security-api
Skill0 starsChanged 16 days agoMITView on GitHub
Audit application APIs for broken authorization, unsafe input handling, injection, excessive data exposure, webhook trust failures, and business-logic abuse. Use for API or backend security reviews.
In this repository5 other files it gives its agents.
- ai-security-auditSkill
- security-ai-llmSkill
- security-reconSkill
- security-secretsSkill
- security-supply-chainSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 15
Check object-level and function-level authorization, tenant isolation, mass assignment, validation, injection, pagination/body limits, …
- Distinctive: line 16
Check controls in shared middleware, database constraints, schemas, service layers, and deployment configuration before treating a …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
API Security Audit
Perform a focused, evidence-driven review of API and backend entry points. This skill is not a substitute for a full repository audit.
Workflow
- Identify route registration, middleware, authentication/session handling, authorization guards, schemas, ORM/database calls, serializers, and webhook handlers.
- Build a route inventory with method, path, authentication requirement, authorization rule, user-controlled fields, sensitive operations, and tenant/owner boundaries.
- Trace untrusted input from request parameters, headers, cookies, body, uploaded files, and webhook payloads to database queries, file operations, external requests, and privileged actions.
- Check object-level and function-level authorization, tenant isolation, mass assignment, validation, injection, pagination/body limits, error leakage, idempotency, rate limiting, and webhook signature/replay controls where applicable.
- Check controls in shared middleware, database constraints, schemas, service layers, and deployment configuration before treating a suspicious pattern as a finding.
- Record candidate findings with exact file/line evidence, attacker prerequisites, concrete impact, and a non-destructive reproduction path.
- Independently attempt to disprove each candidate using
../../validation/finding-validator.md. Keep unproven leads asneeds_validation; do not mark them confirmed without evidence. - State what was and was not reviewed. Run the core CLI validation when findings are represented in the repository's standard schema.
References
- Core rules:
../../SKILL.md - API playbook:
../../agents/api-security.md - Authorization playbook:
../../agents/authorization.md - Business logic playbook:
../../agents/business-logic.md - Finding schema:
../../schemas/finding.schema.json
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