blameless-postmortem
Skill0 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Run a blameless postmortem that produces changed conditions rather than blame or intentions. Use after a SEV1 or SEV2 incident, after a near-miss, after an AI incident, or when asked to analyse what went wrong and why. Covers timeline discipline, contributing-conditions analysis, and the "what was luck" section.
In this repository18 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-impact-assessmentSkill
- artifact-intakeSkill
- backlog-prioritizationSkill
- control-assessmentSkill
- control-verificationSkill
- dependency-vettingSkill
- eval-designSkill
- evidence-writingSkill
- exploratory-testingSkill
- red-teamingSkill
- retro-facilitationSkill
- scanner-triageSkill
- secure-code-reviewSkill
- story-splittingSkill
- test-strategySkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- writing-acceptance-criteriaSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
6 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 53
Ask *why* until you reach something you can change.
- Distinctive: line 98
Every one has an owner (a named person, not a team), a due date, and an issue.
- Distinctive: line 101
Prefer, in order: prevent > detect > mitigate.
- Distinctive: line 117
Ask whether the guardrail fired, did not exist, or fired and was bypassed.
- Distinctive: line 119
Ask whether evals should have caught it — and if they could not have, say so.
- Very specific: line 133
Run /learn against the postmortem.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Blameless postmortem
Consumers: incident participants, delivery-lead, /retro, /learn,
docs/08-operate-and-respond.md, docs/templates/postmortem.md.
Required for SEV1 and SEV2, and worth the hour for any near-miss. Published within five business days — later than that and the details are already reconstructions.
What blameless actually means
Not "be nice about it". It means the analysis stops at conditions, not at people, because conditions are the only thing you can change.
"The engineer deployed without checking" is a restatement of the event, not a cause.
The causes are: what made that action easy · what made the wrong outcome invisible · what allowed one mistake to reach production. Those have fixes. Blame does not — and blame guarantees the next postmortem gets worse data, permanently, because everyone present learns what happens when you volunteer detail.
The person acted reasonably given what they knew at the time. Start from that as a working assumption. If it turns out to be false, that is a management conversation, not a postmortem — do not conflate the two, because doing so destroys the postmortem's ability to function for everyone else.
Timeline
Recorded as it happens by the scribe during the incident, not assembled afterward. Reconstruction is where the truth quietly changes: memory smooths, motives get retrofitted, and the confusing forty minutes become a clean narrative that teaches nothing.
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
| 14:02 | Change deployed | run #4821 |
| 14:09 | First user impact | error rate graph |
| 14:31 | First detection | PagerDuty |
| 14:34 | Incident declared, IC assigned | Slack |
| 14:52 | Mitigation applied | run #4823 |
| 15:20 | Full resolution |
Detection gap = impact → detection. Here, 22 minutes. This is usually the most actionable number in the whole document, and it is frequently the one nobody calculates.
Contributing conditions — plural
Single-cause incidents are rare. If you found one, the search stopped early.
Ask why until you reach something you can change. Stop at a condition, not a person.
Users could not save drafts
← the write path returned 500
← the connection pool was exhausted
← a new query held connections for 30s
← the query was unindexed on a table that grew 40x since the index was designed
← nobody re-examines index coverage as data grows ← CONDITION
← the load test runs against a 10k-row fixture ← CONDITION
← pool exhaustion had no alert ← CONDITIONThree conditions, three fixes, from one incident. Stopping at "bad query" would have produced one fix and the same incident again in a different query.
Useful lenses: what made the wrong action easy · what made the wrong outcome invisible · what let one mistake reach production · what monitoring should have caught it · which gate should have stopped this, and why did it not?
That last question is the sharpest one this process asks of itself.
What went well
Name it deliberately. Things that worked are protected by being noticed and erode silently otherwise — the runbook that was accurate, the rollback that was rehearsed, the alert that fired correctly. If you only ever analyse failure, you will optimise away the things that saved you.
What was luck
The most important section, and the one most often omitted.
Where were we lucky rather than good? Luck is not a control and will not recur.
- It happened at 2 p.m., not 2 a.m. The detection gap would have been hours overnight.
- The on-call engineer happened to have built that subsystem. The next one will not.
- Blast radius was limited because the feature flag was still at 20% rollout — that was a coincidence of timing, not a decision.
Each of those is a finding. "We were lucky the right person was on call" means the runbook is inadequate, and that is actionable in a way that the incident's proximate cause is not.
Action items
Every one has an owner (a named person, not a team), a due date, and an issue. Postmortem actions enter the backlog through normal intake with elevated priority.
Prefer, in order: prevent > detect > mitigate. But do not let a perfect prevention item block a cheap detection one — detection usually lands in days and prevention in months, and the detection improvement protects you during the wait.
An action list with no issues behind it is a document that will be read once.
Be realistic about count. Five well-owned actions beat fifteen aspirational ones; the fifteen-item list is how a team learns that postmortem actions are decorative.
AI incidents
Same process, with the AI Risk Officer required. Additionally:
- Every AI incident becomes an eval case. This is how the suite earns its keep, and it is the difference between a system that learns and one that regresses in a new way each quarter.
- Record model version, prompt version, and grounding source version as they were at the time.
- Ask whether the guardrail fired, did not exist, or fired and was bypassed. Three different fixes.
- Ask whether evals should have caught it — and if they could not have, say so; that is a statement about the limits of the eval suite and belongs in the record.
Security incidents
Preserve evidence before remediating. Snapshot, then fix. Remediating first destroys the forensic record, and the pressure to fix immediately is exactly what makes this rule necessary.
Assess notification obligations against the clock that applies (IR-6). The disclosure decision belongs to a human with authority, not to the responders.
Feeding the loop
Run /learn against the postmortem. Every action lands as a doc change, a CI check, an agent
definition change, a compliance update, or an issue. See
docs/09-retrospective-and-improvement.md.
Controls
IR-4 (incident handling) · IR-5 (incident monitoring) · IR-6 (reporting) · IR-8 · CA-7 · SA-15 (process improvement) · AI RMF MANAGE 4.3.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
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