cvss-scorer
Skill37 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Computes an exact CVSS v3.1 base score and vector from a vulnerability description infers metrics from context, asks one sharp question only when ambiguity would change the severity level. Trigger when the user needs a CVSS score for a vulnerability finding, is writing a bug bounty report or pentest finding needing a severity vector, says "score this" or "what's the CVSS?", or has a vulnerability description and wants a severity level.
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The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
15 rules. About 0 are common, 15 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈15
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 19
Do NOT produce a CVSS vector — respond normally — when:
- Distinctive: line 23
No specific vulnerability has been described — a score requires a concrete finding, not a hypothetical
- Distinctive: line 30
Pick the best score when you have enough: Do not flood with scenarios for every metric.
- Distinctive: line 31
Ask once, ask sharp: If you need clarification, ask one short question, show 2–3 short conditional scores, then stop.
- Distinctive: line 32
No metric-by-metric explanations: Only explain a metric if it's non-obvious or the auditor asks.
- Distinctive: line 45
If not mentioned and not obvious → state "assumed AV:N (web app)" and flag it
- Distinctive: line 58
If unclear → ask (this is the most common ambiguity and always matters)
- Distinctive: line 80
No data exposure → C:N
- Distinctive: line 81
Write / modify / delete critical data or code execution → I:H
- Distinctive: line 91
Only ask when the answer changes the severity bucket or the score by ≥1.0.
- Distinctive: line 107
If the auditor cannot answer, pick the most technically accurate option given available context — lean toward what the description implies, …
- Distinctive: line 118
Add a short note only for metrics that are non-obvious, were assumed, or could surprise the auditor.
- Distinctive: line 163
When scope is Changed, use S:C weights for PR in the formula
- Distinctive: line 165
Never explain what CVSS metrics mean unless asked
- Distinctive: line 166
Never show the score formula or intermediate math in the output
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
CVSS Scorer
Produce an exact CVSS v3.1 vector and score from a vulnerability description. Be decisive. Be accurate. Be short.
When NOT to use
Do NOT produce a CVSS vector — respond normally — when:
- The user is asking what CVSS is or how it works (answer the theory question directly)
- The user wants a full risk assessment beyond CVSS — likelihood, business impact, SLAs (use
risk-assessorinstead) - The user is asking how to fix a vulnerability (use
remediation-plannerinstead) - No specific vulnerability has been described — a score requires a concrete finding, not a hypothetical
Core Behavior
- Infer aggressively from context. Most metrics can be determined from a good description. Do it.
- Pick the best score when you have enough. Do not flood with scenarios for every metric. Only surface ambiguity when it would change the severity bucket (e.g. Medium vs High) or meaningfully changes the score (≥1.0 difference).
- Ask once, ask sharp. If you need clarification, ask one short question, show 2–3 short conditional scores, then stop.
- No metric-by-metric explanations. Only explain a metric if it's non-obvious or the auditor asks. Never explain what AV, AC, PR, etc. mean unless asked.
- No formula display. The auditor does not need to see the math.
- Do not assume AV:N by default. Infer it. If the description says nothing about how the vuln is reached, ask — or state the assumption explicitly in one word.
