agentleFS
jhkchanjhkchan/ast10-agent-skills/skills/AST10/SKILL.md

ast10-cross-platform-reuse

Skill2 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Detect and triage OWASP AST10 Cross-Platform Reuse — security metadata (risk_tier, permissions, signatures) silently dropped when a skill is ported between OpenClaw, Claude Code, Cursor, and VS Code, cross-registry arbitrage, and Universal Skill Format manifest validation (deny_write precedence, network allowlist default-deny, signed content hash). Use when validating a manifest against the Universal Skill Format schema, when a skill is being ported across runtimes and needs a re-validation gate, when a permission finding needs binding to a specific field's precedence rule, or when distinguishing this category from the nine it structurally underwrites.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Do not implement deny: "*" as a rule that must fire to produce the default-deny behavior.

    line 81
  2. Distinctive:

    Every entry below is a *passing* result being read as more than it says.

    line 200
  3. Very specific:

    Call verify_signature(manifest) explicitly: it raises rather than returning False when there is no key, so "unverifiable" cannot be logged …

    line 209

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

AST10 - Cross-Platform Reuse

Unofficial community implementation of the OWASP® Agentic Skills Top 10 standard, v1.0. NOT an OWASP project; no OWASP endorsement. OWASP is a registered trademark of the OWASP Foundation, used here descriptively to identify the standard implemented. Source: https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/

Pattern: Knowledge. The decision rule this category turns on: AST10 is not a protocol problem (MCP already standardizes the transport) — it is that no shared vocabulary for security metadata itself exists, so identical intent (deny this skill write access to identity files) is expressible on one platform and inexpressible on another.

Fires on a manifest being validated against the Universal Skill Format, a skill moving between runtimes, a permission finding that needs binding to a specific field's precedence rule, or an encoded blob in an imported package. Decides whether a security-metadata field is missing, malformed, or silently dropped. Does not decide whether a present field's value is right for the skill it describes — that is the corresponding AST01–AST09 category, and the two co-occur often enough to be worth recording separately. Frozen scenario tiers live in coverage-matrix.md.

Run first, then read only what the finding needs

With a manifest in hand, python3 validators/usf.py <manifest> mechanizes rules 1–5: deny_write/write coherence, default-deny egress with the deny: "*" spelling, host syntax, signature and signing-key coherence, and risk_tier against the floor derived from the declared permissions. With a package in hand, node cli/bin/cli.js audit <pkg> runs the one shipped check behind rule 9. Read the rule text when a tool's output is contested, and for the porting event itself, which no tool observes.

If the finding is…Read
a manifest field's meaning or precedencerules 1–5, then stop
a skill that just changed runtimesrules 6–8
an encoded blob, or a scanner result on onerule 9, then "Where the one shipped check goes quiet"
a write-up about to quote a validator OK, a matching hash, or a clean scan"NEVER" — read it before the finding leaves
"is this AST10 or AST0n?""Distinguishing AST10 from its neighbors"
a write-up that attributes the Universal Skill Format"Attribution" — mandatory before you cite it
a value that is wrong rather than a field that is absentwrong skill → the AST01–AST09 category that owns that value

Do NOT open coverage-matrix.md unless you need a binding tier, the F1 denominator, or the off-artifact evidence for one named scenario; five of the six scenarios are out-of-artifact and this file asserts no tier for them. Do NOT reach for skills/AST10/scripts/detector.py for rules 1–5 — it holds only the rule-9 payload check. The manifest semantics are validators/usf.py and the schema is schemas/usf-v1.schema.json.

Attribution — read before citing this section

The Universal Skill Format is the whitepaper's own published proposal (OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10, ast10.md), not an invention of this project. This skill adopts and validates against that published schema; it does not originate it. Any prose in this repo that implies otherwise is a documentation defect, not a design decision (see docs/context.md glossary delta, T-4.3).

