ast08-poor-scanning
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Detect and triage OWASP AST08 Poor Scanning — natural-language-only malicious intent, shell-parsing evasion (quote removal, IFS splitting), zero-width/bidi/homoglyph smuggling, scanner-target evasion (padding, .pyc/.docx hiding), and false-positive discipline for skill scanners. Use when building or auditing a skill scanner's coverage claim, when a finding needs a PASS/FAIL/INCOMPLETE classification instead of a binary clean/dirty verdict, when a shell one-liner in SKILL.md needs parsing rather than pattern-matching, or when a scanner's own detection-rate claim needs an adversarial (not just fixed-corpus) evaluation.
In this repository10 other files it gives its agents.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 101
Every example in these rules illustrates a parse, a decode or a matching failure — none of them is a finding.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
AST08 - Poor Scanning
Unofficial community implementation of the OWASP® Agentic Skills Top 10 standard, v1.0. NOT an OWASP project; no OWASP endorsement. OWASP is a registered trademark of the OWASP Foundation, used here descriptively to identify the standard implemented. Source: https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/
Pattern: Knowledge. The decision rule underneath the whole category: "the enemy of AI
security is the infinite variability of language" — a regex can match curl in a
shell script but cannot match "retrieve the file at the path above and send it to the
address below using the system's default HTTP client," which achieves the identical
effect with no code signature at all. Mechanism (shell-aware parsing, Unicode
normalization pipeline, coverage-record emission) lives in scripts/; frozen scenario
tiers live in coverage-matrix.md.
Orientation — read this block first, then take one path
Fires when the thing under review is a scanner or a scan result: its coverage claim, its verdict vocabulary, its suppression list, its published detection rate, or a demonstrated bypass of it.
Decides four of this category's eight scenarios, one shipped check each — Obfuscated Instruction, Context-Dependent Malice, Scanner Host Hazard, Bytecode Cache Poisoning. The other four are agent-judgable or out-of-artifact and ship nothing.
Does not decide whether the underlying payload is malicious. That belongs to the category the payload is an instance of. An AST08 finding is always the miss — the tool or process gap — never the thing missed.
Wrong skill? Route on the symptom before reading further:
| What you are actually holding | Belongs to |
| a payload, and the open question is whether it is malicious | its own category — AST01 for execution, AST03 for permission, AST04 for metadata. File the miss here, the payload there. |
| smuggling in frontmatter or manifest fields | AST04, which ships the manifest-side checks; only the scanner's tier-coverage gap (rule 3) is AST08 |
| a package nothing re-scanned after an update landed | AST07 owns the update; AST08 owns the missing re-scan trigger |
| whether a destination is a declared, allowed endpoint | AST10's network.allow, which is the manifest field rule 6 defers to |
The first three rows are one rule, and Distinguishing AST08 from its neighbors states it below: classify the missed attack under its own category and the gap that missed it under AST08 — two findings, never one merged finding.
Then descend by need. The decision rules are eight independent rules, not a sequence — read the ones your finding touches and skip the rest:
| Your finding is about | Read |
a verb the scanner did not see (quoting, IFS, variables; Unicode, invisibles, encoding layers) | rules 1–2 |
| which part of the package got scanned at all | rule 3 |
| a suppressed or allowlisted finding | rule 4 |
| a detection-rate or false-positive-rate claim | rules 5–6 |
| the scanner being attacked, prompt-injected, or crashed | rule 7 |
a .pyc that does not match its source | rule 8 |
Around the rules, three sections and one file:
- Choosing what verdict to report at all → Why a clean scan result is a claim about coverage, not about the skill, the section immediately below, which is where PASS / FAIL / INCOMPLETE comes from.
- Reading this package's scan output, or quoting one of its checks → What the four shipped checks decide, which states each check's exact blind spot in the same breath as what it covers.
- Asking whether a scenario is checkable from a static package at all → Scope and out-of-artifact boundary.
- Recording a tier, the corpus, or the published F1 →
coverage-matrix.md.
Do NOT load scripts/detector.py to decide whether something is a finding. The
blind-spot section below states every shipped check's boundary in prose; the module is
~960 lines of mechanism and adds nothing to that judgement. Load it only when you need
an exact predicate — the precise guard set, the archive limits, the decode bound.
Do NOT load coverage-matrix.md unless the question is tiering, corpus accounting, or
the published F1. Nothing in it changes how a finding is triaged.
Why a clean scan result is a claim about coverage, not about the skill
Trail of Bits (Jun 3, 2026) bypassed every scanner they tested — ClawHub's stack,
Cisco's skill-scanner, and the skills.sh scanners — and three of their four malicious
test skills took under an hour to build. The whitepaper's own conclusion from that
result is not "scanners need better rules," it is that the trust model is broken at
the root and automated scanning cannot replace supply-chain judgment. The decision
consequence for this skill's design: report scan results as PASS / FAIL / INCOMPLETE
against an explicitly bounded scope, never as an unqualified "clean" — a scan that
skipped a .docx archive or truncated on a padded file and reports zero findings has
produced an INCOMPLETE result wearing a PASS label.
