agentleFS
Wang200935Wang200935/security-agent-skills/skills/cloud-security/security-code-review/SKILL.md

security-code-review

Skill4 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Review code in Hermes with a Claude-Code-style security-focused findings-first

5 other projects use a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

8 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 4 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 5

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 3

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Use this skill when the primary task is to find security-relevant issues in code or configuration changes.

    line 22
  2. Distinctive:

    If feasible, validate concerns with evidence:

    line 73
  3. Distinctive:

    Do not claim exploitability without basis, but do not require a full exploit proof to raise a risk.

    line 80
  4. Distinctive:

    If no findings are discovered:

    line 111
  5. Distinctive:

    Do not dilute the review with generic style comments.

    line 122
  6. Very specific:

    Use claude-code-review-executor for a broader non-security review.

    line 139
  7. Very specific:

    Use claude-code-pr-executor after security review if the user wants a PR-ready writeup.

    line 140
  8. Very specific:

    Use claude-code-coding-executor if the user asks to fix confirmed issues.

    line 141

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 4 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Claude-Code-Style Security Review

Use this skill when the primary task is to find security-relevant issues in code or configuration changes.

When To Use

Load this skill when:

  • the user asks for a security review
  • changes touch authn, authz, secrets, file access, persistence, input handling, or network boundaries
  • a general review surfaced possible security concerns that need deeper inspection

Security Review Contract

You are not doing a general style review. You are looking for exploitable or trust-boundary-relevant issues.

Prioritize:

  1. authentication and authorization flaws
  2. injection risks
  3. unsafe deserialization or dynamic execution
  4. secret leakage or insecure secret handling
  5. path traversal and filesystem trust issues
  6. SSRF, open redirects, and outbound trust misuse
  7. data exposure, multi-tenant leakage, or missing access checks
  8. weak validation at trust boundaries

Workflow

1. Understand The Trust Boundary

Identify:

  • where untrusted input enters
  • where permissions are checked
  • where secrets are read, stored, or transmitted
  • where filesystem, database, or network boundaries are crossed

2. Inspect Risky Surfaces

Look closely at:

  • request parsing
  • query construction
  • file path handling
  • shell or process invocation
  • token/session handling
  • serialization/deserialization
  • redirects and URL fetching
  • object ownership or tenant scoping

3. Verify When Practical

If feasible, validate concerns with evidence:

  • targeted tests
  • malicious or adversarial inputs
  • negative-path checks
  • permission-boundary scenarios

Do not claim exploitability without basis, but do not require a full exploit proof to raise a risk.

Output Format

Report findings first.

Each finding should include:

  1. severity or impact
  2. file and location if available
  3. the vulnerable behavior
  4. why it matters
  5. a realistic attack or failure scenario

Use this structure:

Findings

1. [severity] `path/to/file:line` - concise statement of the security issue and why it matters.

Open Questions / Assumptions

- assumptions affecting confidence

Verification Notes

- checks run
- notable results

If no findings are discovered:

No security findings.

Residual risks / gaps:
- unverified assumptions, untested boundaries, or areas not executed

Findings Bar

Do not dilute the review with generic style comments.

Good findings:

  • user-controlled path reaches file open without canonicalization or allowlisting
  • auth check occurs after data fetch and leaks unauthorized metadata
  • token is logged or returned in an error path
  • SQL or shell command construction incorporates untrusted input

Weak findings:

  • naming preferences
  • formatting issues
  • architecture opinions with no security consequence

Interaction With Other Skills

  • Use claude-code-review-executor for a broader non-security review.
  • Use claude-code-pr-executor after security review if the user wants a PR-ready writeup.
  • Use claude-code-coding-executor if the user asks to fix confirmed issues.

Suggested Internal Checklist

Before concluding, confirm:

  • trust boundaries were identified
  • findings are actually security-relevant
  • severity reflects realistic impact
  • claims are not overstated beyond the evidence

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