The manifest's own precedence rules — get these exactly right

permissions:
  files:
    write: [~/.config/app.json]
    deny_write: [SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, AGENTS.md]
  network:
    allow: [api.example.com]
    deny: "*"
  shell: false
  1. deny_write always wins over write for any path it lists — most-specific-wins, not first-match. A manifest granting broad write access with SOUL.md also present under deny_write denies that one path; a validator that evaluates write and deny_write independently rather than as one most-specific-wins resolution will misreport this as a conflict or, worse, as a grant.
  2. network.allow is evaluated default-deny; the deny: "*" line is redundant auditability, not an override. Only domains explicitly listed under allow are permitted egress — this is true with or without an explicit deny: "*" present. Do not implement deny: "*" as a rule that must fire to produce the default-deny behavior; the absence of a domain from allow is sufficient on its own.
  3. Host matching is exact-or-suffix-at-a-label-boundary, host component only — no wildcard subdomains, scheme, or port matching unless a future revision states otherwise. This is the same matching discipline AST08's egress-suppression rule requires, applied here to the manifest's own allowlist field: substring or prefix matching on unparsed URL text is a bypassable implementation, not a stricter one.
  4. signature covers the canonical JCS (RFC 8785) serialization of the manifest, excluding signature itself and including content_hash. Validating a signature against an arbitrary JSON serialization of the same fields (rather than the canonical form) admits semantically-identical-but-differently-serialized manifests that fail or falsely pass verification depending on the serializer's key ordering and whitespace choices — canonicalization is not optional cleanup, it is what makes the signature checkable at all.
  5. risk_tier is an untrusted author assertion that governance policy must not be driven by directly. Per the format's own design rationale, automated governance decisions must be driven by permission-derived risk classification computed from the manifest's actual grants; risk_tier is used only to detect under-declaration or policy inconsistency against that independently-derived classification — the same principle as AST04's Risk Tier Spoofing decision rule, restated here as the format's own stated design intent rather than an external critique of it.

Decision rules for the porting event itself

  1. Porting is a re-validation trigger, never an equivalence assumption. A skill with risk_tier: L3 and a scoped network.allow on its source platform ported to a platform with no equivalent field does not inherit that platform's default permissiveness safely — it inherits the target's default, silently, unless porting explicitly re-validates the full security metadata against the target platform's actual enforcement surface. "It worked correctly on the source platform" is evidence about the source platform only.
  2. Cross-registry arbitrage exploits install-count as a trust proxy across registries that do not share scanning intelligence. A skill lightly scanned on one registry and promoted to a more trusted one, leveraging accumulated install count as a false trust signal, defeats any single registry's own scanning — the control is cross-registry threat-intelligence sharing, not a stronger scanner on any one registry alone.
  3. Manifest Stripping and Implicit Privilege Escalation are the same underlying event described from two ends. Stripping (the source manifest's fields drop during translation) is the cause; Implicit Privilege Escalation (the ported skill inherits the target platform's broader default) is the effect. A finding that only checks "did fields get dropped" without checking "what does the target platform default to in their absence" understates the actual exposure.

Distinguishing AST10 from its neighbors

AST10 is structurally different from AST01–AST09: it is the metadata substrate the other nine categories' controls are expressed in. deny_write is AST01's identity-file-protection control given a field; network.allow is AST03's domain-allowlist control given a field; signature + content_hash are AST01/AST02's provenance controls given fields. A finding that a specific field is missing, malformed, or silently dropped is AST10; a finding that the value of a present field is wrong for the skill's function is the corresponding AST01–AST09 category. The two frequently co-occur (a stripped deny_write field is both an AST10 porting defect and an AST01-relevant exposure) — record both, since they are fixed by different actors (the porting tool vendor vs. the skill author/reviewer).

