axguard-triage
Skill17 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub
Triage AXguard scanner output — false-positive filter, severity promotion, and keep/drop gates per vuln class. Use after an audit when the user wants signal, not volume, or runs /axguard-triage.
- Pipes a download into a shell
- Reads credentials
Files
AXguard Triage
Fewer confirmed bugs beat a long maybe-list. Read .findings/axguard/axguard-report.json when present. If .findings/axguard/adversary.json is present, prefer adversary final statuses (CONFIRMED / LIKELY / UNVERIFIED / FALSE_POSITIVE / REQUIRES_REVIEW) over raw Judge labels when deciding Keep vs Drop. Else if .findings/axguard/verification.json is present, use Judge statuses (VERIFIED / LIKELY / UNVERIFIED / FALSE_POSITIVE) — hunters emit candidates only; do not promote pattern-only UNVERIFIED hits to critical. Defensive reasoning only.
Gate (all must pass to keep)
- Real sink in shipped code (not a test/fixture unless fixtures ship or CI deploys them).
- Reachability — attacker-influenced data can reach it, or a required control is clearly absent.
- Impact — more than style / theoretical purity.
- Actionable fix — engineer knows what to change.
Fail any → Drop. Pass all → Keep with severity + evidence. Uncertain reachability → needs-manual, do not promote to critical.
Severity rules
| Action | When |
| Promote | Confirmed RCE/auth bypass/secret-in-prod with clear path; scanner said medium |
| Hold | Scanner severity matches evidence |
| Demote | Sink real but only authenticated admin on isolated network, or mitigated partially |
| Drop | Test-only, constant input, dead code, already parameterized/sanitized on path |
Critical reserved for: RCE, auth bypass, prod secret leak, unverified JWT / alg=none on auth path.
Class-specific FP notes
| Lead type | Often false when… | Promote when… |
| IDOR / get-by-id | Query also filters user_id/tenant_id; BOLA already enforced in middleware | Id-only load on user-facing API |
| JWT decode | Display-only after prior verify | Decode used for auth decisions |
| SQL concat | All fragments are constants / bind vars used | Request/body/params interpolated |
shell=True / exec | Fixed string; no user input in command | Any request/file/model field in command |
| pickle / unserialize | Local trusted cache, never from network | Cookie, queue, upload, or request body |
| SSTI | Template name dynamic; string is static file | User string compiled as template |
| path open/join | realpath + prefix check to jail | User segment joins then opens/sends |
| SSRF | Host allowlist / no user URL | User URL or redirect to internal/metadata |
| XSS sinks | Constant HTML or strict sanitizer in correct context | User/HTML from API into sink |
| upload original name | Random key in object storage + no exec | Saved under web root / executable path |
CORS * | No credentials; public CDN | * or reflect-origin with credentials |
| DEBUG flags | .env.example / local-only compose not used in prod | Prod config or default True |
| supply curl|sh | Docs-only, not CI/ship script | Dockerfile, CI, install.sh ship path |
| agent exec | Human approval hard-gate always | Model/tool output → shell/exec |
Workflow
# Prefer existing report; else regenerate
axguard audit . --out-dir .findings/axguard- Sort findings critical → low.
- Apply gate per item; record Keep / Drop / needs-manual.
- Re-rank kept items by blast radius (see
axguard-cso). - Hand confirmed list to
/axguard-fixor/axguard-report.
Output
| Keep / Drop / Manual | ID | Severity | Location | One-line reason |
Close with: kept count, dropped count, manual count, recommended ship decision hint (blocker if any Keep ≥ high on auth/RCE/secret).
In this repository39 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-agent-securitySkill
- ai-application-securitySkill
- api-securitySkill
- attack-surface-mappingSkill
- authentication-analysisSkill
- authorization-analysisSkill
- axguard-auditSkill
- axguard-csoSkill
- axguard-knowledgeSkill
- axguard-preshipSkill
- axguard-remediateSkill
- axguard-reportSkill
- axguard-securitySkill
- cloud-securitySkill
- command-injectionSkill
- configuration-securitySkill
- deserialization-securitySkill
- file-upload-securitySkill
- graphql-securitySkill
- jwt-securitySkill
- mcp-securitySkill
- oauth-securitySkill
- path-traversalSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- prototype-pollutionSkill
- secrets-detectionSkill
- security-architecture-reviewSkill
- security-remediationSkill
- security-triageSkill
- session-securitySkill
- sql-injectionSkill
- ssrf-analysisSkill
- ssti-analysisSkill
- supply-chain-securitySkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- websocket-securitySkill
- xss-analysisSkill
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