ai-impact-assessment
Skill0 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Assess an AI feature before it is built — purpose, affected people, risk tier, data governance, failure modes, guardrails, human oversight, transparency. Use at G2 for any AI-relevant change, when deciding whether to add AI to a product, when assigning an AI risk tier, or when asked whether an AI feature is safe to build.
3 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- grcmana/grc-ostheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- grcmana/grcskillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- better-isms/grcskillstheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 3
- better-isms/grcskills★ 53same name
- grcmana/grc-os★ 2same name
- grcmana/grcskills★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository18 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- artifact-intakeSkill
- backlog-prioritizationSkill
- blameless-postmortemSkill
- control-assessmentSkill
- control-verificationSkill
- dependency-vettingSkill
- eval-designSkill
- evidence-writingSkill
- exploratory-testingSkill
- red-teamingSkill
- retro-facilitationSkill
- scanner-triageSkill
- secure-code-reviewSkill
- story-splittingSkill
- test-strategySkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- writing-acceptance-criteriaSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 3 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 15
If a deterministic solution works, it is usually the better engineering answer.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 3 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
AI impact assessment
Consumers: ai-risk-officer, /design, process/gates/g2-design.md,
docs/templates/ai-impact-assessment.md. Blocking co-approval at G2.
Ask this before anything else
What is the non-AI alternative, and why is it insufficient?
If a deterministic solution works, it is usually the better engineering answer. AI carries a permanent assurance cost — eval suites, red-teaming, drift monitoring, incident handling, inventory upkeep — paid every quarter for as long as the feature exists.
Most "AI feature" requests are a search problem, a rules engine, a better form, or a templating job wearing a fashionable hat. Establishing that this one is not takes ten minutes and occasionally saves a year.
1. Purpose and context (MAP 1)
What decision or task does the AI perform? For whom? In what setting? What does the user believe is happening? — the gap between what the system does and what the user thinks it does is where most harm originates.
Deployment context: where in the product, at what frequency, with what latency and cost budget.
2. Affected people (MAP 1.1, 3.3)
Who is affected — including people who are not the user. Data subjects. People described in content the model generates. People on the receiving end of a decision.
This is the section that gets written generically and should not be. State the worst realistic outcome for each group, concretely:
✗ "Potential bias risk in outputs."
✓ "Output quality degrades for names outside the training distribution's dominant
locale. This feature gates account recovery, so the failure mode is: users with
non-Western names are disproportionately locked out of their own accounts and
routed to a support queue with a 3-day SLA."The second is assessable. The first is a sentence that has appeared in ten thousand documents and changed nothing.
3. Risk tier
| Tier | Criteria | Requirements |
| Minimal | Internal, no personal data, non-consequential output | Basic evals, standard gates |
| Limited | User-facing, advisory, a human acts on it | Evals + guardrails + user disclosure |
| High | Affects rights, access, safety, finances, employment, health, or legal standing; or processes sensitive personal data | Full assessment + red-team + bias testing + human-in-the-loop + monitoring |
| Prohibited | Deception at scale, covert manipulation, unlawful discrimination, safety-critical without human control | Not built. Escalate to a human decision-maker |
Do not negotiate a tier down because the requirements are inconvenient. If a feature is High, the honest options are to build it properly, redesign it so it is not High, or not build it. Tier inflation downward is the most consequential failure available in this assessment.
4. Data governance (MAP 2)
| Question | Why it matters |
| What data reaches the model? | Scope of exposure |
| Personal data? Lawful basis? | PT-2, PT-3 |
| Does data leave our boundary, to whom, under what terms? | Contractual and regulatory |
| Is it used for training? | Must be no for anything non-public. Verify the contract, not the marketing page |
| Grounding / retrieval sources and provenance | Poisoning surface, license |
| Retention and deletion | SI-12, MP-6 |
| Data quality and representativeness for the population served | Where bias originates |
The retrieval corpus is the part most often skipped. Everything in it is attacker-reachable context if any of it is user-supplied.
5. Failure modes (MAP 5)
Enumerate, then disposition each — same four options as any threat model: mitigate / transfer / accept / eliminate. An undispositioned failure mode fails G2.
Confabulation · harmful or biased output · prompt injection, direct and indirect · sensitive information disclosure · insecure output handling · overreliance and automation bias · denial of wallet · plus the ones specific to this feature.
For each, state how it manifests here, not in general.
6. Guardrails
Each one needs a location and a test that proves it blocks:
- Input validation and injection defense at every ingestion channel
- Output filtering and validation
- Model output treated as untrusted input to every downstream system — never evaled, exec'd, rendered unescaped, or passed to a privileged operation unvalidated
- Tool-call authorization checked server-side against the user's rights, never against the model's request
- Rate and cost limits
- Fallback when the model is unavailable or a guardrail trips
7. Human oversight
Where is the human? In the loop (approves each output) · on the loop (monitors, can intervene) · absent (justify against the tier).
What is the human shown in order to decide well? Including uncertainty, and the basis for the output — not just the output.
An oversight point where the human sees only the answer and not its basis is oversight in name only. Record it as a finding, not as a design.
What can they actually do? Override, escalate, reject, correct. An oversight point with no available action is a notification.
Then the harder question: will they actually do it? A human asked to approve 200 outputs an hour is a rubber stamp with a job title. Design the throughput, not just the checkpoint.
8. Transparency (GOVERN 4.2, MAP 5.2)
Users told they are interacting with AI · limitations stated where they will be seen · generated content marked · a path to contest or escalate a consequential output.
9. Decision
Proceed / proceed with conditions / do not proceed. Conditions must be verifiable at G4. Residual risk accepted by a named human, with a review date.
Then
Feed the eval plan (eval-design) and, at High tier, the red-team charter (red-teaming).
The AIA is what G4 verifies against — if a requirement is not written here, G4 cannot check it.
Register the system in docs/compliance/ai-inventory.md.
Controls
AI RMF MAP 1–5, GOVERN 4.2 · AI 600-1 · ISO 42001 6.1, A.5 · 800-53 RA-3, SA-8, PT-2, PT-3, PT-5, SI-12, MP-6.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

