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lgzarturolgzarturo/codeconductor/.agents/skills/security-ai-llm/SKILL.md

security-ai-llm

Skill0 starsChanged 27 days agoMITView on GitHub

Harden LLM and agent integrations you operate: prompt injection, tool allowlists, secret leakage, and supply-chain of models. Defensive only.

  • Reads credentials

1 other project uses a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

4 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈4

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Use this skill only with explicit written authorization for a named scope (systems, environments, and time window).

    line 11
  2. Distinctive:

    Treat model output as untrusted.

    line 20
  3. Distinctive:

    Keep secrets out of prompts and logs

    line 22
  4. Distinctive:

    Do not produce exploit payloads, malware, or attack procedures.

    line 29

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

AI / LLM Security

Authorization

Use this skill only with explicit written authorization for a named scope (systems, environments, and time window). If authorization is missing, expired, or the request is for someone else's systems, stop.

This skill is defensive and owner-authorized. It does not authorize offensive cyber operations.

Do

  • Treat model output as untrusted; never exec it without a schema
  • Allowlist tools and paths; contain file writes
  • Keep secrets out of prompts and logs

Do not

  • Help jailbreak third-party products or steal model weights
  • Log raw user PII to prompt-debug stores
  • Do not produce exploit payloads, malware, or attack procedures.

How to Use

Load this skill from /cc-security when the Task Card domain is security-ai-llm. Example prompts:

  • Review our agent tool runner for path traversal and unbounded shell.
  • Add tests that a prompt cannot make the bot dump .env.

Integration

  • Workflow: /cc-security (CCEP command security)
  • Existing OWASP application-security skill remains security (not this id)
  • High-risk changes still require security-reviewer

Download now (ZIP)

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What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.

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