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harshgoyal1harshgoyal1/cloud-architect-skills/skills/threat-model/SKILL.md

threat-model

Skill1 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Build a STRIDE threat model for a cloud architecture or application — trust boundaries, data flows, threats per element, and prioritised mitigations. Use when the user asks for a threat model, security design review, STRIDE analysis, attack surface assessment, or asks how a system could be attacked.

61 other projects use a version of this.

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Used with

Projects with it also use vuln-scan, supply-chain-review and 10 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
  • AnthropicSkill

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    Static source-code vulnerability scan. Reads a target directory (and THREAT_MODEL.md if present), spawns parallel review subagents per focus area, and writes VULN-FINDINGS.json + .md for /triage to consume. Read-only — no building, running, or network. For execution-verified crashes, use vuln-pipeline instead. Use when asked to "scan for vulns", "review this code for security issues", "find bugs in <dir>", or as the step between /threat-model and /triage.

    Also in 5 projects that use this

  • MesteriisSkill

    supply-chain-review

    Reviews lockfiles, installers, provenance, CI permissions, dependency confusion, artifacts, registries, and publishing.

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • AnthropicSkill

    patch

    Generate candidate fixes for verified security findings. Consumes

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  • mbwsimsSkill

    orbit

    Run for repo-wide or diff-wide readiness sweeps: "/orbit", "/orbit pr", "/orbit deep", "/orbit quick", "audit this project", "project-wide review", "is this PR ready overall", or "combined security, tests, codebase, evolution, and instruction review". Use this for broad multi-system assessment, not for a single-file review or a one-domain question.

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • mbwsimsSkill

    test-plan

    This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan tests", "what should I test", "what tests do I need", "test plan for", "testing strategy for", "test matrix for", "what cases should I cover", "help me plan tests", mentions "/test-plan", or wants to understand what tests are needed before writing any test code.

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  • Sagargupta16Skill

    dependency-audit

    Audit project dependencies for security vulnerabilities, licensing issues, maintenance health, and optimization opportunities. Use it during regular security audits (monthly or quarterly); before a major release when you want to ensure the dependency tree is clean; when evaluating whether to adopt or replace a dependency; after a security advisory affects one of your dependencies; when your install times or bundle sizes have grown noticeably.

    Also in 4 projects that use this

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 55 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 1

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Every threat needs a plausible attacker path — who, from where, with what access.

    line 78

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 55 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Threat Model (STRIDE)

Model the system as it is, not as documented. If code and diagram disagree, the code wins.

Method

  1. Scope — one system or bounded context. Note what is explicitly out of scope.
  2. Decompose — list external entities, processes, data stores, and data flows.
  3. Draw trust boundaries — internet↔edge, edge↔app, app↔data, tenant↔tenant, workload↔platform, human↔system, and any boundary where authority changes.
  4. Apply STRIDE per element, not per system.
  5. Rate likelihood × impact. Prioritise by exploitability, not novelty.
  6. Map mitigations to existing controls first; only then propose new ones.

Element applicability

ElementSTRIDE
External entity✔✔
Process✔✔✔✔✔✔
Data store✔✔✔✔
Data flow✔✔✔

Prompts per category

Spoofing — can identity be forged? Token replay, missing audience/issuer validation, weak service-to-service auth, unauthenticated internal endpoints, DNS or SNI confusion.

Tampering — can data or code be modified in flight or at rest? Unsigned artifacts, mutable image tags, missing integrity checks, writable IaC state, parameter and mass-assignment issues, cache poisoning.

Repudiation — can an actor deny an action? Missing or mutable audit logs, shared accounts, actions performed by a service identity with no attribution to the human behind it.

Information disclosure — what leaks? Verbose errors, metadata endpoints, public storage, over-broad API responses, logs containing secrets or PII, side channels, unencrypted internal traffic, backup and snapshot exposure.

Denial of service — what exhausts? Unbounded queries, missing rate limits and quotas, retry storms and amplification, expensive endpoints reachable unauthenticated, noisy-neighbour in shared tenancy, dependency timeouts cascading.

Elevation of privilege — how does an attacker gain authority? Over-broad IAM, privilege escalation via role assignment or policy write, container escape and host mounts, SSRF into the metadata service, deserialization, dependency confusion, CI/CD as a path to production.

For AI and agentic components, add

  • Prompt injection through any content the model reads, including tool output and file names
  • Tool boundary: what can the agent actually invoke, and with whose authority?
  • Confused deputy — agent acting on behalf of a user with more privilege than that user
  • Excessive agency: mutating actions without an approval gate or rollback path
  • Output handling: model output flowing into a shell, SQL, or a browser unescaped
  • Data exfiltration through model context, embeddings or logs

Output

## Threat Model — <system>

### Scope and assumptions
### Trust boundaries
### Data flow inventory

| # | Element | Boundary | STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Existing control | Gap | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

### Top 5 by exploitability
### Accepted risks
### Open questions

Every threat needs a plausible attacker path — who, from where, with what access. Drop anything you cannot write a path for.

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