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mn-youssefmn-youssef/security-skills/skills/threat-modeling/SKILL.md

threat-modeling

Skill47 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Use when starting a security assessment and you need to map an application's attack surface, enumerate trust boundaries, and rank what to test first — before auditing code or running tools. Produces a prioritized target list.

45 other projects use a version of this.

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Projects with it also use iac-security, container-security and 10 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 40 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 1

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Test high scores first.

    line 22

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 40 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Threat Modeling (PLAN phase)

Overview

Decide what to worry about and test first before spending effort. Map assets, entry points, and trust boundaries; apply STRIDE; rank risks by likelihood × impact.

Core principle: You can't test everything. Spend effort where a break hurts most.

Process

  1. Inventory assets — What's valuable? (user data, money, credentials, PII, admin control, IP)
  2. Map entry points — Every place untrusted input enters: routes/endpoints, forms, file uploads, query params, headers, webhooks, message queues, mobile API calls, third-party callbacks.
  3. Draw trust boundaries — Where does data cross from less-trusted to more-trusted? (browser→API, API→DB, service→service, user→admin). Bugs cluster on these lines.
  4. Apply STRIDE per boundary/component — see references/stride-and-surface.md.
  5. Rank — score each threat: risk = likelihood × impact (1–3 each → 1–9). Test high scores first.

Quick reference — STRIDE

ThreatQuestionDefends
SpoofingCan someone pretend to be another user/service?Authentication
TamperingCan data be modified in transit/at rest?Integrity
RepudiationCan an action be denied / is it logged?Non-repudiation
Information disclosureCan data leak?Confidentiality
Denial of serviceCan it be made unavailable?Availability
Elevation of privilegeCan a user gain rights they shouldn't?Authorization

Output: prioritized target list

A table the next phases consume:

#AssetEntry pointSTRIDELikelihoodImpactRiskTest via
1User PIIGET /api/users/:idI (IDOR)339code-audit + active-pentest
2AuthPOST /loginS236code-audit

Hand-off

Feed the top items into security-code-audit (find) and active-pentest (validate).

The surface inventory is also the applicability driver. It tells the security-testing orchestrator which specialists apply (surface present → run) and which to skip (absent → N/A), and exposes any surface with no matching specialist as a coverage gap to handle with the generic methodology + a recommendation to build a new skill. List every surface you found — including ones no current skill covers — so nothing is silently missed.

Common mistakes

  • Modeling the happy path only — attackers use the unhappy paths.
  • Forgetting internal/trusted entry points (admin panels, internal APIs, cron, queues).
  • Treating all findings as equal — rank, or you'll drown in low-value work.

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