security-supply-chain
Skill0 starsChanged 16 days agoMITView on GitHub
Review dependency and software supply-chain risks including lockfile integrity, dependency confusion, install scripts, vulnerable packages, CI permissions, untrusted build inputs, and release provenance. Use for dependency or build pipeline security reviews.
In this repository5 other files it gives its agents.
- ai-security-auditSkill
- security-ai-llmSkill
- security-apiSkill
- security-reconSkill
- security-secretsSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 13
Check whether lockfiles are committed and consistent, versions are pinned appropriately, registries are trusted, lifecycle scripts run with …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Software Supply-Chain Security Audit
Review the path from dependency declaration to build and release. A package warning alone is not proof of an exploitable vulnerability.
Workflow
- Inventory package manifests, lockfiles, package registries, install scripts, build scripts, CI workflows, release automation, container definitions, and deployment configuration.
- Check whether lockfiles are committed and consistent, versions are pinned appropriately, registries are trusted, lifecycle scripts run with unnecessary privileges, and dependency updates are reviewed.
- Inspect CI triggers and permissions, pull-request trust boundaries, token scopes, secret availability to forked/untrusted code, artifact handling, cache keys, and release/tag protection.
- Assess known advisories using available local audit tools when configured. Record package, affected range, installed version, advisory source, reachability/context, and remediation. Do not invent current CVE status if no advisory data was checked.
- Trace untrusted build inputs into scripts, shell commands, artifact publication, or deployment credentials. Prefer static review and safe local tests.
- Separate confirmed weaknesses from general hardening advice and ecosystem warnings. Avoid installing or executing untrusted packages just to investigate them.
- Independently validate candidates, redact credentials, and state whether dependency resolution and advisory databases were actually checked.
References
- Core workflow:
../../SKILL.md - Supply-chain playbook:
../../agents/supply-chain.md - Dependency playbook:
../../agents/dependencies.md - Infrastructure playbook:
../../agents/infrastructure.md - AI-specific supply-chain checks:
../../rules/ai.md
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