postmortem
Skill0 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Write a blameless incident postmortem with a timeline and tracked actions. Use after any customer-visible incident, data loss, or security event.
45 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- ychampion/ystacktheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- Dimon94/dveritytheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- Dimon94/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- MichaelLeeHobbs/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 10, 2026
- mehboobali98/rmine-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 6, 2026
- SethGammon/Citadeltheir own version, first seen Nov 4, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use hypothesis-driven-debugging, status-report and 9 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
Sturla22Skillhypothesis-driven-debugging
Debug by ranking concrete hypotheses and running discriminating checks. Use when a bug is hard to localize, many plausible failure points exist, logs are noisy or misleading, a symptom appears intermittently, or trial-and-error edits haven't worked.
Also in 3 projects that use this
AnthropicSkillstatus-report
Generate a status report with KPIs, risks, and action items. Use when writing a weekly or monthly update for leadership, summarizing project health with green/yellow/red status, surfacing risks and decisions that need stakeholder attention, or turning a pile of project tracker activity into a readable narrative.
Also in 3 projects that use this
seongjaeryuSkillorganize
Organize knowledge into Sets
Also in 3 projects that use this
SaluteYBSkillskill-eval
Evaluate, tune, and regression-check AgentSkills. Use when creating a new skill or improving an existing one and you need structured should-trigger, should-not-trigger, boundary-case, and execution-quality examples. Also use when auditing overlapping skills and sharpening trigger descriptions before release.
Also in 3 projects that use this
neurofooSkillpremortem
Pre-mortem analysis that imagines a plan has failed, then works backward to identify causes and preventions. Use before launches, major decisions, or risky initiatives to surface hidden risks.
Also in 3 projects that use this
AnthropicSkillincident-response
Run an incident response workflow — triage, communicate, and write postmortem. Trigger with "we have an incident", "production is down", an alert that needs severity assessment, a status update mid-incident, or when writing a blameless postmortem after resolution.
Also in 4 projects that use this
Other versions45 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 45
- dotnet/fsharp★ 4.3ksame name
- SethGammon/Citadel★ 927same name
- boshu2/agentops★ 454same name
- flonat/flonat-research★ 150same name
- neurofoo/agent-skills★ 111same name
- Dimon94/dverity★ 107same name
- Dimon94/skills★ 107same name
- EthanReedLabs/sulde★ 99same name
- Hongyu-yu/matsci-ai-skills★ 19same name
- Hassaan146/claude-skills★ 18same name
35 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository16 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .claude/commands/agents.mdAGENTS.md
- .opencode/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
- .cursor/rules/caveman.mdcCursor rule
- adrSkill
- agent-registrySkill
- cost-reviewSkill
- data-contractSkill
- delegation-protocolSkill
- marketplaceSkill
- onboardingSkill
- orchestrationSkill
- runbookSkill
- threat-modelSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 41 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 103
Every action item has an owner, a date, and a tracking ID.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 41 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Blameless Postmortem
The purpose is to make this class of failure impossible, not to explain it. A postmortem that produces no system change was a writing exercise.
Template
# Postmortem: <title>
- Date: <UTC> | Duration: <detection → resolution> | Severity: <level>
- Impact: <users affected, requests failed, data lost, money — quantified>
## Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
<From the first contributing change or signal to full resolution.
Every row cites a log, alert, deploy record, or message. No memory-reconstructed rows.>
## What happened
<The mechanism. What actually broke, technically, in sequence.>
## Contributing factors
<Multiple. Never a single "root cause". Never a person.>
## What went well
## What was hard
## Detection gap
<How long until we knew, and why not sooner. This is its own finding.>
## Action items
| Action | Type (prevent/detect/mitigate) | Owner | Due | Tracking |Worked example
Blameful, single-cause — produces one useless action item:
## Root cause
Engineer deployed a migration without checking the lock behaviour, which locked
the orders table for 12 minutes.
## Action items
| Action | Owner |
| Remind the team to check migrations before deploying | Team lead |This blames a person, finds one cause, and produces an action that changes nothing. The same outage happens again in four months with a different name attached.
Blameless, multi-factor — produces changes to the system:
## Contributing factors
1. The migration took an `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` lock. The tool offers no online path
for this operation, and nothing in review surfaces lock class.
2. Staging holds 40k rows; production holds 90M. The migration ran in 0.3s in staging.
Nothing compares migration timing across environments.
3. The deploy pipeline has no timing gate — a migration may run unbounded.
4. Alerting fired on API error rate at 4 min, not on DB lock wait at 30 s.
We detected the consequence, not the cause.
5. Rollback required a second migration; there was no abort path mid-run.
## Detection gap
4 min 12 s from first lock wait to page. Lock-wait metrics exist in the exporter
but are on no dashboard and in no alert.
## Action items
| Action | Type | Owner | Due | Tracking |
| Add lock-class linter to migration CI; block ACCESS EXCLUSIVE on tables >1M rows | prevent | @dbteam | 2026-04-12 | INFRA-2231 |
| Run migrations against an anonymised production-sized snapshot in CI, report timing | prevent | @platform | 2026-04-26 | INFRA-2232 |
| Statement timeout of 30s on all migration sessions | mitigate | @dbteam | 2026-04-05 | INFRA-2233 |
| Alert on `pg_locks` wait > 30s, route to service owner | detect | @sre | 2026-04-05 | INFRA-2234 |
| Document the online migration path in the engineering standard | prevent | @dbteam | 2026-04-19 | INFRA-2235 |Five factors, five system changes, five owners, five dates. Any one of them would have prevented or contained the outage. That is the point: defence in depth, found by refusing to stop at the first cause.
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it fails |
| A single "root cause" | Incidents are always multi-factor. Stopping at one leaves the rest live. |
| Naming a person | Guarantees the next person hides the near-miss. You lose your best signal. |
| "Human error" as a factor | Humans are constant. The system that let the error through is the finding. |
| Action item "be more careful" | Not an action. Not trackable. Changes nothing. |
| Timeline from memory | Times drift, order inverts, and the analysis inherits the error. |
| No detection gap section | Slow detection is a separate, fixable failure. |
| Action items with no tracking ID | Untracked means undone. The incident will repeat. |
Rules
- Blameless. Name systems and processes. "The deploy was not gated" — not "X deployed without checking".
- Timeline rows cite evidence. A row with no source is deleted or marked as an estimate.
- Quantify impact. "Some users saw errors" is not impact.
- Every action item has an owner, a date, and a tracking ID.
- Publish it. A private postmortem teaches one team.
Done when
- At least three contributing factors, none of them a person.
- Every timeline row cites a log, alert, deploy, or message.
- Impact quantified in users, requests, money, or data.
- Detection gap analysed as its own finding.
- Every action item has owner, date, and tracking ID.
- Each action is a system change, not a promise to be careful.
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