Mobile Security Auditor Protocol

Mobile apps run in hostile, untrusted environments (the user's device). Unlike a web server tucked behind a firewall, a mobile app can be decompiled, memory-dumped, and its network traffic intercepted by anyone holding the physical device. This skill enforces hard security boundaries on the client.

Core principle: Assume the device is compromised. Never trust the client. Never store secrets in plaintext.

Workflow

1. Analyze the requested feature / current implementation
2. Check against OWASP Mobile Top 10 vulnerabilities
3. Audit Data at Rest (Storage Security)
4. Audit Data in Transit (Network Security)
5. Audit Runtime Defenses (Reverse Engineering/Tampering)

Step 1: Implementation Analysis

Understand what the app is doing:

• Storing an API token or password?
• Communicating with a backend over HTTPS?
• Handling financials, PII, or health data?

Step 2: OWASP Mobile Top 10

Cross-reference the implementation with common flaws:

• M1: Improper Platform Usage (Misusing Keychain, Intents).
• M2: Insecure Data Storage (Storing tokens in AsyncStorage or UserDefaults).
• M3: Insecure Communication (No certificate pinning, HTTP traffic).
• M4: Insecure Authentication (Relying purely on device ID).
• M5: Insufficient Cryptography (Using weak algorithms like MD5/SHA1).

Step 3: Data at Rest (Storage)

How is data saved on the device?

• Rule: Never store JWTs, API keys, or passwords in unencrypted SharedPreferences (Android), UserDefaults (iOS), or React Native AsyncStorage.
• Solution: Always use the iOS Keychain and Android Keystore / EncryptedSharedPreferences (via libraries like expo-secure-store or react-native-keychain).

Step 4: Data in Transit (Network)

HTTPS is not enough to stop a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack if the user installs a rogue root certificate on their device (using tools like Charles Proxy).

• Solution: For high-security apps (banks, health), implement Certificate Pinning or Public Key Pinning. Hardcode the server's public key hash in the app so it only trusts that specific certificate.

Step 5: Runtime Defenses

How do you stop a user from tampering with your app logic?

• Obfuscation: ProGuard / R8 for Android.
• Root/Jailbreak Detection: Check if the OS is compromised (e.g., checking for Cydia/Magisk paths). Warn the user or lock the app.
• Anti-Debugging / Anti-Tampering: iOS ptrace checks, Android SafetyNet / Play Integrity API.

Output Format

# 🛡️ Mobile Security Audit Report

**Feature/Area:** [e.g., User Authentication Token Storage]

## 🚨 Critical Security Vulnerabilities
*Must be fixed before release to prevent data breaches.*

1. **[Vulnerability, e.g., Insecure Data Storage (OWASP M2)]**
   - **Threat:** [E.g., Storing the JWT in `AsyncStorage` means any rooted device or malicious app with root access can read the token in plaintext from the app's data folder.]
   - **Remediation:** [E.g., Migrate storage to the hardware-backed Android Keystore and iOS Keychain utilizing `react-native-keychain`.]

## ⚠️ Medium-Risk Warnings
*Best practices that should be implemented.*

1. **[Risk, e.g., Insecure Communication (MitM Vulnerability)]**
   - **Threat:** [E.g., Users on public Wi-Fi could have their traffic intercepted if they are tricked into installing a rogue profile.]
   - **Mitigation:** [E.g., Implement strict Certificate Pinning for the `/login` endpoint.]

## 💡 Code Implementation

```javascript/swift/kotlin
// Insecure Pattern (DO NOT DO THIS):
await AsyncStorage.setItem('userToken', token);

// Secure Pattern:
import * as Keychain from 'react-native-keychain';
await Keychain.setGenericPassword('user', token);
```

When to Skip

• The user is asking about server-side SQL injection or backend Kubernetes security (this skill focuses on the mobile client).

Guardrails

• Hardcoded Secrets: Explicitly warn developers against hardcoding API Secrets or third-party paid keys directly into the app source code, even if obfuscated. Strings can always be extracted. Route calls through a secure backend proxy instead.
• Root Detection Bypass: Remind developers that client-side Jailbreak/Root detection is an arms race and can be bypassed. It is a defense-in-depth layer, not a silver bullet.

References

See references/EXAMPLES.md for a worked case.

🔗 Next Steps & Handoffs

Ecosystem: @ecosystem-mobile — Mobile App Domain.

Workflows:

• Pre-Release Audit Flow (mobile-pre-release-audit, step 3 of 3): last step → once it passes, complete the workflow and report the outcome.

Direct handoffs:

• @auth-flow-designer — Findings involve token storage or backend auth design.

Handoff contract: pass results to the next skill through an inline Handoff block in your reply with the fields skill, workflow, created_at, inputs, summary, and next (the handoff contract of @ecosystem-mobile). If a next skill is not installed, continue with its step from the ecosystem map, or install it with npx skills add fatih-developer/fth-skills --skill <name> after the user agrees.