ssrf
Skill20 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Detects HTTP requests to user-controlled URLs that can reach internal services
13 other projects use a version of this.
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Most recently taken up by
- mahumadad/quarrytheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- blacklanternsecurity/red-runtheir own version, first seen Oct 25, 2026
- SubhiSec/claude-ai-cyber-security-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 25, 2026
- ferr079/claude-code-cybersec-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 12, 2026
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- cdxiaodong/cain-agenttheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use sqli, ssti and 6 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
SubhiSecSkillsqli
Hunt SQL injection in REST/GraphQL/SOAP/raw parameters using sqlmap, ghauri, manual UNION/Time/Boolean techniques, and custom WAF-bypass tamper scripts. Use when an input flows into a database query or when the user has identified a parameter that might be vulnerable.
Also in 6 projects that use this
SubhiSecSkillssti
Hunt Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, Velocity, Smarty, ERB, Handlebars, Mustache, and Spring (SpEL). Use when input is reflected in a way that suggests template rendering — error pages, email templates, PDF generators, dynamic content systems.
Also in 7 projects that use this
zebbernSkillsubdomain-enum
Enumerate subdomains for a target domain using passive and active reconnaissance techniques. Use when starting reconnaissance on a new target, when you need to discover the attack surface, when expanding scope from a root domain, or when the user provides a domain to investigate.
Also in 4 projects that use this
langbyyiSkilldeserialization
Insecure deserialization playbook. Use when Java, PHP, or Python applications deserialize untrusted data via ObjectInputStream, unserialize, pickle, or similar mechanisms that may lead to RCE, file access, or privilege escalation.
Also in 4 projects that use this
xfstudioSkillgraphql
GraphQL gives clients exactly the data they need - no more, no less. One endpoint, typed schema, introspection. But the flexibility that makes it powerful also makes it dangerous. Without proper controls, clients can craft queries that bring down your server. This skill covers schema design, resolvers, DataLoader for N+1 prevention, federation for microservices, and client integration with Apollo/urql. Key insight: GraphQL is a contract. The schema is the API documentation. Design it carefully.
Also in 5 projects that use this
- +3 more from SubhiSec
Other versions13 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 13
- cdxiaodong/cain-agent★ 953same name
- blacklanternsecurity/red-run★ 296same name
- SubhiSec/claude-ai-cyber-security-skills★ 45same name
- 0xGhostCAT/claude-ai-cyber-security-skills★ 41same name
- sunilgentyala/OmniRed★ 5same name
- langbyyi/websec-skills★ 4same name
- emre-guler/websec★ 2same name
- KaanBicaklar/mona-sast-skills★ 2same name
- mahumadad/quarry★ 1same name
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1same name
3 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository52 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- authentication-failuresSkill
- broken-access-controlSkill
- concurrency-correctnessSkill
- contract-reviewSkill
- cryptographic-failuresSkill
- crypto-library-misuseSkill
- csrfSkill
- exceptional-conditionsSkill
- excessive-agencySkill
- file-uploadSkill
- graphql-securitySkill
- hardcoded-secretsSkill
- header-injectionSkill
- hotspotsSkill
- injectionSkill
- insecure-designSkill
- insecure-local-storageSkill
- insecure-output-handlingSkill
- insecure-plugin-designSkill
- integrity-failuresSkill
- ipc-securitySkill
- llm-supply-chainSkill
- logging-failuresSkill
- mass-assignmentSkill
- mcp-securitySkill
- memory-api-misuseSkill
- model-dosSkill
- model-theftSkill
- multi-agent-trustSkill
- nosql-injectionSkill
- numeric-trust-boundarySkill
- oauth-implementationSkill
- open-redirectSkill
- overrelianceSkill
- path-traversalSkill
- privilege-handlingSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- prototype-pollutionSkill
- pr-reviewSkill
- race-conditionSkill
- rag-securitySkill
- redosSkill
- security-cleanupSkill
- security-misconfigurationSkill
- security-reviewSkill
- sensitive-disclosureSkill
- supply-chainSkill
- threat-modelSkill
- token-smugglingSkill
- training-data-poisoningSkill
- unsafe-api-consumptionSkill
The file
Files
SSRF Security Check (A10:2025 / API7:2023)
What this checks
Protects against Server-Side Request Forgery where an attacker tricks the server into making requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or arbitrary external hosts. Exploitation leads to internal network scanning, credential theft from cloud metadata APIs (169.254.169.254), and access to services behind firewalls.
Vulnerable patterns
- Outbound HTTP fetch where the URL, host, or scheme comes from request input with no validation
- Webhook callback or URL-preview feature that follows whatever the caller supplies
- URL-fetch APIs that follow redirects by default, letting an allowlisted host 302 to an internal IP
- Hostname-only allowlists that do not also check the resolved IP — vulnerable to DNS rebinding
Fix immediately
Flag the vulnerable code, explain the risk, and suggest a fix establishing these properties. Proxy, webhook, and URL-preview features are the highest-risk shapes — the scheme/host/IP/redirect checks must actually run at the call site before the outbound request; a comment saying "URL should be validated" satisfies nothing if the next line still fetches the raw URL. Translate to the language and HTTP client of the audited file — use that stack's documented URL parser, DNS resolver, and redirect controls.
- Scheme is restricted to
https(andhttponly for trusted internal use). Rejectfile:,gopher:,ftp:,dict:, and other schemes that SSRF toolkits exploit. - Host is checked against an allowlist, and the resolved IP is checked against a blocklist covering private, loopback, and link-local ranges — IPv4
10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8,169.254.0.0/16and IPv6::1/128,fc00::/7,fe80::/10. Resolve-then-check defeats DNS rebinding: an allowlisted hostname can still resolve to169.254.169.254. Language-idiomatic checks that cover the same ranges are equivalent to explicit CIDR comparisons. - Redirects are disabled, or each redirect target is re-validated against the same allowlist. A lone allowlisted host can still 302 to an internal IP.
- The check actually runs. A blocklist declared and never evaluated does not satisfy any of the above — the comparison must be present at the call site, before the outbound request.
Verification
- Every outbound HTTP request using a caller-supplied URL validates the scheme, host, and resolved IP against an allowlist or blocklist before the request is sent
- Cloud metadata and link-local addresses are blocked — either via explicit CIDR entries covering
169.254.0.0/16,fe80::/10, andfc00::/7, or via language-idiomatic checks that cover the same ranges. Declaring a list without evaluating it does not satisfy this - HTTP redirects are disabled, or each redirect target is re-validated against the same allowlist
- DNS resolution results are checked for private/loopback/link-local IPs before connecting
References
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