identity-domain
Skill1 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/. They are never committed (gitignored). Redact internal hostnames and domain names from any text that leaves the machine; sanitize reports to show the disclosure mechanism with sample values masked. Authentication material is never stored: this skill sends no credentials and captures none.
In this repository50 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .claude/CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- agent-safetySkill
- ai-llmSkill
- apiSkill
- asset-graphSkill
- authSkill
- auto-researchSkill
- binary-analysisSkill
- business-logicSkill
- campaignSkill
- cicd-securitySkill
- cloudSkill
- cors-csrfSkill
- coverageSkill
- cross-accountSkill
- domain-modelSkill
- enrichmentSkill
- evaluation-harnessSkill
- file-uploadSkill
- graphql-auditSkill
- http-protocolSkill
- impact-verifierSkill
- meme-coin-auditSkill
- mobileSkill
- modern-browserSkill
- nuclei-scannerSkill
- oob-infraSkill
- osintSkill
- personaSkill
- plannerSkill
- privescSkill
- program-memorySkill
- race-conditionSkill
- rceSkill
- reconSkill
- reportingSkill
- sastSkill
- scope-managerSkill
- skill-scientistSkill
- sqliSkill
- ssrfSkill
- standard-catalogSkill
- technique-kbSkill
- traffic-corpusSkill
- triage-validationSkill
- vuln-intelSkill
- web3-auditSkill
- xssSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 7
No relay, coercion, delegation abuse, or credential attacks - those require internal foothold and stay out of this harness by design.
- Very specific: line 33
All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/.
- Very specific: line 51
Use when recon surfaces any of: /adfs, /certsrv, /EWS, /autodiscover, WWW-Authenticate: NTLM|Negotiate, Microsoft login flows on scope, or …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Identity Domain Recon
Overview
No-creds identity infrastructure discovery for externally-scoped targets. Translates the safely-automatable slice of the GOAD methodology (recon, user-find, NTLM surface, Exchange/ADFS/ADCS no-creds phases) into header-, DNS-, and XML-level workflows. No relay, coercion, delegation abuse, or credential attacks - those require internal foothold and stay out of this harness by design.
Quick Reference
- Skill: identity-domain
- Version: 1.0.0
- Bounded Context: IdentityContext
- Required tools:
python3,dig,curl - Risk tier: passive to active-safe (one workflow is intrusive and manual-only)
Workflow Selection
Available Workflows
| Workflow | Purpose | Tier |
ntlm-recon | Probe live hosts for NTLM/Negotiate; decode Type 2 challenge | active-safe |
adcs-fingerprint | Enumerate certsrv/CES/mscep exposure | passive |
adfs-endpoints | Fingerprint ADFS; parse FederationMetadata.xml | passive |
entra-recon | Entra tenant metadata (federation, GUID, MOERA, MDI) | passive |
kerberos-userenum | Governed AS-REQ username diff on scoped 88/tcp | active-safe |
owa-userenum | Timed username validation; MANUAL gate only | intrusive |
spn-osint | SPN and Negotiate realm leaks in JS bundles and headers | passive |
Evidence Handling And Redaction
All collected headers, challenge bytes, metadata XML, and tenant lookups are
evidence and stay local-only under $OUTDIR/identity/evidence/. They are never
committed (gitignored). Redact internal hostnames and domain names from any text
that leaves the machine; sanitize reports to show the disclosure mechanism with
sample values masked. Authentication material is never stored: this skill sends no
credentials and captures none.
| Intent | Workflow | Tier |
| Find NTLM leaks + decode challenge | ntlm-recon | active-safe |
| Check certsrv/CES/mscep exposure | adcs-fingerprint | passive |
| Fingerprint ADFS, parse SAML metadata | adfs-endpoints | passive |
| Entra tenant metadata (federation, GUID, MOERA) | entra-recon | passive |
| Kerberos username diff on scoped 88/tcp | kerberos-userenum | active-safe |
| OWA timed username validation | owa-userenum | intrusive, MANUAL |
| SPN/Negotiate realm leak hunt in JS | spn-osint | passive |
Dispatch Context
Use when recon surfaces any of: /adfs, /certsrv, /EWS, /autodiscover,
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM|Negotiate, Microsoft login flows on scope, or when
program scope includes VPN/gateway hosts that front AD estates.
Evidence Required
- Raw request/response pairs per endpoint probed.
- Decoded Type 2 challenge fields (domain, host, DNS info) with raw header.
- FederationMetadata.xml artifact plus parsed fields.
- getuserrealm / OIDC well-known / DKIM responses proving tenant disclosure.
- For kerberos-userenum: the explicit port-88-in-scope acknowledgement in trace.
References
- mayfly277 GOAD series (https://mayfly277.github.io/categories/goad/)
- KB5005413: NTLM relay mitigations for ADCS (EPA)
- m8sec NTLM info leak; Praetorian NTLMRecon
- dirkjanm.io: Entra actor tokens; ADCS attack surface extension
- Sprocket Security: tenant enumeration status (methods rot; verify before reporting)
- Technique mappings: see technique-kb entries tagged
identityandauthfor precondition/signal alignment.
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