agentleFS
zyphr-labszyphr-labs/bounty-harness/.claude/skills/identity-domain/SKILL.md

identity-domain

Skill1 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/. They are never committed (gitignored). Redact internal hostnames and domain names from any text that leaves the machine; sanitize reports to show the disclosure mechanism with sample values masked. Authentication material is never stored: this skill sends no credentials and captures none.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    No relay, coercion, delegation abuse, or credential attacks - those require internal foothold and stay out of this harness by design.

    line 7
  2. Very specific:

    All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/.

    line 33
  3. Very specific:

    Use when recon surfaces any of: /adfs, /certsrv, /EWS, /autodiscover, WWW-Authenticate: NTLM|Negotiate, Microsoft login flows on scope, or …

    line 51

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Identity Domain Recon

Overview

No-creds identity infrastructure discovery for externally-scoped targets. Translates the safely-automatable slice of the GOAD methodology (recon, user-find, NTLM surface, Exchange/ADFS/ADCS no-creds phases) into header-, DNS-, and XML-level workflows. No relay, coercion, delegation abuse, or credential attacks - those require internal foothold and stay out of this harness by design.

Quick Reference

  • Skill: identity-domain
  • Version: 1.0.0
  • Bounded Context: IdentityContext
  • Required tools: python3, dig, curl
  • Risk tier: passive to active-safe (one workflow is intrusive and manual-only)

Workflow Selection

Available Workflows

WorkflowPurposeTier
ntlm-reconProbe live hosts for NTLM/Negotiate; decode Type 2 challengeactive-safe
adcs-fingerprintEnumerate certsrv/CES/mscep exposurepassive
adfs-endpointsFingerprint ADFS; parse FederationMetadata.xmlpassive
entra-reconEntra tenant metadata (federation, GUID, MOERA, MDI)passive
kerberos-userenumGoverned AS-REQ username diff on scoped 88/tcpactive-safe
owa-userenumTimed username validation; MANUAL gate onlyintrusive
spn-osintSPN and Negotiate realm leaks in JS bundles and headerspassive

Evidence Handling And Redaction

All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/. They are never committed (gitignored). Redact internal hostnames and domain names from any text that leaves the machine; sanitize reports to show the disclosure mechanism with sample values masked. Authentication material is never stored: this skill sends no credentials and captures none.

IntentWorkflowTier
Find NTLM leaks + decode challengentlm-reconactive-safe
Check certsrv/CES/mscep exposureadcs-fingerprintpassive
Fingerprint ADFS, parse SAML metadataadfs-endpointspassive
Entra tenant metadata (federation, GUID, MOERA)entra-reconpassive
Kerberos username diff on scoped 88/tcpkerberos-userenumactive-safe
OWA timed username validationowa-userenumintrusive, MANUAL
SPN/Negotiate realm leak hunt in JSspn-osintpassive

Dispatch Context

Use when recon surfaces any of: /adfs, /certsrv, /EWS, /autodiscover, WWW-Authenticate: NTLM|Negotiate, Microsoft login flows on scope, or when program scope includes VPN/gateway hosts that front AD estates.

Evidence Required

  • Raw request/response pairs per endpoint probed.
  • Decoded Type 2 challenge fields (domain, host, DNS info) with raw header.
  • FederationMetadata.xml artifact plus parsed fields.
  • getuserrealm / OIDC well-known / DKIM responses proving tenant disclosure.
  • For kerberos-userenum: the explicit port-88-in-scope acknowledgement in trace.

References

  • mayfly277 GOAD series (https://mayfly277.github.io/categories/goad/)
  • KB5005413: NTLM relay mitigations for ADCS (EPA)
  • m8sec NTLM info leak; Praetorian NTLMRecon
  • dirkjanm.io: Entra actor tokens; ADCS attack surface extension
  • Sprocket Security: tenant enumeration status (methods rot; verify before reporting)
  • Technique mappings: see technique-kb entries tagged identity and auth for precondition/signal alignment.

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