secure-audit
Skill1 starsChanged 8 days agoMITView on GitHub
Perform comprehensive security guidance and vulnerability reviews for codebases, APIs, services, CLI tools, libraries, and microservices. Use when the user asks for a security audit, vulnerability review, pen test, code security check, or asks security questions about their codebase. Operates in Guidance mode (focused advice) or Full Audit mode (6-phase coverage-led audit with verified machine-readable findings and reports).
In this repository62 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .claude/skills/humanizer/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
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- agentshieldSkill
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- awwwardsSkill
- backend-engineeringSkill
- boarduiSkill
- courtSkill
- designsSkill
- design-systemsSkill
- diagram-designSkill
- frontend-engineeringSkill
- humanizerSkill
- impeccableSkill
- interface-designSkill
- jurySkill
- karpathy-guidelinesSkill
- last30daysSkill
- lemo-opuscarSkill
- logo-designSkill
- model-routerSkill
- motionsites-web-builderSkill
- ponytailSkill
- quality-engineeringSkill
- rev-engineerSkill
- rigorSkill
- sanzo-wada-colorsSkill
- scraplingSkill
- security-auditSkill
- skillforgeSkill
- socraticSkill
- stageshowSkill
- stealSkill
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- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
12 rules. About 0 are common, 10 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈10
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 26
Use for security questions, specific file reviews, triage, or investigating particular vulnerability classes.
- Distinctive: line 37
Strict Sandboxing for Local Tests: If running bounded local checks, harnesses, or unit tests:
- Distinctive: line 38
No external network access.
- Distinctive: line 39
Use dummy credentials and non-production fixtures.
- Very specific: line 40
Write only into isolated scratch/ directories outside repository source.
- Distinctive: line 41
Never generate or persist functional exploit payloads or weaponized exploit chains.
- Very specific: line 42
Evidence Over Assumptions: If a decisive security control is outside the repository (e.g.
- Distinctive: line 75
Every unique candidate must be verified by a fresh, independent perspective whose goal is to attempt to disprove or boundedly confirm the …
- Distinctive: line 112
Do NOT report generic style deviations or missing defense-in-depth as vulnerabilities without a reachable boundary failure.
- Distinctive: line 113
Do NOT guess external deployment configurations that are absent from the source.
- Distinctive: line 114
Do NOT generate weaponized exploit code or attack payloads.
- Distinctive: line 115
Do NOT deliver reports before both schema validators pass cleanly.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Audit: Coverage-Led Vulnerability Review
A defensive, source-grounded security audit workflow adapted for Google Antigravity IDE. It orchestrates isolated review perspectives through reconnaissance, coverage-led hunting, adversarial candidate validation, structured machine-readable findings, independent verification, and target-neutral reporting.
A candidate without a concrete lower-trust principal, crossed boundary, and affected resource is not a confirmed finding.
Operating Modes
This skill is guidance by default. Loading it does not authorize the full multi-phase audit workflow or bulk file creation.
- Guidance Mode (Default for questions and focused reviews): Use for security questions, specific file reviews, triage, or investigating particular vulnerability classes. Answer directly, inspect relevant source, explain mechanics, and recommend the smallest effective fix. Do not write full audit artifacts.
- Full Audit Mode (Explicit requests: "audit this codebase", "full security review", "pen-test"):
Execute the complete 6-phase audit lifecycle and generate the full report suite (
REPORT.md,FINDINGS-DETAIL.md,NEEDS-VALIDATION.md, and machine-validatedfindings.json).
If the user's intent is ambiguous between guidance and a full audit, ask one focused clarification question before initializing files.
Safety & Execution Boundaries
- Source Inspection is Read-Only: The audit investigates and reports; it never modifies target source code.
- Strict Sandboxing for Local Tests: If running bounded local checks, harnesses, or unit tests:
- No external network access.
- Use dummy credentials and non-production fixtures.
- Write only into isolated
scratch/directories outside repository source. - Never generate or persist functional exploit payloads or weaponized exploit chains.
- Evidence Over Assumptions: If a decisive security control is outside the repository (e.g. cloud IAM, reverse proxy, external WAF), record it as
needs_validationwith the exact unverified fact rather than guessing.
Full Audit Workflow (6 Phases)
In Full Audit mode, resolve the target path and output directory (default: ~/security-audits/<repo-name>/run-<N>/), then execute the phases in order:
Phase 1: Reconnaissance
Map architecture, trust boundaries, entry points, and deterministic coverage units.
- Guide: RECONNAISSANCE.md
- Artifacts: Produce
architecture.mdand initialcoverage-ledger.json. - Validation:
node scripts/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs coverage-ledger.json
Phase 2: Coverage-Led Hunting Waves
Assign focused hunting tasks across the ledger units. Hunters inspect source and identify candidate boundary failures.
- Guides: HUNTING.md and ATTACK-CLASSES.md
- Domain Companions (consult on-demand based on target architecture):
- Web & Auth: WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md
- Cloud & Infra: CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md
- AI & LLM Systems: AI-AND-LLM.md
- Client-Side & DOM: CLIENT-SIDE.md
- Supply Chain & CI: SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md
- Protocols & Messaging: PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md
- Data Isolation & Lifecycle: DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md
- Binary & Memory Safety: MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md
- Resource & Availability: RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md
- Native & Local IPC: DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md
Phase 3: Candidate Validation
Every unique candidate must be verified by a fresh, independent perspective whose goal is to attempt to disprove or boundedly confirm the boundary failure.
- Guide: VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md
- Candidates that fail verification are marked
rejected. - Blocked hypotheses with missing environment facts are marked
needs_validation.
Phase 4: Structured Output
Compile verified candidates into findings.json.
- Schema: report-schema.json
- Validation (mandatory before reporting):
node scripts/validate-findings.cjs findings.json node scripts/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs coverage-ledger.json
Phase 5: Independent Record Verification
A fresh verifier performs a final source-trace confirmation on all confirmed records. Any material updates require re-validation.
Phase 6: Reporting
Synthesize findings into clean, target-neutral markdown reports:
REPORT.md: Executive summary, coverage statistics, risk breakdown.FINDINGS-DETAIL.md: Comprehensive technical details for confirmed vulnerabilities with root causes and smallest effective source fixes.NEEDS-VALIDATION.md: Items requiring runtime or environmental verification by repo owners.
Severity Calibration
- Critical: Unauthenticated arbitrary code execution, full database takeover, or arbitrary tenant compromise.
- High: Defeats explicit security controls (e.g. auth bypass, cross-tenant read/write, stored XSS on sensitive origins).
- Medium: Real boundary violation with limited blast radius or uncommon preconditions.
- Low: Information disclosure of non-secret internals or low-gain logic anomalies.
- Informational: Minimal-impact hygiene observation.
- (Note:
needs_validationitems carry NO severity until verified).
Anti-Patterns to Avoid
- Do NOT report generic style deviations or missing defense-in-depth as vulnerabilities without a reachable boundary failure.
- Do NOT guess external deployment configurations that are absent from the source.
- Do NOT generate weaponized exploit code or attack payloads. Provide clear, minimal reproduction descriptions and defensive patches.
- Do NOT deliver reports before both schema validators pass cleanly.
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