The rule behind the one shipped check

  1. Silent Supply Chain Injection is the one AST10 scenario a single package decides, and the decision is made on the decoded bytes, not on the source. The whitepaper's wording is precise: payloads "hidden inside encoded script blocks ... execute at agent speed once imported into a new ecosystem without structural validation", and the matching mitigation is to "build platform-agnostic skill scanners that evaluate the content layer independently of the runtime". Two consequences follow, and reviewers get both wrong in opposite directions. Encoding is not the finding. An embedded icon, a configuration blob, a compressed policy document, and the format's own hex content_hash and signature fields are all encoded, and flagging them makes a scanner unusable on precisely the conformant packages the Universal Skill Format exists to produce. Nor is an unreadable payload a clean one. When a blob is encrypted or triple-wrapped, the decoded content says nothing — but a package that hands an opaque literal to an interpreter has skipped the structural validation the scenario names, and that structure is itself the finding. Judge the decoded content layer where you can read it, and the decode-to-execution path where you cannot.

Where the one shipped check goes quiet

Two different qualifications ride on a negative here, and neither one discharges the other. Scope is how much of the category a single package can decide at all — one scenario of six. Bound is what the check that actually ran was able to look at on this package. A report that gives the scope and stops has told its reader that most of AST10 is out-of-artifact and left them believing the one in-artifact answer was complete; a report that gives the bound and stops offers a careful account of one check as though it were the category. Both, every time.

Both are qualifications, and a qualification needs something to qualify: an answer giving the scope and the bound and never issuing the verdict the question asked for has reported the shape of the question and withheld the answer, which reads downstream as a pass. State it in the package's own nouns as well — the field, the file, the literal's own name as the source spells it. A bound written in this page's vocabulary is checkable against this page and against nothing the reader is holding.

detect_encoded_payload_injection fires on two structural conditions and nothing else: C1, an encoded blob whose decoded text matches a payload-behaviour signature, and C2, an encoded literal whose decoded result reaches an execution sink on the same line or through a single assignment. Both arms have edges a reviewer inherits.

  • C1 convicts decoded behaviour, so a payload the signature set does not describe decodes and reads as inert. The set covers interpreter invocation, destructive filesystem operations, credential harvesting, identity-file writes, fetch-and-execute, exfiltration, reverse shells and dynamic-execution sinks. A payload expressed outside that vocabulary passes C1 and is caught only if it also satisfies C2.
  • C2 follows the decode to a sink across at most one assignment. Two hops — decode, store on an object attribute, execute later — breaks the link, and the package reads clean on both arms.
  • The USF integrity-field exclusion is keyed on the line's text, and only for bare hex. Any hex run sharing a line with content_hash, signature, digest, checksum, etag, uuid and the rest of that list is skipped regardless of which field it actually belongs to; base64 candidates are never excluded this way. The exclusion is what makes the scanner usable on conformant packages, and it is also a named place to hide a hex blob.
  • The decode is bounded: depth 2, 256 KiB per blob, 400 candidates per file. Past any of those, content is unexamined rather than examined-and-cleared. A deeply nested or blob-dense package needs a manual pass, not a re-run.

NEVER

Every entry below is a passing result being read as more than it says. That is this category's characteristic failure: the tooling here is unusually good at shape and unusually quiet about substance, so the false assurance arrives wearing a green check.