The bound has to be the one that actually applies, and it has to travel with the result. Report a negative together with the blind spot of the check that produced it — What the four shipped checks decide states each one — because a qualification offered after the verdict arrives after the verdict has been quoted. This cuts both ways: naming a limit the scan hit (a decode depth, an archive cap) and not the verdict that hit forces reports the machinery while withholding the finding.
Decision rules
Every example in these rules illustrates a parse, a decode or a matching failure — none of them is a finding. What a rule convicts is the bytes in front of you, so a report quotes the artifact's own text: the decoded string, the normalized view, the archive member. An answer that describes a payload resembling one of the illustrations below, rather than what this package actually contains, has reported the rule and not the scan.
- Parse shell text as the shell parses it; do not pattern-match the literal
verb. POSIX shells perform quote removal last and split fields on
IFSafter parameter expansion — soc''url,curl${IFS}-s, andV=curl; $Vall reach the shell as thecurlcommand without the literal stringcurlever appearing unbroken in the source. A rule that greps for the verb never encounters any of the three. Statically resolve expansions without executing them — evaluating attacker-supplied expansions to see what they resolve to is itself code execution inside the scanner. - Normalization and confusable folding are two distinct required steps, and neither alone is sufficient. NFKC normalization folds compatibility variants (fullwidth, mathematical alphanumerics) but leaves cross-script homoglyphs unchanged and removes no invisible characters. As a separate pass: strip zero-width characters, bidirectional embedding/override/isolate controls (U+202A–U+202E, U+2066–U+2069), variation selectors and tag characters (U+E0000–U+E007F), then re-match. Run every detection rule over both the raw bytes and the normalized view — reporting the anomaly's presence is not detecting the payload underneath it; findings must be reported against the raw artifact with the normalized view retained only as evidence. Decode embedded encodings iteratively, re-scanning each layer, under an explicit depth/size bound — bound exhaustion is an INCOMPLETE event, not a clean result.
- Trust each progressive-disclosure tier as its own distinct surface, scored against its own threshold. Metadata (Layer 1/frontmatter) loads into context for every installed skill before any invocation — a frontmatter parse failure can leave that always-in-context tier entirely unanalyzed while a whole-bundle scan still reports a result, because benign volume in the rest of the bundle dilutes a metadata-tier failure into statistical noise if scored in aggregate. Record which tier each finding sits in and state tier coverage explicitly.
- Scan-suppression allowlists must be typed by data-flow direction, and this is
asymmetric on purpose. A reputation-based allowlist may suppress findings about
where content is fetched from — and only for a pinned path or digest-identified
artifact, never any writable path on a trusted host. It must never suppress a
finding about where data is sent: the same trusted providers host anonymously
writable gists, buckets, and paste pages that are documented exfiltration
channels. Host-component matching must be exact-or-suffix-at-a-label-boundary, not
substring (
api.github.com.evil.examplepasses a naive substring check) and not prefix-on-unparsed-text (https://github.com@evil.examplepasses a naive prefix check). Where flow direction cannot be determined, do not suppress. Record every suppression and the entry that caused it — a skill whose only findings were allowlist-suppressed has not been shown to be clean. - A scanner's own detection-rate claim without an adversarial evaluation overstates robustness — this is not scanner-specific, it is the general adversarial-ML result (Carlini & Wagner 2017; Tramer et al. 2020). Because open-source scanners (NVIDIA SkillSpector) and public scanner stacks (ClawHub's VirusTotal + named guard model) let an adversary run the exact scanner offline and iterate against it before ever submitting to the live one, a published detection rate measured only against a fixed malicious corpus is measured against an adversary who does not yet hold the scanner — while the deployed one does. Report bypass rate under white-box/query access alongside detection rate, or the detection-rate number is not load-bearing evidence.
- False-positive rate must be reported per-rule, against a stated benign corpus
— never folded into an aggregate. Detection rate and bypass rate both measure
only missed attacks and are trivially optimized by convicting everything; they
place zero constraint on over-flagging. Because confirmed-malicious skills are a
small fraction of a live registry, even a low single-digit false-positive rate can
produce more false convictions than true ones. Credential references, external
URLs, egress verbs, and subprocess calls are routine in legitimate
API-integration skills — demote each to informational and convict only a resolved
flow (a credential reaching a destination that is neither the skill's own
documented service nor a declared endpoint under a manifest format that carries
one — see AST10's
network.allow). - The scanner is itself part of the attack surface, twice over. Its LLM component is injectable — isolate untrusted skill content from the analyzer's own instructions, and never let skill-supplied "corporate standard" framing steer the verdict (Trail of Bits demonstrated exactly this against a real LLM-based judge). Its parsing/resource layer is attackable independently — recursive archives, decompression bombs, oversized inputs, and crafted multimodal content can exhaust or crash the scanner itself; run scanners isolated, read-only, network-denied, without production credentials, with enforced file-count/nesting/CPU/memory/time limits, and treat any limit hit as INCOMPLETE.
