trust-audit
Skill6 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Audit product trust: permissions, privacy, billing, file changes, and silent failures.
In this repository27 other files it gives its agents.
- agent-skills-agentsAGENTS.md
- agent-skills-claudeCLAUDE.md
- agent-log-forensicsSkill
- changelog-writerSkill
- chezmoi-driftSkill
- contacts-unifySkill
- decision-logSkill
- dependency-pinningSkill
- django-smoke-alarmSkill
- empathy-auditSkill
- first-contactSkill
- handle-prSkill
- launch-sequenceSkill
- parallel-isolated-app-testingSkill
- post-mortemSkill
- pre-mortemSkill
- profile-meSkill
- ralph-loopSkill
- release-operatorSkill
- remote-host-verifierSkill
- research-personSkill
- scope-hammerSkill
- second-opinionsSkill
- status-copy-trust-auditSkill
- support-stormSkill
- visual-qa-loopSkill
- wide-open-brainstormSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
6 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 16
Use this skill to answer the question beneath many launch failures: “Will a normal user feel safe, respected, and in control?”
- Distinctive: line 28
Use this skill when reviewing:
- Very specific: line 36
Use status-copy-trust-audit instead when the problem is specific CLI/status wording or repeated-run output.
- Distinctive: line 51
Read the code, docs, and UI strings (do not guess from the product name) enough to map:
- Distinctive: line 97
When the product is partially broken, does it look healthy anyway?
- Distinctive: line 119
Do not flatten them together.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Trust Audit
Use this skill to answer the question beneath many launch failures: “Will a normal user feel safe, respected, and in control?”
A trust audit is not a security review. It is a perception-and-reality review of the places where users feel:
- watched
- tricked
- over-charged
- surprised by file or data changes
- unsure what the product is really doing
- trapped when something goes wrong
When to Use
Use this skill when reviewing:
- onboarding or first-run flows
- permission prompts and explanations
- privacy and AI data flows
- billing, credits, trials, renewals, or BYOK setups
- features that rename, move, delete, sync, upload, or otherwise mutate user data
- products where “creepy”, “shady”, or “I don’t trust it” would be fatal
Use status-copy-trust-audit instead when the problem is specific CLI/status wording or repeated-run output; use support-storm instead when you need the predicted support inbox, not the product-side trust gaps.
Core Principle
Trust breaks when there is a mismatch between:
- what the user thinks will happen
- what actually happens
- how reversible and well-explained it feels
Audit both the reality and the vibe. A technically defensible flow can still feel shady.
<process>Step 1: Gather the trust surface
Read the code, docs, and UI strings (do not guess from the product name) enough to map:
- target user
- product promise
- first-run flow
- permissions requested
- what data leaves the device
- what files or records get changed
- billing or credit mechanics
- failure and recovery paths
Then summarize in 5-10 bullets:
- what the user believes they are agreeing to
- what the product actually does
- where a mismatch might exist
Step 2: Inspect the five trust surfaces
Evaluate each of these explicitly.
1. Consent and comprehension
Ask:
- Does the user understand what they are enabling?
- Is important information explained before the scary system prompt or pricing moment?
- Is consent meaningful, or buried behind momentum?
2. Data and privacy reality
Ask:
- What leaves the machine?
- What is stored, for how long, and by whom?
- Is there any “surprise cloud” moment?
- Would a privacy-sensitive user feel misled if they learned the full data path later?
3. File and state safety
Ask:
- Does the product modify user files or important state?
- Could it break organization, aliases, scripts, expectations, or downstream workflows?
- Is there a visible, believable undo or recovery story?
4. Billing and fairness
Ask:
- Could a user reasonably feel tricked on price, credits, quotas, renewals, or provider costs?
- Is the distinction between app purchase, subscription, AI usage, and BYOK painfully clear?
- Would a user say “wait, I thought this was included”?
5. Degraded-mode honesty
Ask:
- When the product is partially broken, does it look healthy anyway?
- Does the user understand whether it is paused, misconfigured, rate-limited, offline, blocked, or waiting?
- Could the product silently fail in a way that makes the user blame themselves?
Step 3: Generate trust failures
Produce 6-12 concrete trust risks (fewer is fine for a small feature; do not pad). For each, include:
- Trust failure — one sentence
- What the user expected
- What actually happens
- Why it feels bad — creepy, deceptive, careless, destructive, unfair, etc.
- Likely reaction — support email, uninstall, refund, bad review, internal IT rejection, etc.
- Severity — low/medium/high
- Trust fracture type — consent / privacy / pricing / file safety / silent failure / recovery
- Repair move — the most direct product or copy change
Step 4: Distinguish vibes from actual danger
Split findings into:
- Trust theater — looks scary but is mostly messaging / framing
- Real trust hazard — real risk, real surprise, or real damage
Do not flatten them together.
Step 5: Present the audit
Use this format:
# Trust Audit: [Product / Feature]
## Executive Read
- Biggest trust risk:
- Most likely “creepy” interpretation:
- Most likely “I got tricked” interpretation:
- Most dangerous file/data surprise:
## Trust Surface Map
- Consent:
- Data flow:
- File/state mutation:
- Billing:
- Degraded-mode honesty:
## High-Risk Trust Failures
### 1. [Title]
**Trust failure:**
**What the user expected:**
**What actually happens:**
**Why this feels bad:**
**Likely reaction:**
**Type:**
**Repair move:**
## Medium-Risk Trust Failures
...
## Trust Theater vs Real Hazard
- Trust theater:
- Real hazard:
## Copy / UX Fixes to Make Immediately
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
## The Sentence Users Might Say
> “[one-sentence trust-damaging story]”Success Criteria
The audit is complete when it identifies:
- what the user thinks is happening
- where that belief is wrong or incomplete
- which mismatch will feel worst
- which fix most increases user trust fastest
</process>Does it work?
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