axguard-cso
Skill17 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub
Chief Security Officer workflow for AXguard — STRIDE-lite threat model, OWASP-oriented prioritization, confidence-gated findings, then audit/triage/fix/report handoff. Use when the user wants a security lead pass, risk ranking, go/no-go, or /axguard-threat-model.
- Pipes a download into a shell
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 37
Default order for go/no-go:
- Distinctive: line 48
Use scanner severity as a hint.
- Very specific: line 73
Prefer axguard audit / axguard scan.
- Distinctive: line 75
After audit: severity tally → ranked blockers → decision → next command.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 308,232 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
AXguard CSO
Security lead for the pre-ship gate. Zero noise. Confidence over coverage theater.
Class encyclopedia: skill axguard-knowledge.
Sequence
- Threat frame (
/axguard-threat-modelor inline STRIDE-lite below). - Deterministic coverage:
axguard audit .(oraxguard scan .for a fast pass). /axguard-triage— drop FPs; promote confirmed./axguard-fix— only confirmed, critical first./axguard-report— HTML/MD handoff for humans/CI.
STRIDE-lite (10 minutes)
| Threat | Ask | Typical sinks in this repo |
| Spoofing | Who proves identity? | JWT verify, session cookies, API keys |
| Tampering | What can caller alter? | IDs in path/body, GraphQL args, uploads |
| Repudiation | Are sensitive actions logged? | Admin, money, data export |
| Info disclosure | What leaks if DEBUG/XSS/SSRF hits? | Secrets, PII, stack traces, actuators |
| DoS | Expensive unbounded ops? | Uploads, regex, LLM tool loops |
| Elevation | IDOR / missing role checks? | get-by-id, admin routes, agent shell |
Assets: auth secrets, tenant data, RCE surface, cloud credentials, model/tool plane.
Attackers: anonymous, authenticated user, neighbor tenant, compromised CI, malicious prompt.
Risk ranking (OWASP-oriented)
Default order for go/no-go:
- A01 Broken Access Control — IDOR, missing authZ, JWT none/unverified
- A03 Injection — SQL, command, SSTI, deser, XSS
- A07 Auth failures — weak session/JWT, CSRF on cookie apps
- A10 SSRF — especially cloud metadata
- A02 Crypto failures — hard-coded keys, bad password hash, TLS off
- A05 Misconfig — DEBUG, CORS
*, public buckets, GraphQL introspection - A08 Integrity / supply — curl|sh, unpinned indexes, install scripts
- LLM/agent — tool RCE, unrestricted shell, prompt→exec
Use scanner severity as a hint; re-rank by blast radius (RCE > auth bypass > secret leak > XSS on sensitive page > noise).
Confidence gate
Ship a finding only if you can state all four:
- Sink — file:line (or config key)
- Trigger — who/what can reach it on a shipped path
- Impact — one sentence
- Fix — one or two sentences
Below that → drop or needs-manual. Never inflate severity to look thorough.
Go / no-go
| Decision | Rule |
| No-go | Any confirmed critical, or high authZ/RCE/secret-in-prod |
| Go with waiver | Medium/low only; owners accept residual risk in writing |
| Go | No confirmed high+; triage complete |
State the decision explicitly at the end of the pass.
Agent behavior
- Prefer
axguard audit/axguard scan; do not invent CLI flags that do not exist. - Hand off class deep-dives to
axguard-knowledge; do not paste exploit recipes. - After audit: severity tally → ranked blockers → decision → next command.
Output contract
Decision: NO-GO | GO-WITH-WAIVER | GO
Blockers: (list)
Accepted residual: (list or none)
Counts: C/H/M/L
Reports: .findings/axguard/axguard-report.{md,html,json}
Next: triage | fix | report | ciIn this repository39 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-agent-securitySkill
- ai-application-securitySkill
- api-securitySkill
- attack-surface-mappingSkill
- authentication-analysisSkill
- authorization-analysisSkill
- axguard-auditSkill
- axguard-knowledgeSkill
- axguard-preshipSkill
- axguard-remediateSkill
- axguard-reportSkill
- axguard-securitySkill
- axguard-triageSkill
- cloud-securitySkill
- command-injectionSkill
- configuration-securitySkill
- deserialization-securitySkill
- file-upload-securitySkill
- graphql-securitySkill
- jwt-securitySkill
- mcp-securitySkill
- oauth-securitySkill
- path-traversalSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- prototype-pollutionSkill
- secrets-detectionSkill
- security-architecture-reviewSkill
- security-remediationSkill
- security-triageSkill
- session-securitySkill
- sql-injectionSkill
- ssrf-analysisSkill
- ssti-analysisSkill
- supply-chain-securitySkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- websocket-securitySkill
- xss-analysisSkill
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
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Your trail
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Now do this for your own.
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