fp-check
Skill547 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Systematically verifies suspected security bugs to eliminate false positives. Produces TRUE POSITIVE or FALSE POSITIVE verdicts with documented evidence for each bug.
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
15 rules. 14 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
14
Common
Most of the 5 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Common: line 21
When the user explicitly asks for a quick scan without verification
- Common: line 25
If you catch yourself thinking any of these, STOP.
- Common: line 40
Before any analysis, restate the bug in your own words.
- Common: line 50
Execution context: When and how is this code path reached during normal execution?
- Common: line 57
After Step 0, choose a verification path.
- Common: line 61
Use when ALL of these hold:
- Common: line 66
No concurrency or async involved in the trigger
- Common: line 69
Follow standard-verification.md.
- Common: line 73
Use when ANY of these hold:
- Distinctive: line 82
Follow deep-verification.md.
- Common: line 86
Start with standard. Standard verification has two built-in escalation checkpoints that route to deep when complexity exceeds the linear …
- Common: line 90
When verifying multiple bugs at once:
- Common: line 92
Run Step 0 for all bugs first — restating each claim often collapses obvious false positives immediately
- Common: line 95
After all bugs are verified, check for exploit chains — findings that individually failed gate review may combine to form a viable attack
- Common: line 99
After processing ALL suspected bugs, provide:
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 5 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
False Positive Check
When to Use
- "Is this bug real?" or "is this a true positive?"
- "Is this a false positive?" or "verify this finding"
- "Check if this vulnerability is exploitable"
- Any request to verify or validate a specific suspected bug
When NOT to Use
- Finding or hunting for bugs ("find bugs", "security analysis", "audit code")
- General code review for style, performance, or maintainability
- Feature development, refactoring, or non-security tasks
- When the user explicitly asks for a quick scan without verification
Rationalizations to Reject
If you catch yourself thinking any of these, STOP.
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
| "Rapid analysis of remaining bugs" | Every bug gets full verification | Return to task list, verify next bug through all phases |
| "This pattern looks dangerous, so it's a vulnerability" | Pattern recognition is not analysis | Complete data flow tracing before any conclusion |
| "Skipping full verification for efficiency" | No partial analysis allowed | Execute all steps per the chosen verification path |
| "The code looks unsafe, reporting without tracing data flow" | Unsafe-looking code may have upstream validation | Trace the complete path from source to sink |
| "Similar code was vulnerable elsewhere" | Each context has different validation, callers, and protections | Verify this specific instance independently |
| "This is clearly critical" | LLMs are biased toward seeing bugs and overrating severity | Complete devil's advocate review; prove it with evidence |
Step 0: Understand the Claim and Context
Before any analysis, restate the bug in your own words. If you cannot do this clearly, ask the user for clarification. Half of false positives collapse at this step — the claim doesn't make coherent sense when restated precisely.
Document:
- What is the exact vulnerability claim? (e.g., "heap buffer overflow in
parse_header()whencontent_lengthexceeds 4096") - What is the alleged root cause? (e.g., "missing bounds check before
memcpyat line 142") - What is the supposed trigger? (e.g., "attacker sends HTTP request with oversized Content-Length header")
- What is the claimed impact? (e.g., "remote code execution via controlled heap corruption")
- What is the threat model? What privilege level does this code run at? Is it sandboxed? What can the attacker already do before triggering this bug? (e.g., "unauthenticated remote attacker vs privileged local user"; "runs inside Chrome renderer sandbox" vs "runs as root with no sandbox")
- What is the bug class? Classify the bug and consult bug-class-verification.md for class-specific verification requirements that supplement the generic phases below.
- Execution context: When and how is this code path reached during normal execution?
- Caller analysis: What functions call this code and what input constraints do they impose?
- Architectural context: Is this part of a larger security system with multiple protection layers?
- Historical context: Any recent changes, known issues, or previous security reviews of this code area?
Route: Standard vs Deep Verification
After Step 0, choose a verification path.
Standard Verification
Use when ALL of these hold:
- Clear, specific vulnerability claim (not vague or ambiguous)
- Single component — no cross-component interaction in the bug path
- Well-understood bug class (buffer overflow, SQL injection, XSS, integer overflow, etc.)
- No concurrency or async involved in the trigger
- Straightforward data flow from source to sink
Follow standard-verification.md. No task creation — work through the linear checklist, documenting findings inline.
Deep Verification
Use when ANY of these hold:
- Ambiguous claim that could be interpreted multiple ways
- Cross-component bug path (data flows through 3+ modules or services)
- Race conditions, TOCTOU, or concurrency in the trigger mechanism
- Logic bugs without a clear spec to verify against
- Standard verification was inconclusive or escalated
- User explicitly requests full verification
Follow deep-verification.md. Break the work into a full task dependency graph and execute each phase methodically, delegating to subagents where the host supports it.
Default
Start with standard. Standard verification has two built-in escalation checkpoints that route to deep when complexity exceeds the linear checklist.
Batch Triage
When verifying multiple bugs at once:
- Run Step 0 for all bugs first — restating each claim often collapses obvious false positives immediately
- Route each bug independently (some may be standard, others deep)
- Process all standard-routed bugs first, then deep-routed bugs
- After all bugs are verified, check for exploit chains — findings that individually failed gate review may combine to form a viable attack
Final Summary
After processing ALL suspected bugs, provide:
- Counts: X TRUE POSITIVES, Y FALSE POSITIVES
- TRUE POSITIVE list: Each with brief vulnerability description
- FALSE POSITIVE list: Each with brief reason for rejection
References
- Standard Verification — Linear single-pass checklist for straightforward bugs
- Deep Verification — Full task-based orchestration for complex bugs
- Gate Reviews — Six mandatory gates and verdict format
- Bug-Class Verification — Class-specific verification requirements for memory corruption, logic bugs, race conditions, integer issues, crypto, injection, info disclosure, DoS, and deserialization
- False Positive Patterns — 13-item checklist and red flags for common false positive patterns
- Evidence Templates — Documentation templates for data flow, mathematical proofs, attacker control, and devil's advocate reviews
Other versions5 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 3
- davidanthonyn/claude-skills★ 091% same
- matheus-rib1108/meu-kit-claude-code★ 086% same
- TheWatcher01/skills★ 091% same
Wrote their own version · 2
- roomkangali/vulnverify-skills★ 9same name
- ajtazer/heckit★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
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