  • NEVER read OK (signature=signed, ...) as a verified signature. signature_state (validators/usf.py line 579) is a regex on the shape ed25519:<128 hex> and nothing more; validate_manifest never calls verify_signature, and neither does the CLI — grep the repo and tests/test_usf.py is its only caller. A ported copy that kept the signature line while the body was re-serialized therefore passes the exact gate that exists to catch that port. Call verify_signature(manifest) explicitly: it raises rather than returning False when there is no key, so "unverifiable" cannot be logged as "verified".
  • NEVER treat a matching content_hash as integrity over the package. The hashed surface is SURFACE_GLOBS (scripts/content_hash.py line 26), of which only SKILL.md and scripts/*.py are populated in this repo (line 44), and skill.usf.yaml is deliberately outside it so the hash does not depend on the field carrying it. A coverage-matrix.md, a data file, or any non-.py script can be rewritten with the hash unmoved. "Hash matches" answers did the hashed surface change, and a porting tool that touched anything else has produced exactly the silent metadata loss the category is named for.
  • NEVER accept the "deny_write wins, so the write grant is inert" warning as proof the identity file is protected. _identity_state matches by basename, so deny_write: [config/SOUL.md] registers SOUL.md as denied and downgrades the finding to a warning — while _write_allowed matches a path-form entry against that exact path only, so write: [SOUL.md] still resolves to allowed. The two halves of rule 1 disagree on that manifest and the validator prints the reassuring half. Settle it by evaluating write_allowed(manifest, "SOUL.md"), not by reading the warning.
  • NEVER read a default-run OK as "nothing was stripped in the port". UsfValidationResult.ok is not errors, and the three signals that most directly mark a port — an absent network.deny: "*", an absent scan_status, an absent author.identity — are all warnings. semantic_errors says why in its own message text: a reviewer "cannot tell an intentional omission from metadata dropped in a port". The validator's entire port-detection value lives in the stream the default exit code discards. Run --strict.
  • NEVER report a manifest's defect list as complete when the structural pass failed. validate_manifest returns the schema errors and skips semantic_errors entirely, so precedence, the risk-tier floor, signature/key coherence, changelog cover, and the content-hash binding were never evaluated on that run. Fix the schema errors, re-run, and a second and larger list appears — after the first count has already gone into someone's ticket.
  • NEVER let a parent domain in network.allow stand for its subdomains. Rule 3 states the discipline the format permits; the shipped evaluator is stricter than that ceiling — network_egress_allowed is an exact lowercased set-membership test, so api.example.com does not permit evil.api.example.com, and host_errors rejects *.example.com outright rather than expanding it. Never carry a rule-3 reading into a claim about what this evaluator allowed. The misreading costs in both directions: an allowlist read as covering a subtree hides a real egress gap, and an author who hits the wildcard rejection "fixes" it by widening to the apex domain — trading a rejected manifest for a genuinely broader grant.
  • NEVER cite AST06-missing-sandbox-declaration as coverage of AST10-S04. The registry's own AST10-S04 entry lists that check under artifact_signal_checks and states in the same breath that it is "declared covers: artifact-signal-only and never coverage of this scenario", because an absent permission block is byte-identical to one that never existed. Promoting the proxy turns 1-of-6 into 2-of-6 on paper while nothing new became decidable, and it is the single move coverage-matrix.md records the proxies in order to prevent.
  • NEVER close AST10-S06 on a clean detector line. The clean verdict's own words are "N surface(s) scanned, M decodable blob(s) read" — an account of what was decoded, not of what is there. _raw_candidates extracts base64, bare hex, \xNN and percent encodings only, so base32, base85 and any custom alphabet are never candidates at all, and a third layer is past MAX_DECODE_DEPTH. Report the two numbers rather than the verdict; "0 blobs read" and "0 payloads present" are the same sentence to every reader downstream, and only one of them is something the check measured.

Scope and out-of-artifact boundary

Cross-Registry Arbitrage and Multi-Platform Campaign require observing a skill (or its install-count history) across multiple registries at once — no single skill artifact carries another registry's state. Security Property Loss in Translation needs two manifests plus the target schema, and Manifest Stripping and Implicit Privilege Escalation need the pre-port copy and the target platform's defaults respectively. The tier for each, and the evidence that would decide it, is fixed in coverage-matrix.md; this file does not assert a tier for them.

References

The full Universal Skill Format proposal (complete field list: identity, signatures, content hashes, permissions, deny_write, network allowlists, required tools, risk tier, scan status, changelog) and the whitepaper's browser-only metadata-loss simulator are in the whitepaper's own AST10 section (source: the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 publication, section AST10 (no local copy: this repository points at the publication rather than bundling it, so the authority chain cannot drift from a stale copy; the whitepaper is CC BY-SA 4.0)). This file is the delta on top of it.

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