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mn-youssefmn-youssef/security-skills/skills/pentest-reporting/SKILL.md

pentest-reporting

Skill47 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Use when turning security findings into a clear, actionable report — scoring severity with CVSS, writing findings with reproduction and impact, prioritizing remediation, producing an executive summary, and tracking retests to closure. The phase that makes testing matter.

2 other projects use a version of this.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Core principle: Write for two readers at once — an executive who needs *risk and priority*, and an engineer who needs *exact steps to …

    line 13
  2. Distinctive:

    No retest — "fixed" without rerunning the exploit is a guess.

    line 70

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Pentest Reporting (REPORT phase — the end that makes the work count)

Overview

A vulnerability nobody fixes isn't security. This phase converts raw findings into a report that engineers can act on and leaders can prioritize: consistent severity, crisp reproduction, honest impact, concrete fixes, and tracked closure.

Core principle: Write for two readers at once — an executive who needs risk and priority, and an engineer who needs exact steps to reproduce and fix.

Structure of a good report

  1. Executive summary — plain-language risk posture, top 3–5 risks, overall verdict. No jargon.
  2. Scope & methodology — what was tested, environment, dates, what was out of scope.
  3. Findings — one entry each (see template), ordered by severity.
  4. Remediation roadmap — prioritized fix list with effort estimates.
  5. Retest results — status per finding after fixes (Open / Fixed / Risk-accepted).
  6. Appendix — tools, raw evidence, references.

Finding template (use for every issue)

Title:        <Concise, e.g. "IDOR in /api/invoices exposes other users' billing">
Severity:     Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info   (CVSS x.x — vector)
Affected:     <endpoint / file:line / component>
Summary:      <1–2 sentences: what's wrong and why it matters>
Reproduction: <numbered, copy-pasteable steps / exact request>
Evidence:     <response excerpt / screenshot, real data redacted>
Impact:       <business consequence: data exposed, money, accounts, scope>
Remediation:  <specific fix, link to security-hardening pattern>
Status:       Open | Fixed (retested <date>) | Risk-accepted

Severity & CVSS

Score consistently so priorities are defensible. See references/cvss-and-template.md for the CVSS v3.1 metrics, a base-score cheat sheet, and a full report skeleton.

SeverityRough CVSSMeans
Critical9.0–10.0Fix now — full compromise / mass data / unauth RCE
High7.0–8.9Fix this cycle — ATO, sensitive data, privesc
Medium4.0–6.9Plan — needs conditions or limited impact
Low0.1–3.9Backlog — minor/defense-in-depth
Info0.0Note — best-practice, no direct risk

Adjust for business context: a "Medium" on the payment path may be a "High" for you.

Writing rules

  • Reproducible or it didn't happen — steps a developer can paste and rerun.
  • Impact in business terms — "any user can read all invoices," not "missing authz check."
  • One fix per finding — point to the exact security-hardening pattern.
  • No fear, no fluff — accurate severity; over-hyping burns trust, under-hyping gets ignored.
  • Redact real data in evidence.

Retest & closure

For each fixed finding: rerun the original PoC, record pass/fail and date, set status. The report isn't done until every High+ is Fixed or explicitly Risk-accepted by an owner.

Hand-off

Findings come from all FIND/EXPLOIT skills; fixes from security-hardening; this skill packages and tracks them to closure (retest each High+ before marking it fixed).

Common mistakes

  • Dumping scanner output as "the report" — triage, dedupe, and verify first.
  • Severity by gut feel — use CVSS + business context so priorities hold up.
  • Reproduction steps that only you can follow — write for a stranger.
  • No retest — "fixed" without rerunning the exploit is a guess.

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