role-security-auditor
Skill0 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Use this skill to conduct a security audit, authorization review, OWASP-style assessment, threat review, secret exposure check, or sensitive-data review, and to report findings ranked by severity, even when the user only asks whether something is safe. Use standards-security for secure implementation guidance during routine work.
In this repository34 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- mcpSkill
- pattern-orchestration-complexSkill
- pattern-task-breakdownSkill
- role-architectSkill
- role-code-reviewSkill
- role-data-engineerSkill
- role-developerSkill
- role-orchestratorSkill
- role-product-engineerSkill
- role-qa-engineerSkill
- role-site-reliability-engineerSkill
- role-technical-writerSkill
- standards-analysisSkill
- standards-api-designSkill
- standards-codeSkill
- standards-databaseSkill
- standards-documentationSkill
- standards-go-concurrencySkill
- standards-go-performanceSkill
- standards-goSkill
- standards-go-testingSkill
- standards-markdownSkill
- standards-observabilitySkill
- standards-pulumi-typescriptSkill
- standards-pythonSkill
- standards-securitySkill
- standards-shellSkill
- standards-skill-authoringSkill
- standards-testingSkill
- standards-typescriptSkill
- tool-storeSkill
- workflow-debuggingSkill
- workflow-pi-extensionSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 28
Follow authentication and authorization decisions, input parsing, persistence, logs, outbound calls, secrets handling, and error responses.
- Distinctive: line 34
Read the OWASP Top 10 review guide when the audit scope requires category-specific examples and remediations.
- Distinctive: line 40
Prefer evidence from code paths, configs, tests, or reproducible commands over inference from naming.
- Distinctive: line 87
Do not request secrets in chat: Ask for redacted evidence, or for a local command whose output the user can sanitize.
- Distinctive: line 96
Before finishing a security review:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Provides: Audit workflow, severity ranking, a finding format, and guardrails for handling evidence and exploit detail.
Quick Reference
Priority order: authz bypass → data exposure → injection and RCE → secret leakage → availability abuse → hardening
Severity = exploitability × impact × exposure
Never: request secrets in chat, or report a finding without evidence
Reference: skill:standards-security for secure coding details. Also load the domain standards for the API, database, logging, or language code under review.
Audit Workflow
1. Scope assets and trust boundaries
Map the users, tenants, roles, data classes, external inputs, and privileged paths. A finding only means something relative to a boundary someone can actually cross.
2. Trace sensitive flows
Follow authentication and authorization decisions, input parsing, persistence, logs, outbound calls, secrets handling, and error responses.
3. Check common exploit paths
Injection, broken access control, authentication and session flaws, insecure defaults, SSRF and path traversal, unsafe deserialization, dependency risk, and XSS.
Read the OWASP Top 10 review guide when the audit scope requires category-specific examples and remediations.
4. Rank findings
Apply severity = exploitability × impact × exposure. An injection flaw behind an admin-only endpoint on an internal network is not the same severity as the same flaw on a public endpoint.
Prefer evidence from code paths, configs, tests, or reproducible commands over inference from naming.
5. Recommend fixes
Give the smallest safe remediation and the step that verifies it.
Finding Format
Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
Area: {file/path/component}
Issue: {what is vulnerable}
Evidence: {specific code, config, or flow}
Impact: {realistic consequence}
Fix: {concrete remediation}
Verify: {test, command, or review step}
Reference: {OWASP category, CWE, or standard}Calibrate severity against these anchors rather than assigning it by vulnerability class alone. Severity inflation is the most common failure in an audit, and a hardening gap is not High merely because it is security-related.
| Severity | Anchors | Action |
| Critical | Plaintext password storage, SQL injection reaching data, hardcoded credentials in source, missing authentication on admin endpoints | Block deployment, fix now |
| High | Missing input validation on a critical endpoint, no rate limiting on authentication, weak password policy, sensitive data in logs | Fix within days |
| Medium | Missing security headers, outdated dependency with no known exploit, overly permissive CORS, excessive session lifetime | Fix within weeks |
| Low | Older but still secure crypto, verbose internal-only error messages, missing CSRF on read-only endpoints, suboptimal logging | Fix when convenient |
Review Checklist
- Authorization is enforced server-side for every protected operation
- Tenant and user boundaries cannot be bypassed by changing IDs or filters
- Inputs are validated at boundaries and used safely in interpreters
- Secrets are not committed, logged, returned, or exposed to clients
- Sensitive data has explicit retention, masking, and access rules
- Errors are useful to operators without leaking internals
- Dependencies and generated artifacts introduce no known critical risk
- Security-relevant behavior has regression tests where practical
Guardrails
- Do not request secrets in chat. Ask for redacted evidence, or for a local command whose output the user can sanitize.
- Do not provide exploit steps beyond what is needed to verify and fix the issue.
- Treat missing evidence as a question, not a confirmed vulnerability. Report it as something to check, and say what evidence would settle it.
- Separate urgent mitigation from long-term hardening so the reader knows what to do today.
Checklist
Before finishing a security review:
- Findings are severity-ranked and evidence-backed
- Each finding has both a fix and a verification step
- False positives and assumptions are called out explicitly
- Urgent mitigation is separated from long-term hardening
- No secrets were requested or reproduced in the report
Integration with Other Skills
With standards-security: implement the controls the findings call for.
With role-code-review: general quality review runs alongside this deeper security pass.
With role-qa-engineer: turn confirmed findings into security regression tests.
With standards-api-design: review authorization and error models at the contract level.
With role-site-reliability-engineer: handle incidents involving auth, secrets, or user data.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

