threat-model
Skill0 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Produce a STRIDE threat model for a system or feature. Use before building anything that handles authentication, money, personal data, file uploads, or third-party input.
61 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Lucface/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- MichaelRyanWood/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- seancabalse/agentic-playbooktheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- Yomudogly/oh-my-agytheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- mgkvibez/sentinel-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- requie/endostacktheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use vuln-scan, supply-chain-review and 8 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
AnthropicSkillvuln-scan
Static source-code vulnerability scan. Reads a target directory (and THREAT_MODEL.md if present), spawns parallel review subagents per focus area, and writes VULN-FINDINGS.json + .md for /triage to consume. Read-only — no building, running, or network. For execution-verified crashes, use vuln-pipeline instead. Use when asked to "scan for vulns", "review this code for security issues", "find bugs in <dir>", or as the step between /threat-model and /triage.
Also in 5 projects that use this
MesteriisSkillsupply-chain-review
Reviews lockfiles, installers, provenance, CI permissions, dependency confusion, artifacts, registries, and publishing.
Also in 3 projects that use this
AnthropicSkillpatch
Generate candidate fixes for verified security findings. Consumes
Also in 4 projects that use this
mbwsimsSkillorbit
Run for repo-wide or diff-wide readiness sweeps: "/orbit", "/orbit pr", "/orbit deep", "/orbit quick", "audit this project", "project-wide review", "is this PR ready overall", or "combined security, tests, codebase, evolution, and instruction review". Use this for broad multi-system assessment, not for a single-file review or a one-domain question.
Also in 3 projects that use this
mbwsimsSkilltest-plan
This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan tests", "what should I test", "what tests do I need", "test plan for", "testing strategy for", "test matrix for", "what cases should I cover", "help me plan tests", mentions "/test-plan", or wants to understand what tests are needed before writing any test code.
Also in 3 projects that use this
Sagargupta16Skilldependency-audit
Audit project dependencies for security vulnerabilities, licensing issues, maintenance health, and optimization opportunities. Use it during regular security audits (monthly or quarterly); before a major release when you want to ensure the dependency tree is clean; when evaluating whether to adopt or replace a dependency; after a security advisory affects one of your dependencies; when your install times or bundle sizes have grown noticeably.
Also in 4 projects that use this
Other versions61 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 61
- openai/codex-security★ 14ksame name
- openai/plugins★ 7.8ksame name
- anthropics/defending-code-reference-harness★ 7.5ksame name
- Q00/ouroboros★ 6.4ksame name
- me2resh/apexyard★ 542same name
- jmanico/grim-prompter★ 497same name
- Cosmian/kms★ 378same name
- mbwsims/claude-universe★ 71same name
- navikt/copilot★ 61same name
- Codeminer42/skills★ 32same name
51 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository16 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .claude/commands/agents.mdAGENTS.md
- .opencode/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
- .cursor/rules/caveman.mdcCursor rule
- adrSkill
- agent-registrySkill
- cost-reviewSkill
- data-contractSkill
- delegation-protocolSkill
- marketplaceSkill
- onboardingSkill
- orchestrationSkill
- postmortemSkill
- runbookSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 55 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 28
Mitigate or accept: Every threat gets a control, or a signed risk acceptance with a named owner and an expiry date.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 55 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Threat Model
Threat modelling is cheap before the build and expensive after. Do it at design time.
Procedure
- Scope. Name the system, its trust boundaries, and what is explicitly out of scope. Out-of-scope items are written down — silence reads as coverage.
- Data flow. Diagram actors, processes, data stores, and every flow that crosses a trust boundary. Threats live at the crossings, not inside the boxes.
Enumerate with STRIDE at each crossing:
Question Spoofing Can an actor claim another identity? Tampering Can data be modified in transit or at rest? Repudiation Can an action be denied because nothing logged it? Information disclosure What leaks, to whom, through which channel? Denial of service What exhausts under load or deliberate abuse? Elevation of privilege How does a low-privilege actor gain more? - Rate by exploitability and impact. Not by gut feel, not by scanner severity.
- Mitigate or accept. Every threat gets a control, or a signed risk acceptance with a named owner and an expiry date.
- Verify. Each mitigation names the specific test that proves it works.
Output
# Threat Model: <system>
## Scope and trust boundaries
## Out of scope
## Data flow
## Threats
| ID | Boundary | STRIDE | Threat | Exploitability | Impact | Mitigation | Verified by |
## Accepted risks
| ID | Risk | Owner | Expiry | Rationale |Worked example
Feature: users upload a profile picture, served from a CDN.
| ID | Boundary | STRIDE | Threat | Mitigation | Verified by |
| T1 | Browser→API | T | Content-Type lied about; SVG uploaded as image/png, executes script on view | Re-encode server-side; never trust the declared type; serve from a separate origin | test_upload_svg_polyglot_is_reencoded |
| T2 | Browser→API | D | 10 GB upload or a decompression bomb exhausts disk | Size cap before buffering; dimension cap after decode header, before full decode | test_upload_exceeds_cap_rejected_before_buffer |
| T3 | API→Storage | E | Filename ../../etc/passwd escapes the upload directory | Discard the client filename entirely; store under a generated UUID | test_path_traversal_filename_discarded |
| T4 | Storage→CDN | I | Object URL is guessable; private avatars enumerable | Random 128-bit object key; deny bucket listing | test_bucket_listing_denied |
| T5 | API→Image lib | E | Malformed image triggers a native-code CVE in the decoder | Decode in a sandboxed worker with no network and a memory cap; pin and scan the library | test_decoder_runs_without_network |
| T6 | Browser→CDN | S | Attacker replaces another user's avatar via a predictable object key | Ownership check on write; key derived server-side only | test_cannot_overwrite_other_user_avatar |
Six threats on a "just an avatar upload" feature. T1 and T5 are the ones that get shipped without a threat model — and they are the ones that turn into an incident.
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it fails |
| "We validate input" as a mitigation | Which validator? Running where? Against which encoding? |
| Threats without a verifying test | An untested mitigation is an assumption wearing a control's uniform |
| Rating by scanner severity | Scanner severity ignores your architecture and your data |
| Modelling only the happy actor | The attacker does not use your UI |
| Model produced once at launch | It is living. New flow, new crossing, new threats. |
| No out-of-scope section | Readers assume you covered what you silently skipped |
Done when
- Every trust boundary crossing has been walked through all six STRIDE categories.
- Every threat ends in a mitigation or a dated, owned risk acceptance.
- Every mitigation names a specific test, not a policy.
- Out-of-scope is explicit.
- The model is stored next to the design, not in a slide deck.
Does it work?
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
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