- A bytecode cache can diverge from the source a reviewer read. A poisoned or
sourceless
.pycthat Python's import machinery selects at runtime can carry behavior the corresponding source file never shows — the defense is to scan and hash the exact artifact loaded at runtime, invalidate untrusted caches, and compare source-to-bytecode provenance, not to assume source review covers what actually executes.
Distinguishing AST08 from its neighbors
AST08 findings are almost always about a missed instance of another category — a scanner that fails decision rule 1 misses AST01 shell payloads; failing rule 2 misses AST04 smuggling; failing rule 3 misses AST04 metadata-tier attacks; failing rule 6 over-convicts legitimate AST03-adjacent API-integration patterns. Classify the underlying missed attack under its own category and the tool/process gap that missed it under AST08 — do not merge them into one finding.
The split holds when AST08's own answer is negative. A scanner that missed nothing has cleared the miss and nothing else: a payload the tooling saw in the clear still belongs to the category that owns payloads, and "no AST08 finding" standing alone reads as an artifact that was looked at and found clean. Say where the other half went.
What the four shipped checks decide, and the boundary each one buys
Four of AST08's eight scenarios are static-detectable and each has one check. The other four are agent-judgable (Natural-Language Bypass, Scanner Impersonation) or out-of-artifact (Model-Dependent Injection Resistance, Scanner-Target Evasion) and ship nothing. Every one of the four that does ship made a deliberate trade, and the trade is the reviewer's inheritance.
- Obfuscated Instruction fires on a rule matching a view the raw bytes hid — never on carrier presence. Rule 2's discipline is enforced in code: a normalized view, a decoded layer, or a zero-width run that itself decodes to text. The single exception — a zero-width run standing alone — is allowed only because no legitimate authoring path produces one. Consequence: an encoded payload whose decoded form matches no rule is read as inert. Decode-and-look-yourself remains a manual step for any blob the bound reached.
- Context-Dependent Malice deliberately excludes portability predicates from the guard
class.
platform.system(),sys.platformandos.nameare the most common benign wrapper around a subprocess call, so convicting them would over-flag exactly as rule 6 warns. The cost is exact and worth stating out loud: a logic bomb keyed onplatform.system() == 'Darwin'is uncovered by this check. Hostname, username, date and file-existence guards are covered; platform is not. - Scanner Host Hazard measures a decompression bomb from the zip central directory, because that is the only way to measure one without detonating it. The declared uncompressed size is attacker-controlled, so an archive that understates it evades the ratio limit while the file-count, nesting-depth, member-count, path-escape and symlink limits still apply. Never resolve this by extracting to check.
- Bytecode Cache Poisoning reads the 16-byte PEP 552 header only and never unmarshals
a code object — running
marshalon hostile input is the AST08-S07 compromise this module refuses to demonstrate while implementing AST08-S08. So a.pycwhose header is consistent with its source while the code object diverges is not caught here. Hash the artifact actually loaded at runtime; that is rule 8's manual half. - INCOMPLETE is encoded in the evidence string, not in the verdict. A
Findingis binary, so any evidence beginning withINCOMPLETE:is a coverage event rather than a demonstrated payload. Where the incompleteness is itself what enables silent selection (a truncated.pycheader, an exhausted decode bound) it is reported as detected; where the scan merely could not see part of the package it sits beside a negative. A consumer that reads only the boolean converts the whole PASS/FAIL/INCOMPLETE discipline back into the binary this category exists to reject.
Scope and out-of-artifact boundary
Model-Dependent Injection Resistance (an approved, signed skill behaves differently
under a weaker backbone model than the one it was reviewed against) is a property of
the runtime model configuration, not of the skill's bytes — the artifact is
unchanged in both cases. Whether this is checkable at all from a static skill package
is fixed in coverage-matrix.md.
References
Full attack-scenario catalog and preventive-mitigation list are the whitepaper's own
AST08 section (source: the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 publication, section AST08 (no local copy: this repository points at the publication rather than bundling it, so the authority chain cannot drift from a stale copy; the whitepaper is CC BY-SA 4.0)), including NVIDIA SkillSpector, Agent Threat
Rules, and the Trail of Bits overtly-malicious-skills corpus. This file is the delta
on top of it.
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