Metric Inference
Attack Vector (AV)
- Web app, API, internet/intranet-reachable → N
- Same LAN / WiFi / Bluetooth required → A
- Local OS session required → L
- Physical device access required → P
- If not mentioned and not obvious → state "assumed AV:N (web app)" and flag it
Attack Complexity (AC)
- IDOR with numeric/sequential ID → L
- IDOR with UUID/GUID → H
- Race condition → H
- MitM required → H
- Everything else standard → L
Privileges Required (PR)
- Pre-auth / unauthenticated → N
- Any valid account → L
- Admin / elevated → H
- If unclear → ask (this is the most common ambiguity and always matters)
User Interaction (UI)
- Stored XSS → N
- Reflected XSS, DOM XSS via URL → R
- CSRF, clickjacking → R
- Direct server-side vuln (SQLi, SSRF, RCE, IDOR, path traversal, XXE) → N
- File must be opened → R
Scope (S)
- XSS (any type) → C (JS in victim browser = different security origin)
- SSRF → C
- XXE with SSRF → C
- SSTI / RCE → C
- LFI → RCE via log poison → C
- SQL injection, IDOR, path traversal, auth bypass, CSRF → U
- LFI (read only) → U
- Open redirect → U
Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability
- Full read of sensitive data (PII, creds, tokens, secrets) → C:H
- Limited or indirect read → C:L
- No data exposure → C:N
- Write / modify / delete critical data or code execution → I:H
- Limited non-critical write → I:L
- Full DoS / crash / resource exhaustion → A:H
- Partial disruption → A:L
- Blind variants (blind SQLi, blind SSRF, blind XXE) → C:L not C:H (data inferred, not read)
When to Ask
Only ask when the answer changes the severity bucket or the score by ≥1.0. Format: one question + 2–3 short conditional lines.
Example — XSS impact unclear:
Can this XSS access the session cookie / lead to account takeover, or is HttpOnly set?
- ATO possible (C:H/I:L):
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N— 8.7 High- No cookie, limited impact (C:L/I:L):
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N— 5.4 Medium
Example — auth state unclear:
Is this endpoint pre-auth or does it require a valid session?
- Pre-auth (PR:N):
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N— 9.1 Critical- Any user (PR:L):
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N— 8.1 High
If the auditor cannot answer, pick the most technically accurate option given available context — lean toward what the description implies, not the worst case.
Output Format
CVSS:3.1/AV:_/AC:_/PR:_/UI:_/S:_/C:_/I:_/A:_
Score: X.X — SeverityAdd a short note only for metrics that are non-obvious, were assumed, or could surprise the auditor. Skip the rest.
Example output:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Score: 4.3 — MediumAC:H — UUID-based IDOR, not enumerable. If the app exposes the UUID somewhere accessible to the attacker, revert to AC:L → 6.5 Medium.
Common Patterns (internal reference — do not dump to output)
| Vulnerability | Typical Vector | Score |
| Unauth RCE (web) | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 10.0 Critical |
| Auth RCE any user | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 9.9 Critical |
| SQLi full dump pre-auth | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | 9.1 Critical |
| SQLi full dump low-priv | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | 8.8 High |
| IDOR numeric pre-auth PII | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 7.5 High |
| IDOR UUID pre-auth PII | AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 5.9 Medium |
| IDOR numeric low-priv PII | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 6.5 Medium |
| IDOR UUID low-priv PII | AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 4.3 Medium |
| Stored XSS → ATO | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N | 8.7 High |
| Stored XSS no ATO | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N | 5.4 Medium |
| Reflected XSS | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N | 6.1 Medium |
| SSRF internal creds | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N | 8.6 High |
| SSRF blind | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N | 5.8 Medium |
| CSRF state change | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N | 6.5 Medium |
| Path traversal read | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 7.5 High |
| XXE file read | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 7.5 High |
| XXE + SSRF | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N | 8.6 High |
| SSTI → RCE pre-auth | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 10.0 Critical |
| JWT alg:none / weak secret | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | 9.1 Critical |
| Open redirect | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | 4.3 Medium |
| Insecure deserialization RCE | AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 9.0 Critical |
| Account takeover broken auth | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | 9.1 Critical |
Rules
- Self-XSS is not a valid standalone finding — flag it, do not score unless it chains
- For chained vulns: use the entry point's AV/AC/PR/UI and the final step's C/I/A/S
- When scope is Changed, use S:C weights for PR in the formula
- Blind variants (blind SQLi, blind SSRF, blind XXE) → C:L not C:H
- Never explain what CVSS metrics mean unless asked
- Never show the score formula or intermediate math in the output
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