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YomudoglyYomudogly/oh-my-agy/skills/threat-model/SKILL.md

threat-model

Skill4 starsChanged todayMITView on GitHub

[oh-my-agy] Structured security threat modeling workflow producing trust-boundary data-flow diagrams, STRIDE and OWASP Agentic/LLM risk enumeration, likelihood-impact scoring, file:line mitigations, and MCP/supply-chain audits. Use for $threat-model or when mapping attack surfaces, reviewing auth/agent/MCP architectures, or documenting security controls.

  • Reads credentials

58 other projects use a version of this.

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Projects with it also use vuln-scan, supply-chain-review and 10 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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    Also in 5 projects that use this

  • MesteriisSkill

    supply-chain-review

    Reviews lockfiles, installers, provenance, CI permissions, dependency confusion, artifacts, registries, and publishing.

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • AnthropicSkill

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    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • mbwsimsSkill

    test-plan

    This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan tests", "what should I test", "what tests do I need", "test plan for", "testing strategy for", "test matrix for", "what cases should I cover", "help me plan tests", mentions "/test-plan", or wants to understand what tests are needed before writing any test code.

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  • Sagargupta16Skill

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

5 rules. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 4 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 52 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 1

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 4

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Read references/stride-and-agentic-taxonomy.md before enumerating STRIDE categories, OWASP Agentic risks, or trust-boundary mitigations.

    line 20
  2. Very specific:

    Evidence first, never generic filler: every threat entry must tie to real assets, entrypoints, configs, or observed file:line handlers in …

    line 22
  3. Very specific:

    Never expose secrets: never echo .env values or literal tokens into artifacts.

    line 23
  4. Very specific:

    Run sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh mcp-audit <repo> --json to flag literal credentials in MCP headers/env, plaintext non-loopback http://, …

    line 35
  5. Very specific:

    Run sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh dep-license-diff <repo> --json and sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh skill-validate ./skills --strict --json (if …

    line 36

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 52 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Threat Model

Produce an evidence-backed, architecture-specific threat model for systems, services, AI/agentic toolchains, or high-risk features. Unlike $code-review (which checks a scoped PR diff) or $analyze (general debugging/diagnosis), $threat-model systematically models assets, actors, trust boundaries, STRIDE threats, OWASP LLM/Agentic Top-10 vectors, and concrete code-level mitigations grounded in observed file:line references.

Usage

$threat-model "target component, service, or whole repository"
$threat-model --scope auth "authentication, session, and webhook trust boundaries"
$threat-model --agentic "plugin hooks, MCP servers, and tool execution sandbox"

Boundaries

  • Read references/stride-and-agentic-taxonomy.md before enumerating STRIDE categories, OWASP Agentic risks, or trust-boundary mitigations.
  • Read-only by default: $threat-model analyzes code, manifests, configs, and schemas without editing application source unless the user separately asks to implement fixes. Save the deliverable to .omagy/artifacts/threat-model-{slug}-{YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ}.md.
  • Evidence first, never generic filler: every threat entry must tie to real assets, entrypoints, configs, or observed file:line handlers in the repo (or explicitly mark unverified runtime assumptions as inferred).
  • Never expose secrets: never echo .env values or literal tokens into artifacts; run automated checks only against safe metadata (mcp-audit, dep-license-diff).

Workflow

Execute through parallel read-only reconnaissance (explore, security-reviewer, supply-chain-auditor, architect as scope warrants):

  1. Asset & Trust-Boundary Inventory:
    • Identify protected assets (credentials/tokens, PII, tenant data, signing keys, filesystem/shell capabilities, payment/admin mutations).
    • Map actors (unauthenticated external callers, authenticated low-privilege users, cross-tenant users, CI/build pipelines, untrusted external repos/web content, autonomous AI tools/MCP servers) and trust boundaries where privilege or data sanitization changes.
  2. Data-Flow Diagram (DFD):
    • Draw a flowchart LR Mermaid diagram illustrating external inputs, API/CLI entrypoints, authz gates, storage/queues, MCP/subagent hops, and explicit trust boundaries (subgraph).
  3. Automated Config & Supply-Chain Pre-Checks:
    • Run sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh mcp-audit <repo> --json to flag literal credentials in MCP headers/env, plaintext non-loopback http://, filesystem root/.. mounts, unpinned remote packages, and shell-metacharacter args.
    • Run sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh dep-license-diff <repo> --json and sh <plugin>/hooks/run.sh skill-validate ./skills --strict --json (if skills/plugins exist) for Trojan Unicode, hidden prompt-injection comments, or unpinned remote pipelines.
    • Inspect .github/workflows/*.yml for overly broad permissions:, pull-request-target script injection, or unpinned third-party actions (devops-engineer / supply-chain-auditor).
  4. Threat Enumeration (STRIDE + Agentic/LLM Top-10):
    • Evaluate Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege across every crossing of a trust boundary.
    • For AI/agentic/plugin/MCP systems, evaluate prompt injection (indirect HTML comments/external web/PR payloads), tool poisoning/shadowing, confused deputy filesystem/shell escapes, cross-session state bleed, path/symlink traversal, and untrusted postMessage / iframe sandbox leaks.
  5. Risk Matrix & Prioritized Mitigations:
    • Score each threat (Likelihood x Impact -> Critical | High | Medium | Low), record existing controls (file:line verified), identify control gaps, and propose concrete, minimal-change mitigations with verification commands (test-engineer / runtime-qa probes).

Output Deliverable Contract

Write .omagy/artifacts/threat-model-{slug}-{YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ}.md containing:

  • Scope & Protected Assets table
  • Trust-Boundary Mermaid flowchart LR DFD
  • Automated Audit Findings (mcp-audit, dep-license-diff, CI/workflow permissions)
  • Threat Register table (ID, Category, Boundary/File, Threat Vector, Likelihood/Impact, Existing Control, Gap & Concrete Mitigation, Verification Test)
  • Top-5 Priority Actions & Out-of-Scope/Deferred Risks

Return the artifact path and concise Top-5 risk summary to the user.

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