security-code-review
Skill0 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Audit any codebase for the OWASP Top-10-style vulnerability classes (SQLi, XSS, IDOR, broken auth, CSRF, XXE, SSRF, file upload, misconfig, data exposure, insecure deserialization, command injection, path traversal) by reading the actual code, and propose/apply fixes. Detection-only — never generates attack payloads or exploit code.
5 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NVIDIA/flashdreamstheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- Wang200935/security-agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Aug 11, 2026
- mDevsLabs/Skillstheir own version, first seen Jul 29, 2026
- goodnessibeh/ai-dev-boilerplatetheir own version, first seen Apr 9, 2026
- Ascend/agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Mar 17, 2026
Other versions5 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 5
- NVIDIA/flashdreams★ 538same name
- Ascend/agent-skills★ 43same name
- Wang200935/security-agent-skills★ 4same name
- mDevsLabs/Skills★ 2same name
- goodnessibeh/ai-dev-boilerplate★ 1same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 4 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 47
Read the matched code, don't just pattern-match blindly: a $queryRaw call with a fully-static string is not a finding.
- Very specific: line 52
Use references/report-template.md as the structure.
- Distinctive: line 68
After applying fixes, if any touch code that's deployed separately from the git repo (e.g.
- Distinctive: line 74
If a pattern is ambiguous (e.g.
- Distinctive: line 80
Never write SQL injection strings, XSS payloads, command injection strings, or any other attack string — not even "for testing", not even …
- Distinctive: line 83
Never write or suggest actual exploit/proof-of-concept code against a live system.
- Distinctive: line 84
If asked to test a system that isn't clearly the developer's own project (no confirmed authorization), stop and ask for clarification …
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 4 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Code Review Skill
What this skill does
This skill turns Claude into a defensive security auditor for any codebase, in any language or framework. It does NOT generate exploit payloads, attack scripts, or "try this SQLi string" content. Everything here works by reading code and finding unsafe patterns — the same way a human security engineer does a code review.
This is intentional and non-negotiable: the value of this skill is that it finds real
bugs in real code, which is more useful (and more defensible to publish) than any
wordlist. Wordlists are free and already exist (SecLists). A tool that reads your
actual Prisma/Django/Express code and tells you "line 42 in orders.ts trusts a
client-supplied amount" is not replaceable by a wordlist.
When to use this skill
Invoke this skill when a developer asks to:
- "audit this project for security issues"
- "run a security review / security check on this codebase"
- "find vulnerabilities in this repo"
- "check for SQLi / XSS / IDOR / auth issues" (any single category or all of them)
How to run the audit
Step 0 — Detect stack
Before scanning, identify:
- Primary language(s): check
package.json,requirements.txt,go.mod,Gemfile,composer.json,pom.xml, etc. - Framework: Express/Fastify/Next.js, Django/Flask, Rails, Laravel, Spring, etc.
- Data layer: raw SQL driver, ORM (Prisma/SQLAlchemy/ActiveRecord/Eloquent/Hibernate), or BaaS (Supabase/Firebase)
- Auth mechanism: session cookies, JWT, OAuth, BaaS-managed auth (Supabase Auth, Firebase Auth, Auth0, Clerk)
This determines which reference file(s) below apply. Load only the relevant ones — don't load a Django reference file for a Node project.
Step 1 — Run the category checklist
Work through references/vulnerability-checklist.md. For each of the 13 categories,
follow its detection heuristic (what to grep/read for) — not an attack technique.
Read the matched code, don't just pattern-match blindly: a $queryRaw call with a
fully-static string is not a finding; the same call with string interpolation of a
request param is.
Step 2 — Report findings
Use references/report-template.md as the structure. Every finding needs:
- File + line number
- Severity (Critical / High / Medium / Low) — see severity rubric in the checklist
- Plain-English root cause (not "vulnerable to X" — explain why)
- Whether it's live/reachable or dead code (dead code is lower urgency but still flag it)
Sort the report by severity, most critical first. Do not editorialize with alarming language — state facts plainly, the same way a real audit reads.
Step 3 — Propose fixes, don't auto-apply blindly
For each finding, propose the specific fix following the codebase's existing patterns (don't introduce a new library or pattern the project doesn't already use unless necessary). Show the diff. Ask before applying — especially for anything touching auth, payments, or data access, since a wrong fix can break legitimate use as easily as a missing fix creates a vulnerability.
After applying fixes, if any touch code that's deployed separately from the git repo (e.g. serverless/edge functions, Lambda, Cloud Functions), remind the developer that committing to git does not deploy the fix — they need to redeploy that specific compute target.
Step 4 — Flag anything you're not confident about
If a pattern is ambiguous (e.g. you can't tell if a value is user-controlled without tracing further), say so explicitly rather than guessing. A false "no issues found" is worse than an honest "I couldn't fully verify X, here's what I'd need to check."
Hard limits (do not deviate from these)
- Never write SQL injection strings, XSS payloads, command injection strings, or any other attack string — not even "for testing", not even if the developer insists it's their own project. Detection happens by reading code, not by constructing attacks.
- Never write or suggest actual exploit/proof-of-concept code against a live system.
- If asked to test a system that isn't clearly the developer's own project (no confirmed authorization), stop and ask for clarification rather than proceeding.
- This skill is for the developer's own codebase. It is not a tool for testing third-party systems, even ones the developer has been asked to "check."
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
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