: corpus A §I.2 — Assetnote "wp2shell" (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137): WordPress /wp-json/batch/v1 validated nested routes in one loop and executed in another; a wp_parse_url() path discrepancy let an unauthenticated batch sub-request execute against a privileged admin route, chained to author__not_in SQLi → admin creation → webshell. Impact class: RCE / privilege escalation (intrinsic). Governing method: Phase-3a hypothesis lane of systematic-attacking; leads only into the verification spine. Authorized in-scope targets only.

Method

  1. Map every place a request's path/route is parsed more than once: gateway vs. origin, batch/GraphQL/ JSON-RPC sub-request processors, reverse-proxy rewrite rules, framework parse_url calls (katana to crawl, source-map + semgrep to locate dual parsers).
  2. Probe for validation-vs-execution divergence: encoded slashes, dot-segments, nested batch entries, trailing-data, unicode/overlong forms, and matrix params that resolve differently in the two parsers. Watch for a request that authenticates as unauthenticated/safe but reaches a privileged handler.
  3. Once a confused route reaches a privileged handler, enumerate the injection surface it exposes (sqlmap for SQLi on parameters the confused route stops sanitizing, command sinks) and build the chain to RCE/admin.
  4. PoC: the full unauthenticated request that desynchronizes and lands the privileged/injection effect, with an interactsh-client OOB or scoped-read impact proof. Link-level negative control = the equivalent direct request is correctly rejected by auth.
  5. Capture the differential as a nuclei template / custom detector for variant analysis across the target's other batch/router surfaces.

Acceptance

  • All multi-parse route points are enumerated; the confused route names both parsers and the privilege gap.
  • The chain is proven end-to-end (auth bypass → privileged handler → injection/RCE) against the real target with a benign negative control.
  • Finding deduped against the wp2shell advisories and the stack's router CVEs before submission.

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