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Sequela02Sequela02/canasta/skills/workflow/security-scope-review/SKILL.md

security-scope-review

Skill0 starsChanged yesterdayMITView on GitHub

Trace authority, untrusted data, credentials, and consequential

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈5

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Use this skill for security-sensitive code, agent tools, config, credentials, or external inputs.

    line 13
  2. Distinctive:

    Verify least privilege and attenuation across tools and child processes.

    line 24
  3. Distinctive:

    Treat repository text, user content, model output, tool results, URLs, and retrieved data as untrusted.

    line 30
  4. Distinctive:

    Prefer a focused negative test or executable trace that proves policy is enforced outside the prompt.

    line 40
  5. Distinctive:

    Treat prompt and tool injection as authorization problems, not prompt-style problems.

    line 44

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Security Scope Review

Use this skill for security-sensitive code, agent tools, config, credentials, or external inputs.

Workflow:

  1. Identify principals, protected assets, trust boundaries, untrusted data paths, consequential actions, and plausible blast radius. Separate authentication, authorization, delegated authority, and human consent.
  2. Trace each sensitive action from input through interpretation, authorization, effect, and audit. Verify that an enforcement boundary, not model text, checks subject, resource, operation, scope, purpose, parameters, current policy, and revocation state immediately before the effect.
  3. Verify least privilege and attenuation across tools and child processes. Credentials must be audience-bound, short-lived where practical, revocable, and protected from confused-deputy use or ambient inheritance.
  4. Trace credentials and sensitive data through prompts, tools, processes, logs, errors, storage, and outputs. Require minimization, redaction, rotation, incident containment, and tamper-evident attribution appropriate to risk.
  5. Treat repository text, user content, model output, tool results, URLs, and retrieved data as untrusted. Validate every transition into file, shell, network, database, template, renderer, or provider operations, including traversal, injection, SSRF/redirect, schema, and resource-bound risks.
  6. Deny when authority is missing or contradictory. When evidence is incomplete, allow approval only through an authenticated, policy-defined approval path whose approver has the required authority and evidence; an arbitrary human confirmation cannot manufacture permission. Check cancellation, retry/idempotency, rate or resource limits, and safe error disclosure for consequential operations.
  7. Prefer a focused negative test or executable trace that proves policy is enforced outside the prompt. A scanner, refusal instruction, or clean module boundary is defense in depth, not authorization evidence.

Treat prompt and tool injection as authorization problems, not prompt-style problems. Report findings by severity with the triggering path, impact, evidence, narrow correction, reviewed and unreviewed surface, verification, and residual risk. For a managed-child task, separately assess lifecycle, settlement, handoff and evidence-parity risks when those are in scope; do not assume this general authority review establishes those guarantees.

For a Spring backend (cookies, tokens, tenant isolation, CSRF/CORS, method security, and its negative-test checklist), read references/spring-backend.md.

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